The Kosovo crisis and Turkey (1991-2001) by Altunya, Eylem
THE KOSOVO CRISIS 
AND 
TURKEY 
(1991-2001) 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
by 
EYLEM ALTUNY A 
In Parti al Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
ın 
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
September 2003 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis fo the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
Assistant Professor Dr. Hasan ÜNAL 
Supervisor 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
------------~:~----~~-----
Professor N orman STüNE 
Examining Commitlee Member 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
______ t1/~--~~~---~---------
Assistant Professor Dr. Nur Bilge CRISS 
Examining Commitlee Member 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a th sis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
• 1 Relatıons. f1 
~~~~~~--t~ ;~o;~~~~r -;:ç~;~~-~;~~AZ 
Examining Commitlee Member 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International 
Relations. 
----L-7~--------
Assistant Professor Dr. Ömer FarukGENÇKAYA 
Examining Commitlee Member 
Approval ofthe Institute ofEconoınics and Social Sciences 
----~~~--------------
Professor Dr. Kürşat A YDOGAN 
Director 
ABSTRACT 
THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND TURKEY 
(1991-2001) 
ALTUNY A, Eylem 
Ph.D. Depaıiment of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Hasan Ünal 
September 2003 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the post-Cold War period, the 
disagreement between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo reached a elimax 
and a erisis emerged in 1999. The eruption of the Kosovo erisis is closely 
related to the larger Albanian question in the Balkans which started with the 
establishment of the Albanian state in 1912. Existence of Albanians living 
dispersed in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece has 
always been problematic for the host states. Whether the Albanians really 
wished to gather around a single state or not was not questioned by the host 
states, who always tried to prevent the establishment of a larger Albanian state 
in the Balkans. 1 
The Balkans is a corridor between Turkey and the European continent. 
Claiming to be a regional power and having historical and cultural bounds with 
the region, Turkey can not ignore the developmets in the Balkans. Turkey is 
expected to play an influential role regarding the events of the Balkans. 
ÖZET 
KOSOVA KRİZİ VE TÜRKİYE 
(1991-2001) 
ALTUNYA, Eylem 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
Eylül2003 
Yugoslavya'nın dağılmasıyla birlrkte, Kosova'da yaşayan Arnavutlar ile 
Sırplar arasındaki anlaşmazlık en üst düzeye ulaşmış ve 1999 yılında krize 
dönüşmüştür. Kosova krizinin ortaya çıkması, 1912 yılında Arnavutluk'un 
kurulmasıyla başlayan Balkanlar' daki geniş Arnavut sorunuyla yakından 
ilgilidir. Başta Kosova, Makedonya ve Yunanistan olmak üzere, Arnavut 
nüfusunun Balkanlar'a yayılmış olması, sözkonusu nüfusa evsahipliği yapan 
ülkeler açısından sorun olmuştur. Balkanlar' da geniş bir Arnavut devletinin 
kurulmasını her zaman engellemeye çalışan evsahibi ülkeler, Arnavut 
nüfusunun tek bir devlet etrafında birleşmeyi gerçekten isteyip istemediklerini 
sorgulamamışlardır. 
Balkanlar, Türkiye ile Avrupa kıtası arasında bir koridor oluşturmaktadır. 
Bölgesel bir güç olma iddiasında bulanan ve bölgeyle tarihi ve kültürel bağlan 
olan Türkiye Balkanlar'daki gelişmeleri görmezden gelemez. Türkiye'nin 
Balkanlar' daki gelişmelerde etkin olması beklenmektedir. 
Bu çalışmanın birinci bölümünde Kosova krizi, tarihi, etnik ve siyasi bir sorun 
olarak incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde, ı 99 ı -200 ı yıllarını kapsayan dönemde, 
Türkiye'nin Balkanlar'a yönelik genel politikası ile özelde Kosova'ya yönelik 
politikası ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde 
Türkiye'nin Kosova politikasının ne ölçüde etkin olduğunu incelemektir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kosova, Arnavut Sorunu, Balkanlar 
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INTRODUCTION 
AIM 
When the Cold W ar ended, it was expected that cooperation among the states 
would intensify and the world would be a safer place in the absence of 
ideological confrontation. The eruption of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution 
signaled the emergence of a series of erises in the international arena and 
challenges to international security in the form of nationalism and irredentism. 
The Yugoslav wars lasted for almost half a decade and they had regional 
implications for the Balkans until today. 
Kosovo used to be part of Yugoslavia. Interestingly, the initial sıgns of 
dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav system were displayed in Kosovo where the 
Albanian majority criticized the regime vociferously and sought to establish an 
independent state of their own. In both the 1968 and 198 ı demonstrations in 
Kosovo, the Albanians maintained that they were discriminated against by the 
Serbian regime, the political and economic policies of the Yugoslav system led to 
the backwardness of Kosovo and low standard of living compared to the rest of 
Yugoslavia. No one imagined that the dissatisfaction of the Albanians with the 
Serbian regime would create a erisis in Kosovo in the second half of the ı 990s; 
becoming an issue waiting to be solved by the international community until today. 
What made the issue of Kosovo so important for the Balkans and Europe? 
With the disappearance of the Cold W ar ideological division, Europe started to 
move towards intensive political and economic cooperation, leading to 
unifıcation within the framework of Westem organizations like the European 
Union (EU), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The communist 
states in Europe got into a process of economic and political regime 
transformation, as well. The ex-communist states tried to establish democratic 
political systems and free market economies. The new era symbolized joining 
of Eastem and Westem European countries under the framework of "Westem" 
political and economic organizations of the Cold W ar period. The constituent 
republics of ex-Yugoslavia, which started a bloody ethnic and religious war, 
remained outside the process of European integration. Yugoslavia constituted 
an exception to the process of unifıcation in Europe. The Yugoslav wars 
created new challenges to European security; like the problem of refugees and 
displaced people, resettiement and recovery from the ravages of wars. But the 
common fear was that the wars of Yugoslav dissolution might prolong and 
spread to other states in the Balkans and Europe. 
The international community neglected the issue of Kosovo during the 
Yugoslav wars of dissolution since the disagreement between the Albanians 
and the Serbs had not turned into a war. When the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
which ended the Bosnia war, was signed in 1995, the Albanians were 
disappointed since no reference was made to their cause in the Agreement. This 
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was partly due to the fact that the United States and Europe did not want to 
annoy the Milosevic regime, which they perceived as the protector of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement and guarantor of its implementation. This worsened 
the relations between the Albanians and the Serbian regime. Tension turned 
in to a erisis in 1999 with wider regional implications and new security 
challenges. The issue of Kosovo is closely linked to the "larger Albanian 
question" in the Balkans in various respects. This stems from the historic fact 
that the Albanians live dispersed in the territories surraunding Kosovo under 
the authority of different states, mainly in Macedonia, Greece and Albania. The 
potential of the issue to spread to its periphery makes it even more fragile in 
terms of security. So the issue of Kosovo has to be examined from two 
perspectives; one is related to the process ofYugoslav dissolution and the other 
is linked to the larger Albanian question in the Balkans. lt could be argued that 
the issue of Kosovo emerged as a challenge to the security of the Balkans and 
Europe in the post-Cold W ar period. 
The tension between the Albanians and the Serbs was frozen during the Cold 
War. The Albanians rebelled against the Serbian regime in 1968 and 1981 in 
order to achieve their independence, but they failed. Although the events in 
\ 
Kosovo were considered as an internal matter of Yugoslavia during the Cold 
War, the issue was internationalized with the start of Yugoslav wars of 
dissolution after the Cold W ar. The conflict between the Albanians, who make 
up the overwhelming majority of the population in Kosovo, and the Serbs cam e 
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to the surface after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. 
Tension between the Albanians and the Serbs reached a elimax in 1998 and 
ended with NATO air attacks on Serbia in 1999, which, in turn, ended in the 
repression of the Albanians by the Serbian regime and prevented the spread of 
the erisis to the Balkans and Europe. This led to internationalization of the 
issue of Kosovo. Thanks to the NATO air attacks of 1999, the Serbian regime 
was forced to sign an agreement of peace, w hi ch eventually abolished Serbian 
repression of the Albanians and led to deployment of a multinational force in 
Kosovo. After Serbia signed the peace agreement, the international community 
took the upper hand in the region. The United Nations established an Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) by the contributions of the 
European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Council of Europe. Besides, 
Kosovo Forces (KFOR) were deployed in the region in order to prevent the 
emergene e of future erises betwcen the two nations. 
The peace agreement, which was signed between Serbia and NATO allies, 
stipulated that self-government be established in Kosovo, although Kosovo 
would remain part of Yugoslavia. The political status of the region remains 
unresolved. Interestingly, the conditions under which the peace agreement was 
signed have gradually changed. For instance, the two constituent republics of 
Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, signed an agreement in 2003, 
which established a sui generis relationship between themselves. The name 
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"Yugoslavia" was abolished and the state was renamed as the "Republic of 
Serbia and Montenegro". Some analysts argue that this transformation is a 
further step of the unfınished Yugoslav dissolution and since "Yugoslavia" no 
longer exists, the peace agreement conceming the status of Kosovo can not be 
applied any more. According to these arguments, in the light of the current 
conditions, a new agreement has to be signed between the Albanians and the 
Serbs in order to determine the fınal status of Kosovo. Taking into 
consideration the rapid changes in the Balkans, it seems the analysts will be 
busy with the issue of Kosovo in the near future. Developments regarding 
Kosovo deserve academic interest because of their potential effects on the 
Balkans and Europe. Besides the fınal status of Kosovo is a problem waiting to 
be solved, but peacefully. The future political status of Kosovo has to be 
determined not only by the Albanians and the Serbs, but also by the 
international organizations involved in the matter. Particularly the United 
Nations, which administers United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo and NATO, which commands KFOR would probably play determining 
roles in Kosovo. 
The future of Kosovo is unknown. But why is the issue of Kosovo important 
for Turkey? Kosovo is located in the Balkans and Turkey has historic and 
cultural ties to this neighboring region that go back to the Ottoman times. With 
the claim of being a regional power in the post-Cold W ar era, Turkey cannot 
ignore the developments that take place in its periphery, like the Balkans and 
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the Middle East. Turkey aspires to be an influential power in its region and this 
urges Turkey to play an active and determining role in the fields of cooperation 
and/or problematic matters and crises. Since Kosovo emerged as one of the 
most important problems of the Balkans in the post-Cold W ar period, Turkey is 
expected to respond effectively to the issue since its eruption. The Turkish 
community living in Kosovo and the surrounding territories in the Balkans 
expected that Turkey would take an active stance, both during and after the 
crısıs. 
This dissertation aims to examine Turkey' s policy towards the issue of Kosovo 
within the context of the devdopments in the post-Cold War period and 
evaluate to what extent Turkey was able to benefit from the opportunities 
provided by the new period. Turkey started the 1990s with quite an active line 
of diplomacy, but was it permanent or temporary? The study focuses on the 
issue of Kosovo on the one hand, dealing with the history of the region, and on 
the other hand focuses on the causes of the old disagreement between the 
Albanians and the Serbs. Then it discusses the developments in Kosovo after 
the Cold War. Additionally, the dissertation explores Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Balkans in the post-Cold War period with special emphasis on the 
question of Kosovo. The dissertation combines two subjects: Turkish foreign 
policy and the issue ofKosovo. 
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In the first part of this study, the Kosova erisis is analyzed as a historical, 
ethnic and political issue. And in the second part of the study, Turkey' s policy 
towards the Balkans in general, and toward the the issue of Kosova, in 
particular is examined between ı 99 ı -2001. This study aims to analyze to w hat 
extent Turkey' s policy towards the isuue of Kosova has been influentiaı in the 
past-cold W ar period. 
Keywords: Kosova, Albanian Question, Balkans 
Both the dissolution ofYugoslavia and the issue ofKosovo have been analyzed 
by scholars of international relations from different perspectives, historical, 
cultural, economic, political and social. "The Destruction of Yugoslavia: 
Tracking the Break Up (1980-1992)" of Magas, "Yugoslavia: The Process of 
Disintegration" of Sekelj, "Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (1962-
199 1)" and "Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of 
Tito to Ethnic War" of Ramet, "The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: The Failure of 
Democratic Transformation" of Sharpe can be cited as examples of such 
studies. Likewise the issue of Kosova was examined within the cantext of 
Yugoslav dissolution and the roots of the historic disagreement between the 
two constituent nations: the Albanians and the Serbs. Malcolm's "Kosova: A 
Short History" and Mertus's "Kosova: How Myths and Truths Started A War" 
are examples in that context. 
On the other hand, many scholars studied Turkish foreign policy in the past-
Cold War period. Some of these studies examined Turkey's foreign policy 
towards the neighboring regions like the Balkans, the Middle East and Central 
Asia, like Mango's "Turkey: The Challenge of A New Role", Fuller and 
Lesser's "Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Westem China" and 
Çelik's "Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy". Some focused on Turkey's 
search for full membership to the European Union: Balkır and Williams, 
"Turkey and Europe", other studies dealt with the issue of human rights, 
terrorism and Turkey' s s ecurity and defence policy un der the conditions of the 
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post-Cold War period. However, these studies did not examine the issue of 
Kosova, as an issue ofTurkish foreign policy. 
This dissertation aims to answer the fallawing questions: How did the issue of 
Kosova emerge? What were the histarical reasons that lay behind the 
disagreement between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosova? What is the 
relationship between the issue of Kosova and the "larger Albanian question" in 
the Balkans? How was the issue of Kosova intemationalized? How did the 
international community get involved in the matter? How did the issue of 
Kosova influence the developments in the Balkans and Europe, particularly 
after 1999 crisis? Ho w did Turkish foreign policy react to the post-Cold W ar 
developments in the Balkans? Why is the Balkans important for Turkey? What 
were the determining factors of Turkish foreign policy towards the issue of 
Kosova? To what extent Turkish foreign policy towards the issue of Kosova 
was influential? 
8 
METHODOLOGY 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. The fırst chapter deals with the 
history of Kosovo, starting form the Congress of Berlin (1878). This part 
examines the movements towards Albanian independence and fınally the 
establishment of Albania proper (1912). It explains how Kosovo was separated 
form Albania proper and became part ofYugoslavia in 1945. 
The second chapter examines the developments in Kosovo after the death of 
Yugoslavia's charismatic leader Tito in 1980 (1981-1991). Following the death 
of Tito, the dissatisfaction of the Albanians with the Yugoslav system came to 
the surface. Kosovo was a part of the Serbian republic in Yugoslavia, but the 
Albanians who made up 90% of the population of Kosovo refused Serbian rule. 
They wanted to establish their independent state though they offıcially pursued 
a policy that aimed at more self-govemment. 
The third chapter deals with the process of Yugoslav dissolution and i ts impact 
on the issue of Kosovo (1991-1995). This part focuses on the post-Cold War 
developments in Kosovo. 
The fourth chapter analyzes Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold W ar period 
by giving special emphasis to th~ Balkans. The fıfth chapter is an examination 
of the issue of Kosova and Turkey's response in the post-Cold War period. 
Chapter six is an analysis of the developments in Kosovo after the erisis of 
9 
1999 and NATO's air attacks against Serbia. The seventh chapter is an overall 
evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Balkans in general, and 
toward the issue of Kosovo, in particular. 
lO 
CHAPTERI 
IDSTORY OF KOSOVO (1878-1980) 
Four years after the end of the NATO air strikes against Serbia, Kosova 
remains a problem to be solved both for the Kosovars themselves and for the 
outsicters who got involved in this old dispute. One needs to make a histoncal 
evaluation of the facts in order to understand the reasons for the controversy 
between the two main component ethnic groups in Kosovo, namely the 
Albanians and the Serbs. Apart from the ethnic, religious and cultural 
differences between them, the two nations put forward historical claims as the 
actual owners of this territory. In view of the Albanians, Kosovo is the cradle of 
their national independence movement or what they call "Rilindje Kombatare" 
(national awakening) 1• The Albanians (who mak e up 90 % of the population of 
Kosovo) maintain that they have been the inhabitants of these lands for 
centuries, ever since the time of their ancestors: the "Illyrians". Whereas the 
Serbs (who mak e up approximately 8 % of the population of Kosovo) attribute 
a particular importance to this land, perceiving it as the heart of the Medieval 
Serb Kingdom, still commemorating the defeat of the Serb King by the 
Ottoman Sultan at the Battle ofKosovo in 1389. 
1 N. Malcolm, Kosova: A Short Histoty, (Macmillan, London 1998) p.217 
ll 
1.1. Albanian Independence 
Shortly after its establishment, the Ottoman State took control of the lands in 
the Balkans and enlarged its territories towards the European continent. The 
Ottoman existence in the Balkans lasted until the Empire was pushed out of the 
peninsula during the course of the Balkan Wars (1912). Only a small portion 
of the Ottoman lands in Thrace were left to the Turkish Republic which was 
proclaimed in 1923. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans had 
govemed the lands in the Balkans through the "millet system" which was based 
on the division of people into two classes: the rulers (Ottomans) and the ruled 
("rayah"). The determining feature of the rayalı class was religion and each 
religious group established an "intemally autonomous community"2 which was 
called "millet". The religious group s maintained their traditional law and set up 
semi-autonomous administrative structures under the guidance of their 
religious leaders. It should, however, be mentioned that the Muslim community 
had a favored status compared to the other religious groups within the Ottoman 
State, since majority of the population shared the same religion with the 
Ottoman rulers. The Albanians benefıted from this privilege and achieved high 
administrative and military positions within the state3. Such benefi ts explain 
why the Albanians had been Iate-comers in gaining independence from the 
Ottomans compared to other nations in the Balkans. 
2 S.J. Shaw, "The Ottoman View of the Balkans" in C. and B. Jelavich (eds.), The Balkans in 
Transition, (University of California Press, Berkeley I 974) p.6l 
3 F. Bieber, "Muslim ldentity in the Balkans before the Establishment ofNation States" 
NationalitiesPapers, (28) I, (2000) pp. I 3-28, p.l7 
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The Albanian-inhabited lands remained under Ottoman control for almost fıve 
hundred years just like other regions in the Balkans. The Albanians had always 
been a most favored community in the eyes of the Sultan compared to non-
Muslim nations under his rule. Thus, the Albanians made every effort to 
strenghten the Ottoman rule on the territories where they constituted the 
majority of the population. They acted like the "guardian" of the Ottoman 
Empire in the Balkans until the nationalİst movements took over, and nation-
states emerged on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. 
Greece (1829) came out as the fırst independent state in the Balkans, and was 
later followed by Serbia (1831), Bulgaria and Romania (1878). When it became 
obvious that the Ottoman rule could not be maintained and the Ottoman State 
would withdraw from the Balkans, the Albaırians were in a dilemma; whether 
to search for independence or stay under the control of the weak Ottoman 
State. The Albanians were aware that the Ottoman rule in the Balkans was 
collapsing. Although the Albanian national movements intensifıed following 
the end of the Berlin Congress, attempts towards emancipation were initiated 
with the establishment of the "Central Committee for the Defence of the 
Rights of the Albanian Nationality" in İstanbul, which swiftly evolved into the 
Prizren League. The Committee was formed under the leadership of a 
prominent intellectual, Abdyl Frasheri who was a member of a well-known 
Albanian family. Abdyl Frasheri played an active role during the Albanian 
national movement of independence. 
13 
Following the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878), which ended with the victory 
of Russia, the European Powers assembled at the Congress of Berlin (1878) in 
order to decide on the future of the Ottoman lands in the Balkans. The 
Congress of Berlin gathered at a time when nationalİst movements accelerated 
within the Ottoman State. When the Albanians saw that the Ottoman lands 
would be partitioned among the newly emerging nation-states in the Balkans, 
they demanded administrative autonomy for the Albanian-inhabited lands 
which would be unifıed under the name of "Albania". This demand was 
communicated to the European Powers by a protest letter sent by the Prizren 
League just before the gathering of the Congress of Berlin.4 In its letter, the 
League clearly stated to the European Powers that an autonomous rule should 
be established by the Albanians at the four Ottoman "vilayets"5 where they 
constituted majority of the population at that time. These four vilayets were: 
Janina (Yanya in Turkish), Monastiri (Manastır in Turkish), Skopje (Üsküb in 
Turkish) and Scutary (İşkodra in Turkish). 
In 1881, the League transformed itself into the "Provisional Govemment" of 
the four Albanian vilayets. The Albanian Provisional Govemment was directed 
from Kosovo. By 1880, the League started to 'rule Kosovo and its periphery as 
1 
ade facto govemment6• The acceleration of the League's ruling power alerted 
4 S. Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening (1878-1912), (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ 1967) p.36 
5 An Ottoman administrative division 
6 Malcolm, ibid, p.226 
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the Ottoman rulers, and an army was sent to the region, which totally destroyed 
the authority of the League. The intervention of the Ottoman army was so 
influential that the Albanian opposition movements in Kosovo were not able to 
act coherently for several decades. Only the immigrant Albanians were 
successful in resİsting the Ottoman rule in order to establish an autonomous 
regime for their nation. S ome degree of unifıcation among the di verse Albanian 
national groupings was attained towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
the Albanian revolts against the taxation and recruitment systems of the 
Ottoman State intensifıed. 
In 1899, the Turkish opposition movement; the "Committee of Union and 
Progress" was established in Macedonia. There was only a short period of 
cooperation between the Albanian resistance and the Committee of Union and 
Progress. The Turkish opposition mavement against the autocratic rule of 
Sultan Abdulhamid II, w hi ch is normally known as the "Young Turk" 
mavement in Western histography, disappointed the Albanians and some other 
nations in the Balkans. Although the Young Turks promised to the Balkan 
nations to give their basic rights like administrative autonomy and education in 
native language in returu for their support to overthrow the Sultan, they 
followed a rather different policy after coming to power in 1908. Their main 
aim was to strengthen Ottomanism all over the Empire7. When they became the 
7 B. Jelavich, History of the Balkans {Twentieth Century), (Cambridge University Press 1 983) 
p.82 
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rulers, the Young Turks gave priority to the unity of the Empire, rather than 
granting autonomous rights to the constituent nations8 which might lead to their 
independence. 
The dernan ds of the Young Turks' collaborators in the Balkans, co n ceming 
their administrative participation and cultural rights were not accepted by the 
new regime. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian 
Ernpire and the emergen ce of the self-declared Bulgaria in ı 908 dissapointed 
the Albanians. This was the end of cooperation between the Young Turks and 
the Albanian national rnovement. There was a split between the Albanian 
resistance rnovement and the Young Turks shortly after the latter gained the 
upper hand in the Ernpire, although 25 Albanian representatives took office in 
the new Ottornan Assernbly in ı 908. Revolts broke out in Kosovo against the 
Young Turk regime under the leadership of a well-known Albanian figure, 
Hasan Prishtina9, who was a rnember of the Ottornan Assembly. The uprisings 
then spread to all Albanian-inhabited lands and continued between the years 
ı 909- ı 91 ı. The Albanians resisted the taxation policy of the regime and 
demanded that the tax revenues be used for investrnent in Kosovo and 
education in native language. 
8 M.Ş. Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford University Press, NY. 1995) 
9 T. Zavalini, "Albanian Nationalism" in P. F. Sugar and I.J. Lederer (eds), Nationalism in 
Eastern Europe (University of Washington Press, Seatlle and London 1994, 41h edition), p.70 
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Ironically, Albanian resistance against the Ottoman rule slowed down when the 
state was almost totally dedining in power. The Albanians even fought on the 
side of the Ottoman State when the Balkan nations formed military coalitions 
against it, which gradually led to the eruption ofthe two "Balkan Wars" (1912-
1913). A determining feature of the Balkan independence movements was the 
assertive territorial claims of the Balkan nations which made them potential 
enemıes. Unlike the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, the Albanians failed to 
establish a strong political unity among themselves so as to resist both the 
Ottoman rule and aggression by the neighbouring Balkan nations. Being aware 
of the fact that their national interests would be best protected by acting 
harmoniusly with the Ottomans, the Albanians cooperated with their old 
masters vis-a-vis the irredentist claims of the newly emerging nation-states in 
the Balkans. 
<-
Towards the end of the Balkan Wars, however, the Albanians intensifıed their 
movements for gradual independence, refusing to be ruled by another Balkan 
state. Irı 1912, the rebellions, which started in Gjakova and Pec (Westem 
Kosovo) spread to Mirdita, Tirana, Scutary, Mitrovica and Ferizaj. Albanian 
members of the Ottoman army joined these opposition groups as well. The 
supporters of the Albanian resistance moverncnt prepared the "Twelve Points 
Program" and sent it to İstanbul in 1912, w hi ch was based on the "Red Book" 
of the previous year. The Twelve Points Program put forward the basics of 
establishing an autonornous adrnininstrative structure for the Albanian-
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inhabited lands in the Balkans. Resİsting many nations which struggled for 
their independence and territorial extension and being weakened since 1908, 
the Ottomans recognized that they could not prevent the Albanian demands for 
administrative freedom. Finally, the Albanian rebel leaders and the 
representatives of the Ottoman State sat at the negotiating tab le and agreed on 
autonomy for the Albanians. 
But the defeat of the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars aborted this process as the 
Ottomans had to withdraw from the entire regionasa result. Paradoxically, this 
led to the emergence of an independent Albanian state under Austro-Hungarian 
insistence. Finally, Albania proper was designed at the Ambassadors 
Conference ofLondon in 1913. In essence, Albania proper was an international 
protectorate which was based on autonomous Albania, and the Ambassadors 
Conference appointed German Wilhelm von Wied as Prince of Albania. An 
International Commission was established to be responsible for its 
administration. This led to the start of continous struggles between the Prince' s 
forces that were supported by the International Commission and the prominent 
Albanian groups which had de facto ruled the Albanian-inhabited lands since 
the 1880s. The internal confusion fınally ended when the German Prince left 
the country shortly after the outbreak of the First World War (1914). However, 
the Albanian state entered into a new phase of chaos stemming from an 
unstable political system and competetion for administrative control among 
various political groups. These were to be compounded with external problems 
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like the territorial claims of the neighbouring Balkan states (for example the 
Greek claim on southem Albanian lands or what they called the northem 
"E pirus", Serbian and Montenegrin territorial dernan ds to extend their borders 
at the expense of Albania). 
The new Albanian state was an artificial creation of the major European powers 
since it failed to embrace the majority of the Albanian population in the 
Balkans. Almost half of the Albanian population in the Balkans was left 
outside the borders of Albania proper. Some of them had to stay in Serbia (and 
later Macedonia) under Serbian control while some were in Greece. Initially 
there were some attempts to join all the Albanian-inhabited lands, however, 
Albania proper lacked the means to realize this aim. Independent survival was 
the priority of the new Albanian state. However, the existence of large numbers 
of Albanians living dispersed in the surrounding territories had been perceived 
as a potential threat to political stability and territorial unities by their host 
states. This led to the continual repression of the Albanian populations by host 
states who feared that the Albanian population in the Balkans might gather 
within one state under the teadership of Albania proper. 
Serbia took control of Kosovo and Macedonia ın 1913, shortly after the 
establishment of the independent Albanian state. The outbreak of World W ar I 
weakened Serbian influence in the Albanian inhabited lands, and Kosovo was 
invaded by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces. Serbia was totally expelled 
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from Kosovo in 1915. Kosovo was separated from the other Albanian-
inhabited lands in the Balkans during the First World War. The north of 
Kosovo was put under Austro-Hungarian control, while the south was captured 
by Bulgaria. The two invaders ruled Kosovo until the end of the First World 
W ar, when they w ere fınally defeated by the Allied Po w ers in 19 1 8, and 
Kosovo was put back un der Serbian control. During World W ar I, Austria-
Hungary and Bulgaria had applied two different systems of rule in Kosovo. 
Austria-Hungary collaborated with the Albanians by granting them certain 
rights. The Albanians participated in local administrations; they were allowed 
to use the Albanian language in governmental offıces and open schools 
teaching in the Albanian language. But the conditions in the south were rather 
diffıcult. Bulgaria followed a strict policy and did not cooperate with the 
Albanians. Instead, it forced the Albanians to work in certain projects like 
building railways in Macedonia. 
Following the end of World W ar I, the Albanian patriots arranged a National 
Conference in Lushnje (1 920) through which they expressed their trust to the 
outside world on the issue of independence. And when the Albanian 
membership to the League of Nations was accepted in the same year, the 
existence of the indepedendent Albanian s ta te whose borders 10 w ere 
10 ibid p.82 
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determined by the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors was intemationally 
safeguarded. 
1.2. Creation of the Yugoslav State 
One needs to examine the process of creating the Yugoslav state, going back to 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, for a better understanding of the roots 
of the current territorial and political debate in Kosovo. The multicultural 
social structures in the Balkans owe a great deal to the Ottoman political 
system, which prevailed over the region for many centuries. The Ottomans 
created a sui generis millet system, which categorized all the peoples living in 
the Ottoman Balkans according to their religious affınity rather than their 
ethnic or racial backgrounds. The system was based neither on ethnicity nor 
nationality. 
With the gradual decline of the Ottoman power in the Balkans, widespread 
dissatisfaction, particularly among the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire grew and when nationalism took over in Westem Europe, it found 
fertile ground in the Balkans. Nineteenth century saw the penetration of 
nationalism, which, coupled with the continual decline of the Ottoman Empire, 
led to the ernergence of nation-states to be carved out of Ottoman territories. 
The West, in general, and Russia, in particular, supported this new process of 
nation building. Finally, the Ottomans were expelled from the region during the 
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course of the Balkans Wars of 1912-1913. The point to be home in mind is that 
this process, from the beginning of the decline to the end of the Ottoman 
administration in the whole region, took a long time, indeed centuries. 
Similarly, the emergence of the nation-states, in other words, from the 
beginning of dissatisfaction with the Ottoman system to the anti-Ottoman 
revolts that started the nation-building process, took a long time, too. 
The Serbs achieved their independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 at 
the Congress of Berlin. The smail Balkan state enlarged territorially with the 
achievements of the Balkan Wars. The Yugoslav state was created by the 
integration of the Southem Slav population after the collapse of the multi-
national Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy following the defeat in World War 
I. The Italian and Hungarian threat directed towards the Southem Slav 
population of the Dual Monarchy led to the unifıcation of the Slav nations 
-
around the rather powerful Serb Kingdom. The outcome was the establishment 
of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes" in 1918 to be known as 
Yugoslavia. 
In essence, this new state offıchılly acquired the name "Yugoslavia" in 1929. 
Although the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosniacs belonged to the same race 
and ethnicity, their religion, history, as well as their social and political 
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organizations 11 , un der w hi ch they lived for centuries, w ere totally different. 
The Serbs, Montenegrins and Bosniacs were ruled by the Ottoman Empire for 
about five centuries, whereas the Croats and Slovenes made up the Slav 
population of Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Serbs and Montenegrins were 
Orthodox whereas the Croats and Slovenes were Catholic. The Albanian 
majority in Kosovo, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly Muslim. The 
rivalry12 for political control among the constituent nations continued even 
after the achievement of unity within the framework of Yugoslavia. For 
instance, the Croats disputed w!th the Serbs about the structure of the state 
("federal" versus "unitary" state) and they nev er gave up the idea of separation 
from the Yugoslav Kingdom soon after recovering from the wounds of wars. 
Such differences prevented the creation of an ethnic, religious and cultural 
mosaic living in peace; on the contrary, they constituted the roots of political 
and cultural conflicts, which challenged the very existence of the young 
Yugoslav state. 
11 J. Rotschild, "Yugoslavia" in P.F. Sugar and D. W. Treadpold (eds) East and Central Europe 
Between the Two World Wars (University of Washington Press, Seattle and London 1992, 7tlı 
edition), p.207 
12 I. Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia ( Comeli University Press, Ithaca and London 
1984) pp.! 15-140 
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1.3. Kosovo under the Rule of Yugoslavia 
1.3.1. The Interwar Period (1919-1939) 
Kosovo had been conquered by the Serb Kingdom during the Balkan W ars and 
become an integral part of it in 1918. When Yugoslavia was established, 
Kosovo was automatically included in this Slav state. The Great Powers legally 
recognized Serbian conquest of Kosovo at the Paris Peace Conference, which 
gathered after the end of the First World W ar. The Albanian resistance against 
the Serbian fait accompli came immediately. In 1918 a group of Albanians 
gathered around Hasan Prishtina and formed the "Committee for the National 
Defense ofKosovo", also known as the "Kosovo Committee"13 . The major aim 
of the Committee was to struggle against integration with Serbia. The 
movement protested the repression of the Albanians by the Serbs, since the 
latter strongly denied the existence of Albanians as a separate nation and 
considered themas Albanian-speaking Serbs14• 
Serbia suppressed the Albanian community in various realms of social life. For 
example, the Albanians were not allowed\ to use their native language, 
\ 
particularly in the field of education, the lands owned by the Albanians were 
swiftly confıscated and they were forced to leave while the Albanian-inhabited 
13 Malcolm, ibid p.273 
14 ibid p.268-69 
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territories were fılled by people of Slav origin. The Serb oppression of the 
Albanians started with the conquest of Kosovo and continued until the eruption 
of the Second World W ar in 1939. Albanian resistance against the Serbs was 
not very effective, since the Albanians lacked the means for armed struggle. 
Albania proper was not able to make its voice heard on this issue either, 
because it was a small and economically weak state in political turmoil. Thus 
the Serbs got a free hand to implement their discriminatory policies regarding 
the Albanian population in Kosovo. 
1.3.2. The Occupation of Kosovo and the Second World W ar: Realization 
of "Greater Albania"? (1939-1945) 
Even after achieving independence, Albania had to deal with internal 
problems and resist the assertive territorial claims of its neighbors. 
Almost half of the Albanian population had been left outside the 
territories of Albania proper, as a result of the diplamatic bargains of the 
European Powers that were made following the end of the Balkan Wars 
and the First World War, respectively. A temporary solution to internal 
chaos was found when the state was proclaimed a "republic" under the 
leadership of Ahmet Zog ( 1925). The republic continued to exist un til 
Ahmet Zog declared himself king of the country and announced the state 
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a "monarchy" in 1928 15 . During that time Albania developed cl o se ties 
with the economically strong Italy, since it was in need of financial 
support to survive. One should not ignore the fact that there was a lack of 
Great Power interest in Albania at the beginning of the 1930s 16, s ince they 
w ere trying to recover from the effects of World W ar I and the ı 929 
world economic crisis. Cooperation between Albania and Italy intensified 
and Albanian economic dependence on Italy gradually made this state a 
protectorate of the latter. When this became compounded with the 
assertive claims of the fascist leader Mussolini in the Mediterranean 
periphery, it led to the occupation of Albanian lands by Italy on the eve of 
the Second World W ar (ı 939). This was the end of Zog's era in Albanian 
politics that had lasted for about a decade (1928- ı 939). The competition 
of various political groups struggling for administrative daminance 
resumed during World War II, and Albania plunged into turmoil again. 
15 LS. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (Hurst 2000, l sı published in 1958), p.717-727 
16 J. Rotschild, Return to Diversity (Oxford University Press, NY and Oxford 1993, 2"d 
edition), p.70-74 
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By the year 1939, not only the Balkans but also the whole ofEurope came under 
German and ltalian fascist threat. The Munich Agreement regarding the Germans 
of the Sudetanland (Czechoslovakia), the German Anschluss of Austria, the 
Italian maneuvers targeting the Mediterranean and the various assertive claims of 
these two Powers signaled the outbreak of Second World W ar, which was to be 
much more destructive than the first. The Balkans became a battleground during 
World W ar ll. In 1941, Hitler decided to move eastward and invaded both 
Yugoslavia and Greece17• In Yugoslavia, German forces exploited the old rift 
between the Serbs and Croats by collaborating with the fascist "Ustasa" 
movement of the Croats, which was seeking an independent nation-state. The 
consequence was the division of Yugoslavia among the Axis powers (Germany 
and ltaly) and the establishment ofthe independent Croat (1941) state. The fascist 
Ustasa regime of the Croats swiftly initiated a program of ethnic violence against 
the Serbs, once it created its own state. 
During World War Il, Kosovo was perceived as part of Albania proper 
and was put under ltalian control 18• S ince Italy took lands from Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Albania, it was able to dominate the 
Adriatic Sea. Later, the Italians and the Germans agreed to join a large 
part of this Albanian-inhabited lands to Albania proper, still under the 
control of Italy. The logic behind this compromise was to prevent the 
17 Stavrianos, ibid p.754 
18 ibid p.771 
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eruption of Albanian irredentist actions vis-a-vis the German forces 19 of 
occupation, since the Germans wanted to exploit the mineral resources 
of Kosovo (particularly lead and zinc) through the help of its ally, ltaly. 
An interesting and vital outcome of inclusion of Kosovo in Albania 
proper during World War II was that for the first (and the last) time 
Albanian-inhabited lands were united across the borders. From the 
Albanian point of view, this wartime phenomenon justified their 
cause that the Albanians should live as a united nation under a single 
flag, bringing the artificial division of the nation to an end. The 
unification of Albanian-inhabited lands brought two new facts to the 
agenda. Above all, creating a "Greater"20 Albanian state had become 
a feasible target for the first time, since Albania achieved its 
independence. Second, the close contact that developed between the 
Albanian and the Yugoslav communists as wartime allies, who 
opposed the invasions of fascist Axis powers, shaped the future 
structure of the Albanian political regime. Through this partnership, 
the status of the communists in Albania was consolidated by kicking 
out foreign powers from Albanian soil with the support of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This was materialized at the 
expense of giving Kosovo to Yugoslavia. Besides, the foundations of 
19 Malcolm ibid, p.291 
20 N.J. Costa, Albania: A European Enigma (Boulder, NY 1 995) p.85 
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the long authoritarian rule of Enver Hoxha in Albania were laid. 
However, the unification of Kosovo and Albania lasted only to the 
end of the war, and Kosovo was ceded to Communist Yugoslavia. 
Losing Kosovo dashed the wartime hopes of establishing an all-
inclusive "Greater" Albanian state among the members of this 
nation. 
1.3.3. Communist Yugoslavia: Kosovo under the Rule of Tito 
(1946-1980) 
The Yugoslav state was built after the Partisans' victory against both 
the fascist Nazi invasion of Germany and the rival Cethnik bands. 
Ideologically the new state acknowledged the Marxİst-Leninist line 
of communism. The Communists prepared a new constitution and 
proclaimed the establishment of the "Federal People's Republic of 
Yugoslavia" in ı 946. Federal Yugoslavia was established under the 
teadership of Tito, who presided over until his death in ı 980. The 
Yugoslav state was made up of six socialİst republics: Serbia, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
1 
The Serbian Republic was further d!vided into two ethnically 
autonomous units: the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina and the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija. It should be pointed out 
that the six republics and two autonomous units were not 
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homogenous in their ethnic and religious composition. Although 
Slovenia and Montenegro had ethnic homogeneity; both in Croatia 
(Krajina) and Macedonia a large number of Serbs were present, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multinational state, including Serbs, 
Croats and Muslims, whereas the province of Vojvodina hosted a 
large Huiıgarian minority and a Serbian majority. Finally the Kosovo 
province had a Muslim Albanian majority. The federal structure of 
Yugoslavia aimed to guarantee equal status to compounding 
republics. Interestingly, Article ı of the ı 946 constitution 
safeguarded the federal structure of the state by acknowledging the 
right to self-determination to the constituent nations. This article 
stated that Yugoslavia was "u. community of equal peoples that "have 
expressed their will to live together in a federal state" 21 on the basis 
of self-determination, including the right to secession. 
21 A. Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution (1919-1953) 
(Harvard University Press, Massachusetts 1991) p.167 
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Political ideology became an instrument of national integration. "Brotherhood 
and unity" the slogan of Tito evidenced this effort; "Brotherhood" emphasized 
the common Slav origin of the constituent nations, and "Unity" symbolized the 
continuity of common interests and desire of these nations to live togethe~2 . 
The Yugoslav Communist Party tried to establish a common national identity 
to stick various nations together in a single state. This identity was known as 
"Yugoslavhood" (jugoslavanska identitetai3. Yugoslavhood was a 
supranational identity. It did not replace the national identities of the 
compounding units; rather, it displayed the common will to live together in a 
single state. The charismatic Yugoslav leader Tito was able to keep these 
different nations together within the boundaries of common ideology and 
common will of freedom from foreign influence throughout his presideney 
(1946- ı 980). Yugoslav communist movement and i ts leader Tito were under 
the influence of Soviet communism, two regimes developed close contacts 
particularly during the Second World War. They were both under German 
threat directed towards their territorial integrity and political independence. 
This collaboration turned into an ideological split between the two countries in 
ı 948. It should, however, be pointed out that the Soviet Red Army did not 
intervene in Yugoslavia and Albania, either during the Second World W ar or in 
the years that followed it because the British was there fırst. The communist 
22 V.V. Godina, "The Outbreak ofNationalism on Former Yugoslav Territory: A Histarical 
Perspective on the Problem of Supranational Identity" Nations and Nationalism 4 (3) (1998) 
pp 409-422, 413 
23 ibid p.416 
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movements in both Yugoslavia and Albania developed in a rather secure and 
independent environment from the influence and control of the Soviet Union 
compared to other Eastern communist regimes. 
The 1948 split was the result of a disagreement over different interpretations 
and implementations of the Marxİst-Leninist ideology by the two states. The 
Yugoslav-Soviet split had two main repercussions for Yugoslavia. Within the 
domestic realm, the "Yugoslav road to socialism"24 was created in politics and 
economics, which evolved gradually and reflected its genuine features in 
various constitutions of state. In the external realm, the independent attitude of 
Yugoslavia vis-d-vis the Soviet Union was applauded by Westem demecratic 
states, w hi ch gave moral and materi al support to the form er. Although Tito' s 
Yugoslavia welcomed this foreign support, the state gradually created the 
"third way" in its external relations, which meant independence from both the 
communist (East) and the liberal (West) blocs. It was called the "non-aligned 
movement" in world history. This movement increased the popularity of the 
Yugoslav leader abroad, giving him more room for maneuver in the domestic 
sphere. Tito's charismatic teadership helped keep Yugoslav peoples together 
under a single flag throughout his presidency. 
24 B. Magas, The Destruction ofYugos/avia: Tracking the Break Up (1980-1992) (Verso, 
1993) p.79 
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Within this composition, Kosova remained part of the Serbian republic. The 
Yugoslav communists took total control of this region towards the end of the 
Second World War, dashing any Albanian hope of creating a larger nation-
state. Founding a greater state was a comman notian among the Albanians 
when Kosova was included in Albania proper during the Second World W ar. 
The Albanian communists were able to defeat both Italy and Germany, but they 
failed to keep Kosova on their hands. The wartime alliance of Albanian and 
Yugoslav communists was not enough to bring about the unification of 
Albanian population in the Balkans. Although the rhetoric of Yugoslav 
communists was based on the right to self-determination of nations, the 
Albanians were deprived of this right. In 1944, the Kosova branch of Anti-
Fascist Council of People's Liberation (A VNOJ) gathered in Bujan (in 
Albania) where they accepted the Bujan Resolution. With this resolution, the 
Albanians declared the indivisibility of the Albanian population living in 
Kosova and Albania proper25 and the desire of the Al hanian people to li ve in a 
single Albanian state. However, after the establishment of Federal Yugoslavia, 
the Albanians of Kosova were granted only autonomy within the Serbian 
republic. 
25 S. Repishti, "The Evolution ofKosovo's Autonomy Within the Yugoslav Constitutional 
Framework" in A. Pipa and S Repishiti, Studies on Kosova, East European Monographs, 
Boulder, NY 1984) p.207-208 
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The autonomous status of Kosovo within the Serbian republic was safeguarded 
through the Yugoslav constitutions, although this right never satisfied the 
Albanian majority in the region. The 1946 Yugoslav constitution established a 
centralized state structure in the realm of politics and economics. A rapid 
socialization of the means of production, collectivization of agriculture and the 
primacy of the Communist Party in administration were the main themes of this 
phase. In accordance with this constitution, Kosovo was established as a 
nominal "autonomous province" of the Serbian republic. The 1963 constitution 
changed the name ofthe state to the "Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia" 
and put forward the concept of "self management" for the federation, the 
constituent republics and the autonomous units. This ciause emphasized the 
free will of the people in every phase of the administration; from the smallest 
territorial unit to the federal system; it implied a tendeney towards a more 
decentralized administration. This system defended the unified structure of the 
state, based on the sovereign right of the nations who would take 
responsibilities in the administrative system. 
A major amendment, however, came with the 1974 constitution, which defined 
the autonomous units (Vojvodina and Kosova) as the "constituent members of 
1 
the federation"26, although, unlike the republics, they were not granted the right 
to secede from the federation. The right to self-determination was denied to the 
26 J.A. Mertus, Kosova: How Myths and Truths Started A W ar (University ofCalifornia Press, 
Berkeley, LA and London 1999) p.291 
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autonomous units simply because the majority of their population belonged to a 
nation living outside the borders of Yugoslavia. This argument was based on 
the classification of "nation" and "nationality", w hi ch was co mm on in 
Yugoslav communist rhetoric. According to this formulation, a "nation" 
comprised a group who had established a genuine state of its own that did not 
exist outside the borders of Yugoslavia; like the Serb, Croat, Montenegrin, 
Macedonian, Slovene and the Bosnian nations who established their nation-
states in Yugoslavia. A "nationality", on the other hand, was a national group 
who had blood ties with the members of a nation-state founded outside the 
Yugoslav territorial borders. In this respect, the Hungarian minority in 
Vojvodina and the Albanian majority of Kosovo were not labeled as "nations" 
in the Yugoslav sense of the word and they were not allowed to determine their 
own future independently through the right to self-determination. This was also 
safeguarded by the Yugoslav constitutions. The autonomous status of Kosovo 
evolved with the 1974 constitution, but not to the level of a constituent 
republic. Since Kosovo was allowed to use its own flag and establish its 
communist party organization, parliament, police force and judiciary, it 
achieved a de facto republican status27 but it was still deprived of the right to 
self-determination or the right to secede. 
27 M.E. Salla, "Traveling the Full Circle: Serbia's Final Solution to the Kosovo Problem" 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18 (2) (1998) pp 229-240, p.232 
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Several factors impeded granting Kosovo republican status. First, the Serbs 
were deeply concemed about the existence of the large Albanian population 
scattered all over the Balkans. Apart from Albania proper, in neighboring 
Yugoslavia, a large group of Albanians lived in Yugoslav territories; 
particularly in Kosovo, Northem and Westem Macedonia as well as Southem 
Montenegro. The Serbs feared that giving Kosovo republican status and the 
right to secede might end up with the unifıcation of this province with Albania 
proper. Such a move would end with the establishment of a large Albanian 
state across the Yugoslav borders. The Serbs often remember the memories of 
the Second World War, when the Albanians collaborated with German forces, 
following the Italian withdrawal in 1943, to achieve a larger Albanian state. 
After the establishment of Federal Yugoslavia in 1946, the Albanians were 
harshly repressed28, mostly as a sanction against their wartime partnership with 
the Axis Powers. 
One should examine the attitude of Albania proper to the issue of Kosovo in 
order to evaluate Serbia's fears of the unifıcation of two Albanian-inhabited 
territories. It should be home in mind that the Albanians of Kosovo demanded 
the promotion of their status to that of a constituent republic/nation. Their 
demands were limited within the scope of Federal Yugoslavia. However, the 
republican status would mean endowment of the Albanians with the right to 
28 P. Moore, "The Albanian Question in the Former Yugoslavia" RFE/RL Research Report 
(!) 14 (3 April 1992) pp7-15, p.9-10 
36 
self-determination. The Serbs always presumed that the Kosovo Albanians 
would use this right to join Albania proper. However, the existence of close 
contacts between the two Albanian populations of Albania and Kosovo is 
questionable. In Albania, Enver Hoxha ruled the state through his own version 
of communism. He was supported by a small cadre of communist party 
members and there was no political opposition. Hoxha's interpretation of 
communism was so strict that he even denounced the existence of a true 
communist regime in the world with the exception of Albania. Later, Albania 
totally cut off relations with the outside world. Albania aligned itself with no 
other country ( communist and/or democratic) and in the sp here of economics, 
an autarchic self-sustained system was established. Within this confıguration, 
the Albanians living in Yugoslavia and the political status of the autonomous 
province ofKosovo were perceived as an internal matter ofYugoslavia.29 Thus 
Albania pursued a neutral stance to the Kosovo issue during the era of Enver 
Hoxha. 
The Albanians of Kosovo, on the other hand, never gave up their claims to be 
the seventh republic of Yugoslavia. They argued that they were ruled by the 
discriminatory policies of the Serbian administration, which left the region 
underdeveloped with their racial policies favoring the Slav population. In 
essence, the 197 4 constitution raised the status of Kosovo to a de facto republic 
29 E. Biberaj, Albania: A Socialisı Maverick (Boulder, Westview Press I 990) 
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since the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were granted equal 
rights with the s ix federal republics in the process of presidential elections. All 
of the eight administrative units (s ix republics and two autonomous provinces) 
had the right to participate in the presidential elections through seeret voting. 
The presideney council had eight members with equal votes. Besides, a 
"system of rotation"30 in presideney was set up to provide equal chance for 
each unit to achieve top position within the political regime that would come 
in to practice after the death of Tito. 
30 Magas, ibi d p.29 ı 
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CHAPTERII 
KOSOVO BETWEEN 1981-1991 
2.1. Kosovo after the Death of Tito 
The death of Tito in 1980 led to a sequence of crises, which prepared the 
ground for disintegration of Yugoslavia within one decade. The problems of 
the state were in fact residues of the charismatic Yugoslav leader's long rule 
and they were political, economic and ethnic in nature. On the political scale, 
one-party rule of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) turned into 
an oligarchy 1 of the LCY members, since the party had the monopoly of power 
in administration, and no civil and/or political opposition was allawed to exist. 
LCY members became the only benefıciaries of the system. The Yugoslav 
public did not believe that the League would be able to cope with the problems 
of the country. The loss of faith ın the political cadre's capability gradually led 
to the "problem of legitimization"32. The Yugoslav people believed that the 
self-management system failed to function effectively since there was no place 
for criticism and opposition in politics. It was impossible to suggest alternative 
ways to solve the political and economic problems in this monolithic system. 
31 L. Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration (Coluınbia University Press, NY 1993) 
p.l69 
32 S.P. Raınet, Nationalism andFederalismin Yugoslavia (1962-1991) (Indiana University 
Press 1992) p.214 
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Economic dissatisfactions constituted the second major problem in Yugoslavia. 
There were two groups who disagreed about altemative solutions to accelerate 
the development of the economy. The liberal group favored a more 
decentralized system in which the constituent republics would be authorized for 
management of the economy. The second group supported re-centralization of 
the economic system. According to this conservative group, the source of the 
existing fınancial problems was t!ıe delegation of decision-making power in the 
economic sphere to the republics through the 1974 constitution33 . What lied at 
the heart of the public discontent was the failure to develop economically up to 
the level attained by the contemporary W estem European democracies. 
Although the state was endowed with huge amounts of foreign loans, economic 
erisis could not be prevented. The economic erises were only frozen by 
temporary solutions until the beginning of the 1990s. 
The third vital problem of Yugoslavia was ethnic/national in character. The 
communist system, w hi ch was founded on the common will of the constituent 
nations, was no more successful to overcome ethnic disagreements. Various 
ethnic groups sought to establish their own nation-states, daiming that the 
Serbs were the predominant nation in Yugoslavia while the others came second 
in social rank. This sternmed from the failure to attain social integration among 
the constituent nations of Yugoslavia. These nations always made the 
33 Sekelj i b id p. I 62 
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categorization of "we" and "others" in every field of social life. When the 
national problems were compounded with different levels of economic 
development in which roughly the northem republics (Slovenia and Croatia) 
improved rapidly in comparison to the southem republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia), the process of social disintegration started. The advanced 
republics put the burden of economic erisis on the less developed republics and 
this attitude sharpened inter-ethnic conflict.34 
The Albanians of Kosovo, who made up the majority of the population in the 
province, were dissatisfıed with the long rule of Tito and the communist 
regime, as well. In the eyes of this ethnic group, Tito's rule had been 
repressive, and it was responsible for the backwardness of Kosovo, which had 
the lowest standard of living and highest rate of unemployment compared to 
the s ix constituent republics and the autonomous province of Vojvodina. 35 The 
negative stance of the Albanians vis-d-vis the Yugoslav system was displayed 
through rio ts and demonstrations ev en during Tito' s times. The fırst influential 
opposition movement was organized in 1968. In 1968, the A1banians demanded 
republican status for the province and effective Albanian participation in the 
administration of Kosovo. The 1968 riot was also a protest of the repressive 
administration of Aleksandar Rankovic, who was the Interior Minister in 
34 V. Goati, "The Challenge ofPost-Communism" in J. Seroka and V. Pavlovic (eds) The 
Tragedy ofYugoslavia: The Failure ofDemocratic Transformatian (M. E. Sharpe, NY and 
England 1992) p.19 
35 Magas ibi d p.1 O 
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Yugoslavia. Rankovic had been in office between the years ı 946-1966 and his 
policies aimed to control the Albanians in Kosovo.36 
Although the 1974 constitution enlarged the rule of self-management for 
Kosovo, the demand for republican status was not totally abandoned from the 
political agenda of the Albanians. The year 198 ı witnessed the second largest 
Albanian demonstration against the republic of Serbia. The resistance sternmed 
from a protest movement of the students in Prishtina against poor living 
conditions in the university campus. The protest of the university students 
turned into a general riot with the participation of many Albanians who 
belonged to different social classes, and who were critical of inadequate living 
conditions in the province. There was a strong belief that the Serbs were 
responsible for the backward social and economic conditions in Kosovo 
because of their discriminatory policies. The response of the Serbian 
administration came swiftly and in a rather harsh manner. Strict martial law 
was proclaimed in the province, pointing to the seriousness of the situation. 
36 J. Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (St. Martin's Press, NY 1992) pp 
64-72 
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2.2. Autonomous Kosovo 
Although the is su e of Kosovo turned in to a erisis ın ı 999 and became an 
"international" matter, the province had a symbolic character as being the ıast 
of the domino in the process of Yugoslav disintegration. Within the framework 
of Yugosıavia's collapse, Kosovo had a peculiar position with two main 
features, w hi ch separated it from any other part of Yugoslavia. The initial signs 
of dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav communist rule and movements of unrest 
against the regime started in Kosovo. The ı 968 movements of opposition ro se 
to protest the Yugoslav constitution and achieve an independent status within 
the state and ı 98 ı protests of the post-Tito political system came to the surface 
in Kosovo. Those movements were the initial sıgns of the collapse that 
Yugoslavia gradually went through. 
Kosovo had also been the primordial scene for Mi losevi c' s nationalistic 
ambitions. After coming to power in ı 987, Milosevic concentrated his efforts 
on strengthening Serbian position in Yugoslavia, which, he deemed, had been 
weakened during Tito's rule. On his way towards realizing that aim, which 
gradually turned into the realization of "Greater Serbia", he used Kosovo as a 
means to flare up the nationalistic feelings of Serbs. In so doing, Milosevic 
pointed to the historical importance of the territory for the Serbs. The six 
hundredth anniversary of the war against the Ottoman forces at the "Battle of 
Kosovo" had a symbolic value. During the celebrations that to ok place in 1989, 
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Milosevic was able to motivate nationalistic feelings of the Serbs, not only 
against the Albanians living in Kosova, but also against other nations in 
Yugoslavia. After 1981, Kosova symbolized the "decay of charismatic 
legitimacy,"37 following the death of Tito and the rise of Serbian nationalism 
(irredentism) vis-d-vis other constituent nations in Yugoslavia. 
Examining the matter from the perspective of the Albanians, one may conclude 
that the demand for independent status was manifested loudly after ı 98 ı. 
Kosova was granted more autonomous rights by the ı 974 constitution. 
However, the Albanians who made up the majority of the population were 
eager to achieve the status of a "constituent republic". Yugoslav statesmen 
always refrained from granting republican status to Kosova, although the 
political status of the province was upgraded to total autonomy. It was, most 
probably, because of the cancem that republican status might lead to 
independence of Kosova, once the province was given the right to secede like 
other constituent republics. The Serbs were aware of the fact that such an 
attempt of the Albanians might lead to a sequence of dernan ds by other nations. 
Since Vojvodina was recognized as one of the two autonomous provinces in 
Yugoslavia (the other one being Kosova), it was feared that Vojvodina might 
1 
follow the Kosova example and search for independence. All those fears of the 
Yugoslav ruling elite sternmed from the multi-national and multi-ethnic 
37 L. Sekelj, Yugoslavia: The Process of D is integration (Social Science Monographs, Colombia 
University Press, NY 1993) p.207 
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character of Yugoslavia. Being aware of the all-inclusive features of the state 
and possible threats for its survival, the administrators refrained from policies 
that would le ad to the destruction of political and economic integration. 
Economic problems were evident in Yugoslavia during the 1970s. There was a 
clear distinction between the levels of economic development among the 
constituent republics and autonomous regions. Slovenia and Croatia were at the 
top of the list of the "developed" areas, whereas Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo could easily be labeled as 
"underdeveloped". Throughout the 1970s and 1 980s, the secondary group 
failed to cope with their economic and financial problems, and they continued 
to benefit from "central federal fund" for the underdeveloped parts of 
Yugoslavia. The system of central federal fund provided flow of economic aid 
from the more developed regions to those, which were unable to raise their 
economic power. Slovenia and Croatia seemed unwilling to share their gains 
with the others, and they proposed that the donor republics retain control over 
the contributions they made by directly investing in selected development 
projects of the recipients.38 When their demands to reform the system were not 
fulfilled, two prosperous republics focused on "full confederalisation" of the 
political system. Such ideas of the "developed" regions can be evaluated as the 
initial signs of dissatisfaction with the existing political and economic system 
38 A. Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multilateral State 
(Macmillan 1997) pp.75-76 
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and search for altematives to maintain the better life-conditions that they had 
compared to the "others". 
Kosovo was not the starting point ofthe process ofYugoslav dissolution, rather it 
was the outcome of a series of probleıns that had existed both in Kosovo and in 
Yugoslavia. The financial problems in the state can be cited as the most vital of 
such problems, together with differences in the level of econoınic development 
among the constituent republics. Unresolved political and economic problems 
contributed to the acceleration of domestic dissatisfaction that gradually contributed 
to the erisis of political legitimacy. Kosovo had always been one of the least 
prosperous regions ofYugoslavia. When low level of economic improvement was 
compounded with a very high birth rate, Kosovo had endemic financial problems. 
Econoınic problems exacerbated social dissatisfactions in the province. The 
Albanians believed that the poor conditions of the state were due to the policies 
followed by the Serbs that held adıninistrative power. The economic erisis 
gradually led to a legitimacy erisis in Kosovo. The establishınent of the "University 
of Prishtina" in 1970, where the language of education was Albanian and the 
achieveınent of enlarged autonomy through the 197 4 constitution were benefi ci al. 
These caıne about as a result of Albanian demonstrations to display dissatisfaction 
with the regime and Tito's policy of balaneing Albanian demands with the 
preservation of the federal state system. 
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What made Kosovo peculiar was the inconsistency between the composition of 
the population and political representation: The Albanian majority living under 
Serbian control since the end of the Second World W ar. When the Albanians 
were able to achieve enlarged autonomy in 1974, this contributed to the rise of 
national sentiments, since the new state of affairs meant de facto self-rule for 
the Albanian majority. A further characteristic of the region was the low level 
of social and economic integration with the rest of Yugoslavia. There was a 
very little contact between Kosovo and the rest ofYugoslavia. 
It was not surprising that the student protests about living conditions at the 
University of Prishtina turned out to be a popular movement of opposition vis-Cı­
vis the Serbs in 1981. The student unrest had a snowball effect and people that 
belonged to various social strata supported and even joined the movement. Civil 
initiatives like the "Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo"39 
played a determining role in mobilizing the Albanian population at the time. 
Mass demonstrations ended up with the slogan "Kosovo republic". The Serbian 
regime declared a state of emergency in order to stop the unrest from spreading to 
other regions and punish those who had taken part in the uprising. It was the 
beginning of a period of harsh Serbian repression of the Kosovar Albanians. 
During that period, Albanians were fıred from their jobs, imprisoned for no 
reason; they were discriminated against and suppressed by the Serbian regime. 
39 Malcolm, Kosovo ... ibid, p.347 
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2.3. Abolishing Kosovo's Autonomy 
Starting from the second half of the 1980s, Serbia's reaction turned to be a 
national campaign against the Kllsovar Albanians. Not only the statesmen and 
politicians, but also academic circles got involved in activating national 
sentiments. The 1986 "Memorandum" that was prepared and declared by the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAAS), had a decisive role in the 
process. The Memorandum was about the Serbs of Yugoslavia, namely, their 
position vis-a-vis other nations within Yugoslavia. The main argument was that 
the Serbs had been mistreated, and that a policy of discrimination had been 
pursued against them during Tito's times. The Memorandum particularly 
attacked the 1974 constitutional arrangements, which, it was argued, divided 
"Serbia" into three parts40 and undermined its territori~l integrity. It alleged that 
the Kosovar Albanians had waged a war against the Serbs since 1981 and it 
demanded that they be stopped. This attempt of SAAS was rather unusuat 
given the history of the Academy. However, as the developments of the 
following years were to demonstrate, the move was part of a larger design of 
the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia. As it was to be understood later by the 
world public, the expansion of Serbian national sentiments was a means to 
achieve "Greater Serbia" in the coming years. The notion of "Greater Serbia" 
came to the surface when it found fertile ground to flourish after 1990, on the 
40 ibid, p. 340 
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basis of both the domestic conditions of Yugoslavia and the international 
political environment. 
Serbian campaign against the autonomous status of Kosovo ended with the 
abrogation of this right in 1989 through an amendment made in the 
constitution. This was a "radical" political change in retrospect. It symbolized 
the fırst step of Serbian irredentism. The new era had certain direct influence 
on the daily life of the Kosovar people and particularly the Albanians who 
constituted majority of the population. The ı 980s started with Albanian 
demands for more autonomy. The end of the decade saw the abolishing of the 
autonomous rights of Kosovo. 
Following the constitutional change of ı 989, mass movements against this political 
decision started in Kosovo. The Albanians initiated movements of protests. Then a 
"state of emergency'' and "special circumstances" came into being in February 
1990. Afterthat, many Albanians who got involved in the protest movements either 
lost their jobs or they were intimidated by the Serbian security forces. Many Serbs 
in Belgrade or any other part of Serbia made demonstrations in support of the new 
political situation created by the Serbian regime,. The Serbian campaign continued 
1 
with more restrictions on the life of Kosovar Albanians. Among such restrictions 
were the closing of the Albanian newspaper "Rilindja", the only Albanian-language 
newspaper in Kosovo, and the passage of laws through abolishing the previous 
laws that safeguarded the independent education system in Kosovo. All these were 
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quite stringent measures that limited the previous autonornous status, if not, abolish 
it altogether.41 
Three alternatives ernerged for the Kosovar Albanians after the autonorny of 
the province was abolished in 1989. The fırst alternative was to support the 
political reform prograrn that was initiated by the constitutional arnendrnents of 
the Serbian regirne. The second alternative was to achieve independence of 
Kosovo, while the third alternative was to join up with Albania proper. The 
majority of the Albanians chose to struggle for their independence through 
peaceful rnethods. Within this political environrnent, "Dernocratic League of 
Kosovo" (LDK), which was founded on 23 Decernber 1989, ernerged as the 
main political organization to rnaterialize that airn under the leadership of a 
farnous writer and literary critic, Ihrahim Rugova. This political rnovernent 
gradually led to a system of self-rule that was to be recognized only by Kosovar 
Albanians and supported by Albania proper within the international context. 
The LDK later turned into an adrninistrative body and established a sui generis 
paraUel state structure in Kosovo to constitute a political altemative to Serbian 
rule, which had total control ofthe province through the constitutional coup. 
41 A. March and R. Sil, "The Republic of Kosovo (1989- I 998) and the Resolution of Ethno-
Separatist Conflict: Rethinking Sovereignty in the Post-Cold W ar Era" at 
http://www. ciaonet. orglwps/sirO 1 /index. html 
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There were many reasons for the establishment of this paraUel state structure. 
After the enforcement of constitutional changes, the Serbian regime put into 
action a series of repressive measures just to intimidate Albanians and provide 
obedience to this new state of affairs. Almost all cultural institutions and 
ministries, together with the Albanian language seetion in the University of 
Prishtina, all Albanian-language secondary and elementary schools were closed 
down. As a response, the Albanians declared the "Republic of Kosovo" on 22 
September 1991 42• They even organized multi-party elections a year later in 
May 1992, through which the LDK of Rugova got the majority of the votes. A 
new government was established by Dr. Bujar Bukoshi as prime minister. 
There were some major achievements of the new "state structure" made by the 
Albanians. The peaceful way followed by Rugova earned them international 
sympathy. During the 1992 London Conference gathered to find a solution to 
the Yugoslav process of disintegration, a "Special Group on Kosovo" also took 
part in the talks. 
42 ibid 
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CHAPTERIII 
THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLA VIA AND KOSOVO 
(1991-1995) 
3. 1. The Collapse of Yugoslavia 
The sui generis role played by charismatic leader Tito in Yugoslav domestic 
politics and foreign policy is beyond any doubt. However, the era of Tito was 
not totally safe from problems and internal conflicts. The collapse Yugoslavia 
did not come about over night; it was the result of a sequence of political, 
economic and ethnic/national problems, which turned into a snowball effect. 
The major actors of the communist regime, as well as Tito, were responsible 
for the downfall of the state, since they ignored these issues and solved the 
problems on a temporary basis. 
The unresolved problems opened a new scene in Yugoslav domestic politics of 
the 1 980s. Combined with the drastic changes taking place in Eastern 
communist regimes and collapse of the Cold War, the dissatisfıed groups 
within the state started to speak with a louder voice. Those groups strongly 
criticised the ill-functioning political (federalism) and economic (self-
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management) structures43 , as being the major causes of ongoing problems. A 
further development was the rising tide of "nationalism" among the Yugoslav 
people. Each and every constituent national group started to favour a nationalİst 
solution to the existing problems, while continuously blaming the rest of the 
population. This was gradually carried to the level of republican 
administrations. Among the constituent republics, Serbia was playing the 
leading role in giving primacy to national issues. Slobodan Milosevic's rise to 
presideney of the LCY in Serbia by the year 1987 was the first major catalyst 
for the rising nationalism in this republic. Milosevic had manipulated 
nationalistic tendencies within the republic to be elected president, and later, he 
continued to exploit such feelings to maintain his position and materialise his 
aggressive policies regarding other republics. Nationalism legitimised the 
extremist policies of Milosevic, who turned out to be an authoritarian president 
in time. 
The Serbian view of the causes of internal erises had been made public even 
before Milosevic came to power. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences had prepared a "Memorandum", through which reasons and possible 
solutions of the Yugoslav crises44 had been announced. This was mainly a 
Marxist criticism of the LCY's policies since the 1960s. The Memorandum 
43 A. Pavkovic, "From Yugoslavism to Serbism: The Serb National Idea 1986-1996" Nations 
and Nationalism, 4 ( 4) (1998), pp 511-528, p.515 
44 ibid p.513 
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included an additional part entitled: "The Status of Serbia and the Serb 
Nation", which argued that the Serb population in Yugoslavia had been subject 
to continuing political, economic and cultural discrimination vis-iı-vis other 
nations since the establishment of the communist regime. This was very similar 
to the allegations that were put forward by other constituent nations in 
Yugoslavia, who often claimed that the Serbs had been the most favoured 
nationsince the establishment of the Yugoslav Kingdom (1918). 
Milosevic successfully manipulated the growing nationalistic feelings among 
the Serbs. In 1989, he displayed a show of strength at Kosovo Polje, on the 
anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. At the celebrations, Milosevic 
addressed the Serbian crowd in an effective and provocative manner. During 
the speech, he stressed that the territory of Kosovo witnessed a great heroism of 
Serbs in 1389; thus the land belonged to the ancestors of this nation and it 
should stay like that forever. This long speech was important for two reasons; it 
demonstrated Milosevic's understanding of politics and gave the fırst clues of 
the nature of his future political rule. Besides, he advised the Serbs in Kosovo 
not to leave their fathertand for any reason. Kosovo region had become the 
focus of attention for Milosevic and he successfully manipulated the growing 
\ 
tensions between the Serbs and Albanians in order to legitimise his own status 
in Serbia. Milosevic maintained his presidential position in Serbia through the 
exploitation of nationalism. Under the teadership ofMilosevic, Serbia proposed 
strong "federalism" as a solution to the political crisis. The main theme was 
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that decentralization of political power by the 197 4 constitution, which 
strengthened the republican administrations and granted autonomy to the 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina by raising them to the level of constituent 
republics, weakened the Yugoslav central administration and led to the current 
political deadlock. 
The other republics did not share the Serbian view. Particularly Slovenia and 
Croatia supported an even looser federal system; or rather a "confederal" 
system through which the republics would be bound only by common foreign 
policy. The rich northem republic of Slovenia supported a relaxed system of 
nıle in the belief that the federal system was exploited by the poorer republics. 
Slovenia even proposed an "asymmetric federation"45 through which it would 
enjoy special administrative rights compared to other republics who had minor 
contributions to the Yugoslav economy. Thus, Slovenia planned to share its 
wealth with other republics only at the expense of a determining role in 
politics. 
At the beginning of the 1 990s, the "recentralization" versus "decentralization" 
debate dominated Yugoslav politics. The dis::ıgreements among the republics 
were reflected at the LCY Congresses, as well. The 1990 Yugoslav Communist 
Congress in Belgrade witnessed a Slovene-Serbian political confrontation. 
45 S.P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration ofYugoslaviafrom the Death ofTito to 
Ethnic W ar (Westview Press 1996) p.25 
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While the Slovenes insisted on a party reform to overcome the political chaos, 
the Serbs opposed this view. In the end, the Slovene delegation, under the 
leadership of Milan Kucan, walked out of the Congress and the Croat 
delegation followed suit. This was the collapse of the LCY. Yugoslavia had to 
deal with major domestic problems in the 1990s.46 These problems included: 
the federal question ("centralization" versus "decentralization"), the economy 
("privatisation and market economy" versus "self-management"), political 
pluralization ("pluralistic system" with opposition and alternatives versus 
"single party system") and fınally breakdown of the sense of community within 
the state as a result of ri s ing nationalism. 
What lied behind Milosevic's policy was the Serb aspiration to achieve 
dominance in Yugoslav domestic politics. This aim signalled total divergence 
from "unifıcation of Yugo-Slavs", an idea of the 1 920s and "brotherhood and 
unity" notion of the communist regime. Thus, "Serbian supremacy" policy was 
developed as an alternative to "Yugoslav unitarism"47 under the influence of 
internal (political and economic crises) and external (end of the Cold War, 
period oftransition in Eastern European states) factors. Dissatisfaction with the 
communist regime became more apparent in the 1990s and national conflicts, 
which had been frozen by the regime under the conditions of the Cold War 
46 ibid p.33-34 
47 I. Banac," Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism: The Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of 1989-
1990" in I. Banac (ed), Eastern Europe in Revolution ( Comeli University Press, Ithaca and 
London 1992) p.l69 
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dominated the political agenda ofYugoslavia. It was clear that the South Slavs: 
the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, who were supposed to constitute a single 
community ofYugoslavia, were no tonger able to live peacefully under a single 
flag. 
Statements of Milosevic regarding unification of all the Serbs within the 
borders of Yugoslavia and abandonment of the autonomous status of both 
Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989 were strongly criticised by Slovenia and 
Croatia. They responded to Serbia's arbitrary practices by holding multi-party 
elections in April and May 1990 respectively. In both republics the victors of 
these elections were not reformist communists; rather the parties, which 
committed themselves to a "confederal"48 solution to the Yugoslav political 
erisis achieved considerable success. In Slovenia, a coalition of Christian 
Democrats, Slovene Democrats and Social Democrats were the participants in 
the new government, although Milan Kucan, who had been a former 
communist leader, was elected president. In Croatia, the winner was the 
nationalİst Croat National Union (HDZ) headed by Franjo Tudjman, a former 
general of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). 
48 ibid p.l80 
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Slovenia and Croatia went one step further and prepared an altemative federal 
constitution to replace the existing problematic one. The proposed constitution 
envisaged a "minimalist" confederal system, since the basic aim of the two 
republics was to strengthen the administrative structures of the constituent 
republics, while reducing the role of the federa] centre. According to this 
minimalist confederal structure, the centre would have jurisdiction on matters 
like commerce, customs and agriculture whereas the constituent republics 
would have their own security system and armed forces. 49 Slovenia and Croatia 
acted in harmony in order to resolve the erisis in Yugoslavia, which was about 
the future political structure of the state. Milosevic totally rejected the Slovene-
Croat proposal. 
The tension between Serbia and the rich republics ·of Slovenia and Croatia 
resulted in a total split on 25 June 1991 when the latter two declared the 
establishment of their own independent states. This was a shocking move for 
Serbia. In response, Milosevic said that all the Serbs living outside the 
boundaries of Serbia had the right to self-determination50• Milosevic's attitude, 
compounded with his earlier statements, had been provocative and pointed to 
the redrawing the boundaries of "Serbia". By 1991, the Serbs living in the 
Krajina region of Croatia (where they constituted the majority) had already 
seceded from the republic by declaring Krajina the "Serbian Autonomous 
49 ibid p.l81 
50 Rogel ibid p.21 
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Region". In addition, Milosevic sent the JNA forces both to Slovenia and 
Croatia, with the allegation to preserve Yugoslav territorial integrity. The 
Slovene national forces defeated the JNA within ı O days. In Croatia, the JNA 
succeeded in grasping one third of this state's territories, which remained under 
Serbian control until ı995. 
Serbia was supported only by Montenegro. Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, which were comparatively poorer, followed the line of Slovenia 
and Croatia and favoured the idea of a "looser" confederation. However, when 
they realised that keeping Yugoslavia intact was not possible, both Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia proclaimed their independence in ı 99 ı. The 
following year, Serbia and Montenegro got together to form the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the absence of four of the former constituent 
republics. By the year ı 992, Yugoslavia had totally collapsed. 
3.2. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, a sequence of intra-state (civil) wars and 
inter-state wars (among the newly indep~ndent states) took place. The 
confrontations had attracted extemal interest and they had been 
intemationalised through the participation of foreign states and international 
organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO in 
the conflicts. Among them, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which erupted in 
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ı 992, had been the longest and most destructive of all confrontations in ex-
Yugoslavia. Both the collapse of Yugoslavia and Milosevic's encouragement 
of the Serbs to achieve "Greater Serbia" led to the civil war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unique. The 
Muslims, who were recognised as one of the constituent nations of Yugoslavia 
by the ı 97 4 constitution, made up 44% of the population, and the Serbs made 
up 33% of the population, whereas the Croats constituted ı 7%. Shortly after 
the international recognition of the Bosnian state in ı 992, Serbs living within 
the borders of this new entity declared their independent state entitled the "Serb 
Republic of Bosnia", imitating their co-nationals in Krajina region of Croatia. 
This was the implementation of Milosevic's project to establish Greater Serbia 
with the inclusion of all the Serbs living in former Yugoslav territories. The 
Croats, who received full support from the Tudjman regime, had, meanwhile, 
proclaimed their own independent state, "Herzeg-Bosna", on the Bosnian 
territories where they constituted the majority, further destabilising Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Serbian and Croatian claims of independence started the 
"Bosnia War". 
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The Bosnian state failed to react to the separatists effectively because it had no 
military power to speak of. In addition, the United Nations "arms embargo" 
introduced51 in 1991 against Yugoslavia was still in force. Although 
Yugoslavia collapsed, the United Nations embargo was not lifted. The United 
Nations arms embargo had prolonged the Bosnia war for two reasons. First, the 
Serbs got the upper hand militarily vis-d-vis other nations since the JNA was 
under full Serbian command. The FRY's (Serbia and Montenegro) claims of 
succession of ex-Yugoslavia enabled the Serbs to use the artillery and 
ammunition of the JNA, irrespective of the United Nations embargo. Besides, 
the Serbs were generous enough to support their co-nationals who made claims 
of independence claims against the newly independent host states, which used 
to be part of rump Yugoslavia. The Bosnians did not have the necessary 
material to defend themselves against either the Serbs and Croats. When this 
inferiority was combined with the arms embargo, Bosnians were left almost 
defenceless. A further impediment for Bosnians was Westem unwillingness to 
intervene in the matter militarily since the Bosnia war was defıned as a "civil 
war", thus an internal matter of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces "UNPROFOR" (United Nations Protection 
Force), which was sent in 1992 did not military intervene in the matter for fear 
that the lives ofthe United Nations personnel52 would be in danger. 
51 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (Macmillan, London 1996) pp.242-243 
52 ibid p. 247 
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Throughout the Bosnia war, the Serbs displayed increased violence against the 
Muslims. A programme of "ethnic cleansing" was put into practice in Serb-
controlled regions of Bosnia. The world media broadcasted news about the 
Serbian detention camps, through which ethnic cleansing was materialised by 
rape, murder and torture. Serbian violence resulted in a major wave of exodus 
from the Bosnian cities under Serbian control and/or siege, leading to the 
problems of refugees and displaced people. The presence of United Nations 
forces did not prevent Serbian actions. On the contrary, their existence gave a 
free hand to the Serbs in their actions when they realised that UNPROFOR 
constituted an impediment or just a verbal justification on the part of Westem 
govemments for European military intervention. The United Nations plan of 
establishing safe territories under its control did not work either. Even the "safe 
heavens"53 which were spared for Muslim civilians, including six Bosnian 
cities (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Goradze, Bihac and Srebrenica) could not be 
protected from Serbian attacks. 
The peace plans that were prepared by international organizations like the 
United Nations and the European Union failed to end the Bosnia war. The 
atrocities continued until the Croatian forces were finally persuaded by Croatia 
proper to fight on the s ide of the Bosnians against the Serbs. By the year 1994, 
53 M.F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Eastern Europe (M. E. Sharpe, NY and London 
1997) p.353 
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the two parties formed the "Muslim-Croat Federation"54 and unified their 
military and manpower vis-d-vis the Bosnian Serbs. In 1995, Croatia made a 
sudden attack against the Krajina Serbs by successfully destroying their forces 
and re-establishing authority in entire Croatia. The unification of Muslim-Croat 
forces, the defeat of Krajina Serbs by Croatia and the sınall-scale NATO air 
strikes against the Bosnian Serbs prepared the ground for peace in Bosnia war. 
The war finally ended with the acceptance of the Dayton Peace Agreement by 
allpartiesin November 1995. 
The Dayton Peace led to the establishment of a canfederal state in Bosnia, 
which was made up of the "Muslim-Croat Federation" and "Republica Srpska" 
(Serb Republic) owning 51% and 49% of the territories respectively. The peace 
agreement allowed the federal entities to develop "parallel special 
relationships"55 with their neighbours. The Muslim-Croat Federation could 
establish close contact with Croatia whereas the Serb Republic could do the 
same with Serbia. This ciause of the agreement was criticised to a large extent, 
since it enabled continuous divergence among the new constituent federal 
republics, whose establishment had already depended on ethnic and religious 
differences. However, the Bosnian canfederation continued to survive to this 
date, although internal problems exist and the two federal entities could not 
integrate socially and economically. 
54 ibid p.380 
55 Malcolm, Bosnia ... ibi d p.267 
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3.3. Response of the International Community to the Yugoslav 
Dissolution 
The Yugoslav dissolution took place in the post-Cold War environment, when 
the Western European states were busy with reforming and redetining the roles 
of Western organizations that were established under conditions of the Cold 
War. Initially, the European Union states failed to put forward a coherent 
policy towards Yugoslavia, which would satisfy all the members. Instead, the 
European Union states declared that they favoured the continuation of the 
status quo, ignoring the existence of independent states, which emerged from 
communist Yugoslavia. Germany supported the new states, whereas the British 
and the French were hesitant to react positively and swiftly. In the end, 
Germany legally recognized Slc.venia and Croatia simultaneously by forcing 
other European Union members to accept this fait accompli. The European 
Union members acted likewise and recognized the new republics (1992). The 
United States, on the other hand, was busy with domestic issues and the 
campaigns for the 1 992 presidential elections. The Bush administration was 
careful about not making foreign policy commitments on the eve of elections. 
The United States military intervention, whi~h was made in response to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had been binding for the Bush administration; thus 
Bush di d not wish to make s imilar connections in any other part of the world. 
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Yugoslavia had lost its strategic value for the West, compared to the Cold W ar 
period. The Yugoslav altemative to the communist camp and the non-aligned 
foreign policy line was not supported by the Westem states any more in the 
absence of ideological confrontation between the two blocs. Stili, the European 
Union and the United Nations worked for a possible peace throughout the 
Bosnia war. The Vance-Owen plan of 1992, Owen-Stoltenberg plan of 1993 
can be enumerated as examples. The election of Clinton as president in the 
United States accelerated the endeavours for peace since he was concerned 
with the matter more than the Bush administration who used to evaluate Bosnia 
conflict as "a matter of the Europeans"56. However, the response of Western 
Europe was ineffective and led to the escalation of the conflict57 . European 
states insisted on diplamatic initiatives and economic sanctions, which were 
agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations. When the peace 
proposals were rejected by the aggressors in Bosnia, NATO air strikes were put 
in to effect by the enforcement of the United States. Only after the realization of 
the NATO air strikes, the peace proposal put forward by the Contact Group58 
(the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Fmnce, Germany and ltaly) was 
enforced upon the Bosnian Serbs. Most scholars and historians argued that 
Western military intervention had been a Iate response to Serbian atrocities; the 
56S.L. Burg, "Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart" Current History, (92) 577 (1993) p.361 
57W.R. Duncan, "Yugoslavia's Break-Up" in W.R. Duncan and Jr. G.P. Holman (eds) Ethnic 
Nationalism and Regiona! Conjlict: The Former SU and Yugoslavia (Westview Press, Boulder 
1994)p.36 
58 The Contact Group consisted of: the US, UK, France, Gennany, Italy and Russia. It was 
originally established by the 1992 London Conference on Yugoslavia. 
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Westem unwillingness to get involved militarily had encouraged Serbian 
aggression and prolonged the Bosnia war. 
3.4. The Events in Kosovo 
The lifting of autonomy by the Milosevic regime in 1989 had been a tuming 
point in the recent history of Kosovo. · The following years witnessed 
confrontations between the Albanians, who struggled to regain the autonomy 
and achieve independence and the Serbian regime, which made every effort to 
maintain a dominant status vis-a-vis the Albanian majority. Kosovo continued 
to be a source of conflict between the two nations in the post-Cold W ar period. 
However, the attitude of the Milosevic regime deteriorated after 1989 and the 
repression of Albanians continued. Milosevic benefited from the ongoing 
tension in Kosovo to strengthen his own political career and to maintain control 
over the Albanians in Kosovo. 
The Albanians reacted swiftly to the lifting of autonomy. In 1990, the Kosovo 
Parliament, which was banned by the Serbian authorities, prepared a new 
constitution that declared the province of Kosovo a "separate republic".59 The 
following year, they held a referendum among the Albanian population through 
which the Albanians declared their willingness for a separate state of Kosovo. 
59 B. Lombardi, "Kosovo: Introduction to Vet Another Balkan Problem" European Security 5 
(2) (1996), pp 256-278, p.263 
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The Kosovo independent state was proclaimed in ı 99 ı, and the parliamentary 
and presidential elections were held in ı 992. The victor of the first 
"independent" elections in Kosovo was the Democratic League of Kosovo 
(LDK) under the teadership of the prominent Albanian leader Ihrahim Rugova, 
who used to be the president of Kosovo Writers' Union. Starting from the year 
ı 992, the Albanians formed their "parallel state structure" in Kosovo. That 
political entity was based on the establishment of paraHel state institutions to 
those already existing under Serbian rule. Education and health-care centres, 
together with the judiciary, which functioned underground, could be 
enumerated as examples of those paraHel structures. The shadow state was 
financed by the Albanians living outside the borders of Kosovo. 
Following the establishment of underground state institutions by the Albanians, 
repression of the Serbian administration intensified. When the Albanian moves 
toward more freedoru was compounded with the eruption of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Belgrade administration made every effort to stick to the 
remaining parts of ex-Yugoslavia together under its control. Annual reports of 
various international human rights organizations displayed the fact that the 
Serbian administration had become very repressive against the Albanians 
particularly after the year 1992, out of fear that the Albanian majority in 
Kosovo would separate itself from the FRY by proclaiming independent 
statehood. The records of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are 
very telling in this sense. Those organizations mainly focused on the violations 
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of civil and political rights in Kosovo. Such violations involved arbitrary 
detention, torture and ill treatment of the Albanians; dismissal from jobs on the 
basis of ethnicity, banning the m~etings of underground paraHel state structure 
and the restrictions upon the Albanian-language press60 . A further 
implementation of the Milosevic regime was to settle large number of Serbian 
refugees, who fled from the Bosnian W ar in Kosovo. The aim of the Serbian 
regime was to increase the number of Serbs in the province, which was 
overwhelmingly populated by Albanians. This Serbian policy of settlement was 
meaningful, since the Serbs constituted only 9% of the population in Kosovo, 
and this attempt was directed towards Kosovo Albanians who had the highest 
birth rate compared to other ethnic groups within the boundaries of ex-
Yugoslavia. 
Although Serbian repression against Albanians and human rights violations 
intensifıed particularly after the declaration of independence in Kosovo, the 
"parallel state" established by this ethnic group continued to function 
underground. Total independence from Serbia remained to be the basic aim of 
the Albanians. Albanian shadow state functioned to achieve two major targets. 
The aim of this underground system was to evolve towards a fully sovereign 
Albanian state. The health, education and social security systems were handled 
by the Albanians, and they were already functioning paraHel to the existing 
60 Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 (Events of 1992), p.264 and Amnesty International 
Report 1994 (January-December 1993), p.319-321 
68 
Serbian state structure. The other aim was to gain international recognition for 
Albanian struggle against the authoritarian rule of the Serbs and for the 
proposed independent state of Kosovo. 
Non-violent measures had been used by the Albanians on the way towards 
realizing their political objectives. Rugova's point was that only peaceful 
methods and refraining from the use of arms could contribute to the 
achievement of legal international recognition for the Albanian cause. 
However, not all the Albanians in Kosovo agreed with the pacifist stance, or 
what some called the "Gandhian" way of Rugova. Some believed that only an 
actual fight against the Serbs would advance the Albanian cause. Gradually this 
group gained strength, through full support of some hard-liner Albanians. The 
hard-liners got the upper hand, particularly after the exclusion of the Kosovo 
issue from the agenda of the Dayton Peace negotiations. When the Bosnia war 
ended with approval of the Dayton Peace Agreement by all the warring parti es 
in 1995, the Albanians understood that the future status of Kosovo would not 
be formulated together with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The expectations of the 
Albanians had not been fulfilled by Dayton, since the Albanians were not 
invited to the peace talks and the future status of Kosovo was not included in 
\ 
the peace accords. 
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There were several factors, which led to the exclusion of Kosovo from the 
agenda of Dayton peace negotiations. The Contact Group, who prepared the 
merits of the peace and the Milosevic regime shared a common cause: 
application and continuation of peace among the people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Contact Group was aware that they needed Serbia's 
cooperation for the realization of the agreement. In addi tion, the United States 
and the European states chose neither to support nor to acknowledge an 
independent state in Kosovo in the belief that a separate entity in this region 
would further complicate the situation on the eve of an arınİstice in Bosnia. The 
Europeans believed that an independent state in Kosovo would constitute an 
example for future movements of secession. In addition, such an attitude might 
end the positive stance of Milosevic to Dayton, since the Serbian regime had 
always evaluated the erisis in Kosovo as an "internal matter". Legal 
international recognition of independent Kosovo might annoy the Serbian 
regime and the war in Bosnia might restart. 
The Western policy makers had two main considerations.61 First, the Kosovo 
case might be considered as an example of "self-determination", leading to 
proposed national movements of separation in the Balkans. The immature 
peace in Bosnia might be influenced negatively, and this might lead to the 
resumption of fights among the multiple religious groups living on these 
61 R. Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo" International Affairs 74 (4) 
(1998), pp 745-761, p.755 
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territories. Second, recognition of Kosovo's independence might further 
destabilise the Balkans by carrying the Albanian question to the political 
agenda of the peninsula. An indt:pendent Kosova might create questions about 
the future status of this state and the reactions of the Albanians living outside 
the borders of this new political formation. The major cancem of foreign 
observers was that the Albanian population living outside Kosova would 
follow the example of Kosova Albanians and secede from their host countries. 
This theory held water especially for the Albanians in Macedonia, who make 
up nearly one third of that state's population. A further notian was that all the 
Albanians in the surraunding territories of Kosova, including Albania proper, 
might unite to achieve "Greater Albania" at the centre of the Balkans. All those 
fears of the Westem policy-makers and political analysts led to a political 
preference of ignoring the situation in Kosova, cancentrating on the peace in 
Bosnia instead. 
The Kosova Albanians changed strategy in resİsting the Serbs. Starting from 
1995, hard-liners gained the upper handin Kosova. Insisting on the use of force 
vis-d-vis the Serbs, a small group of extremist Albanians established the 
Kosova Liberation Army (KLA). The founders of the KLA argued that 
repressive policies of the Serbs against the Albanian population did not 
diminish, since there existed no mechanism of opposition to stop them. This 
theorem of the KLA founders and their supporters was to be compounded with 
actual attacks against Serbian targets and KLA insurgencies, gradually 
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intensified both in quantity and quality. Thus, KLA rejected both the non-
violent approach of Rugova's LDK and the attitude of the Western powers 
who, from the Albanian point of view, rewarded Serbian aggression62 through 
the Dayton Peace Agreernent. 
62 G. Xhudo, "Ethnic Violence Escalates in Kosovo" Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1997 
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CHAPTERIV 
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 
4.1. Historical Background of the Relations 
The founding elite focused oıı maintaining independence and territorial 
integrity following the establishment of the Turkish Republic under the 
le adership of Atatürk in ı 923. The Balkans was vital in foreign policy 
formulations of the young Turkish Republic. The historic and cultural ties with 
the Balkans had been a catalyst for close relations with the states in this region. 
Shortly after signing the Lousanne Treaty (24 July ı 923), Turkey concluded 
bilateral agreements with the Balkan states. Friendship agreements were signed 
with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on ı5 December ı923, ı8 October ı925 
and 28 October 1925 respectivell3. Turkey had also signed "pacte d'entente 
cordiale" with Greece on 30 October 1930, which symbolized the intensified 
bilateral relations between the two states. 
Turkey initiated the gathering of a serıes of Balkan conferences with the 
attendance of the regional states between ı 930- ı 933, w hi ch brought about the 
foundation of the Balkan Entente on 9 February ı 934. Turkey, Greece, 
63 i. Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri için Kılavuz (1919-1993) (OBİV Yayınları, 
İstanbul ı 993) pp.4 ı -44 
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Romania and Yugoslavia64 were the members of the Balkan Entente, whereas 
Bulgaria and Albania di d not join. The en ten te aimed to maintain the status quo 
in the post-World W ar I period and it included provisions of collective security 
and collaboration among the members in case of a security threat. The Balkan 
Entente was designed to resİst threats that might come from the revisionist 
states not satisfıed with the peace agreements that ended World W ar I. Bulgaria 
was the revisionist state of the Balkans. However, the actual security challenge 
of World W ar II made the entente useless at the beginning of the 1940s and the 
Balkans became a battleground. 
After the end ofWorld War Il, ideological divisions shaped the relations of the 
states in the Balkans. During the Cold War period, Turkey and Greece were 
members of NATO; Bulgaria and Romania took part in the communist camp 
while Albania and Yugoslavia followed their independent ways. In the context 
of the American containment policy of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Greece and 
Yugoslavia signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation on 28 February 
1953, which constituted the basis ofthe Balkan Pact of the Cold War period65 . 
In 1954, the pact was transformed into an alliance. Like the Balkan Entente of 
the 1 930s, the Balkan Pact was öesigned to maintain cooperation in the field of 
\ 
defence among its members. Political and territorial disagreements that erupted 
64 i. Soysal, Türkiye 'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları (Cilt /, 1 920-1945) (TTKB, Ankara I 983) 
pp.447-453 
65 O. Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965) (Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara 1969) 
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between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and the non-aligned movement of the 
Yugoslav leader Tito made the Balkan Pact ineffective in time. 
Under Atatürk's leadership, Turkey paid utmost attention to develop peaceful 
relations, particularly with the neighboring states but friendly relations between 
Turkey and Greece lasted only for a decade. During the Cold War period, 
Turkey's relations with its Balkan neighbor, Greece, was problematic. Turkey's 
relations with its second neighbor in the Balkans, Bulgaria, worsened in the 
1 980s. Violations of the rights of the Turkish community in Bulgaria led to a 
political erisis between Turkey and Bulgaria. The issue was resolved after the 
regime change in Bulgaria and the participation of the Party of Rights and 
Freedoms of the Turkish population in the coalition govemment, which was 
established after the free general elections of 1991. 
The geographical situation of Turkey is sui generis, since the country is located 
at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Geography has been advantageous for the 
state in the sense of easy access to various regions and the economic gains that 
might accrue from transportation links (highways and sea-routes). However, 
the long border with the Soviet Union in the north-east had been a security 
challenge for Turkey, particularly towards the end of the Second World War66. 
Turkey sought to become a member of NATO shortly after the establishment of 
66 S.Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World W ar: An "Active" Neutrality 
(Cambridge University Press ı 989) p. ı 80 
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this organization, perceiving an actual security threat coming from the Soviet 
Union. The strategic location of Turkey, sharing long sea and land borders with 
the Soviet Union and owning the Straits contributed to its accessian to NATO 
as a "frontier" state. Turkey' s membership to W estem international 
organizations cam e ab out as a result of convergence of Turkish and W estem 
foreign policy priorities, on the one hand, and the strategic and geographical 
location of Turkey, on the other67 . 
During the Cold War years it was often stated that Turkey constituted a 
"bridge" between the opposite cultures of the East and the W est thanks to its 
location at the converging point of the two continents and the Ottoman 
heritage. In addition, the common border with the Soviet Union made Turkey a 
"flank country" of NATO, by further increasing its strategic importance in 
W estem s ecurity concems. 
Whether Turkey actually plays the role of a bridge between the two 
continents and two different cultures is an open-ended question. But the 
evaluation of Turkey's role depends on two determinants. First, 
Turkey's "capabilities" in terms of domestic and foreign policy, 
economic power and security should be examined, since those factors 
constitute the real power and influence of a state vis-a-vis the others. 
67 K. Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974) (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1975) 
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The bridge role has to be supported by the state's actual power. Second, 
the "perception of other states" should be accounted for. The activities 
of Turkey as a "bridge" should be accepted and appreciated by other 
states. Recognition of Turkey as a "bridge" by other states would help 
legitimize its foreign policy undertakings. Taking into consideration 
Turkey's problematic relations with its neighbours as a residue of the 
Ottoman imperial past and the continous exclusion of Turkey from the 
European Union enlargement process, it is hard to argue that it plays the 
role of a bridge between East and West. Thus, it would be safe to say 
that Turkey acts as a "barrier"68 or a "frontier"69 in the region. Taking 
into consideration the claim of acting as a bridge between Asia and 
Europe, one should raise the point that geographical location is not 
enough to determine the role of a certain state within the international 
re alın. 
68 1.0. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After the Co/d W ar (RAND 1992) 
69 S. Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier?: Turkey' s Post-Cold W ar Geopolitical Posture" The 
International Spectator, (34) (1 January-March 1999) pp.63-78 
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The Balkans has an historic and strategic importance for Turkish foreign 
policy. Since the regıon remained under Ottoman rule for more than five 
hundred years, Turkish cultural influence on these territories is self-evident. 
The Balkans is home to several groups of Turkish communities while large 
numbers of people in Turkey have Balkan origins. Turkey signed emigration 
agreements with Yugoslavia in 1938 and 195370, large groups ofpeople came 
and settled in Turkey as the beneficiaries of those bilateral agreements. This 
created a further link with the region. Turkey' s political structure and 
geographical location led to its membership of NATO during the Cold W ar 
period, and its foreign policy actions were shaped under the conditions of 
bipolarity. Stemming from ideological divisions, relations between the Balkan 
states who belonged to opposite camps were limited. Although problematic 
relations with Greece who was also a member of NATO continued, Turkey' s 
foreign policy towards the Balkans developed in accordance with the 
requirements of the Cold W ar. Except the Turkish-Bulgarian political erisis of 
the 1980s that emerged from the mistreatment of the Turkish community in 
Bulgaria, Turkey's relations with the Balkan states were far from being 
problematic, although limited contacts existed with Albania and Romania. 
70 Ş. Kut, "Turks ofKosovo: What to Expect?" in http:!Avww.mfa.gov.tr/grupalpercept/V-
3/skut-4.htm 
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4.2. The Post-Cold W ar Period 
4.2.1. General Framework of Turkish Foreign Policy 
The end of the Cold W ar signalled the end of ideologial East-West divide and 
brought about both "opportunities" and "challenges"71 to Turkish foreign 
policy at the beginning of the 1990s. Besides, Turkey -with its economic and 
political potential to play an active and determining role in its periphery-was 
perceived as an effective regional power by most analysts 72 of international 
relations. Geographically, the Balkans acts as a "corridor" between Turkey and 
the European continent73• Turkey is not in a position to ignore Balkan 
developments in her foreign policy calculations; besides, the rapid domestic 
and extemal changes in the region urges Turkey to take a more active stance. 
The GulfWar of 1991 was a watersbed in post-Cold W ar Turkish foreign policy. 
In the past, Turkey had stayed away from "inter-Arab conflicts"74 but it got 
involved in the 1991 Gulf War by fully complying with the United Nations 
resolutions75 • One should not neglect the role played by President Özat16, who 
71 E. Rouleau," The Challenges to Turkey" Foreign Affairs, (72)5 (1995) pp. ı ıo-ı26, p. ı ı3 
72 R.S. Chase, E.B. Hill and P. Kennedy, "Pivotaı States and US Strategy"Foreign Affairs, 
(75) ı (1996) pp.33-5 ı ' 
73 B. Oran, "Türkiye'nin Balkan ve Katkas Politikası" SBF Dergisi, (50)ı2 (Ocak-Haziran 
ı 995) pp.27ı-294 
74 A. Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of A New Role (Preager ı 994) p. ı ı2 
75 A. Naclıman i, Turkey and the Middle East (BESA Center for Strategic Studies ı 999) p.8-9 
76 S. Sayari " Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Guıf Crisis" 
Middle East Journal ( 46) ı, pp.9-21 , p. ı O 
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had been very active during the erisis and took the initiative to make Turkey 
"part" of the conflict irrespective of the criticisms raised by the military and 
foreign policy establishment. The existence of a sizeable Kurdish population 
living very close to Turkish-lraqi border was a major source of concem for 
Turkey. The Turkish establishment feared that the Gulf W ar might end up with 
total control of the PKK in Northem Iraq. PKK benefıted largely from the 
existing security vacuum in Northem Iraq and found shelter on the territories very 
near to the Turkish border. Under the circumstances, Turkey continued to fıght 
the PKK, and it achieved a considerable success towards the en d of the 1 990s. 
Turkey' s search for full membership to the European Union has been one of the 
most vital themes of its foreign policy in the post-Cold W ar period. Since the 
establishment of the Republic Turkey has turned its face towards Westem 
Europe. Turkey aimed to incorporate i ts elf in to appropriate W e stern- type of 
political, economic institutions and way of living since this part of Europe 
symbolized the advanced standard of living for the Turkish founding elite. This 
purpose of Turkish foreign policy which goes back to the early years of the 
Republic, found fertile ground to flourish during the Cold W ar period. Turkey' s 
membership to Westem organizations such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (1948), the Council of Europe (1949) and 
NA TO (1952) had been realized under the specifıc conditions of ideological 
confrontation and bipolarity. Turkish application to the European Community 
for membership, shortly after the Greek initiative to join this organization in 
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1959, seems to be the logical extension of Turkish foreign policy, which was 
directed towards being part of the W est. Turkey signed the "Ankara Agreement 
of Association" with the European Community in 1963, which constituted the 
legal base for eventual Turkish membership. Turkey made its application to 
European Community simultaneously with a similar Greek attempt. This was 
not a simple coincidence; rather it was evidence and outcome of the "Greek 
factor"77 that influenced Turkey's relationship with the West. Turkey's full 
membership to the "European Union"78 has not been materialized until today. 
Turkey signed the agreement of Customs Union with the European Union in 
1995 and legally bound itself by accepting the economic obligations of the 
organization. The Customs Union Agreement has been a "unilateral" liability 
for Turkey since the Union did not declare a certain timetable for Turkey's 
admission to the European Union on the basis of this agreement. Right after the 
European Union Luxembourg Summit of 1997, at which the Union did not 
mention Turkey as a "candidate state" for membership, Turkey even cut off 
communication channels with the Union. However, the European Union 
declared Turkey as one ofthe candidates at the Helsinki Summit of 1999; albeit 
refraining once more from setting a timetable for eventual admission. 
77 A. Eralp "Turkey and the EC in the Changing Post-War International System" in C. Balkır 
and A.M. Williams, Turkey and Europe (Pinter 1993) p.25 
78 The EC took the name EU with the signature ofthe Maastricht Agreement in 1992 
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Leaving aside the domestic problems, which Turkey has to overcome, full 
membership to the European Union seems even more difficult within the post-Cold 
W ar political context. After the collapse of the communist regimes in East Europe, 
the European Union gave priority to integration of those states with the Union by 
accelerating the process of "enlargement". In addi tion, the Union developed the 
notion of "Common Foreign and Security Policy'' (CFSP) and "European Security 
and Defence ldentity'' (ESDI), which were materialized through enhancing the role of 
the Westem European Union as the security ann of the European Union within close 
relationship with NATO. Despite being a member of NATO, Turkey has only 
achieved an "observer" status at the W estem European Union in 1992. 
Continuous exclusion of Turkey from the structures of the European Union79 
and the Westem European Union is something to be reckoned with for 
Turkey's foreign and security policies in two respects. First, the European 
Union designs to make the Westem European Union the "European pillar" of 
NA TO through common and/or integrated military operations would 
necessitate the involvement of Turkey, being a member of the NATO 
Counci180, in the decision-making process for the realization of joint action. 
However the European Union insistence on not granting Turkey the status of 
"full member" and the policy of excluding non-European Union member states 
79 W. Park "Turkey's EU Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki-to Ankara" 
Med iterranean Politics, (5)3 (Autumn 2000) pp.3 ı -53, p.5 ı 
80 M. Müftüler-Bac "Turkey' s Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies" Security 
Dialogue, (3 ı) 4 (December 2000) pp.489-502, p. 493 
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from the decision-making mechanism canceming future joint actions between 
the Westem European Union and NATO endangers Turkey's active 
participation in NATO decision-making bodies. Second, the rejection of 
Turkey displays a new understanding in the W est which involves a redetinition 
of "European identity'' simultaneously with the transformatian and reshaping of 
Westem organizations by including new members, most of which were ex-
communist states of the Eastem camp. In fact the European Union attitude of 
keeping Turkey rather "outside" the framework of W estem organizations 
almost breaks the links between Turkey and Europesince securitl1 has always 
been the building bl oc of Turkey' s relationship with the W est. 
Since 1991, a new factor has been added to the Turkish-European Union 
relations: the membership application of the Greek Cypriots to the European 
Union on behalf of the whole island. This was a rather interesting attempt, 
particularly when the existence of two separate administrative bodies on the 
is lan d is taken into consideration. In the northem part of the is lan d, there exists 
the "Turkish Republic of N orthem Cyprus"; in the south there is the "Cyprus 
Republic" which in essence represents only the Greeks who live in that part of 
the island. However, the Europe::ın Union considered the Greek application for 
full membership as if it was a single state, which represented the whole 
population ofthe island: the Turks and the Greeks. The Union's positive stance 
81 G. Aybet and M. Müftüler-Bac "Transfonnations in Security and Identity after the Cold 
W ar" International Journal, (Autumn 2000) pp.567-582, p.569 
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on the issue of Greek Cypriot application was an attempt to carry one of the 
problematic issues between Turkey and Greece to the European Union 
platform. While the Union decided to start negotiations with the Greek 
Cypriots, it insisted on prolonging consultations with Turkey for admission. 
Cyprus is just one of the problematic issues between Turkey and Greece. Two 
states disagree over a series of political and legal problems. The sources of 
continuous political confrontation between Turkey and Greece can be 
enumerated as follows82 : the Aegean-related problems (militarization of the 
Aegean Islands of non-military status, delimitation of the continental shelf, 
extension of territorial waters to 12 miles by Greece, issues of airspace 
command and control); violations of human rights of the Turkish minority 
living in Greece (particularly in Westem Thrace) arid the Cyprus conflict. lt 
should be noted that the problematic bilateral relations erupted shortly after two 
states achieved independence by fıghting against each other and continued until 
the contemporary times. Any examination of two states' attitudes toward each 
other demonstrates that competition has been the rule, and that cooperation has 
been the exception83 in bilateral relations. lnterestingly enough, rivalry over the 
above-mentioned issues continued during the Cold War period although the 
two states remained allies within the framework ofNATO. 
82 Ş. S. Gürel "Turkey and Greece: A Diffıcult Aegean Relationship" in C. Balkır and A.M. 
Williams ibid, pp.l67-180 
83 ibid, p.163 
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During the second half of the 1 990s, the "Greek factor" played an influential 
role in Turkey's foreign policy priorities. Apart from the efforts to make 
Cyprus a member of the EU, the Greek side developed new projects to deploy 
Russian made S-300 missiles to the island. This attempt was severely rejected 
by Turkey. The Greek side claimed that the missiles were purchased as a means 
of defence. However, the actual range of the missiles created security concems 
on the part of Turkey since they were capable of endangering the southem 
territories of Turkey. In essence the Greek move aimed to question the 
existence of Turkish military deployment on the island84. However, Turkey's 
rejection was so strict that the missile erisis ended up with the deployment of S-
300 missiles on the isiand ofCrete in 1999, instead ofCyprus. 
The "Greek factor" has als o been influential in Turkey' s relations with the 
European Union, as well, because Greece joined the club in 1981 w hile Turkey 
was left outside. Since its admission to the Union, Greece insistently obscured 
Turkish access to the EU. The Greek attitude towards Turkey's membership to 
the Union became a means of its foreign policy towards Turkey. Greece 
continuously rejected Turkey' s admission to the Union and vetoed the granting 
of legal financial assistance to Turkey on the basis of the agreements concluded 
with the Union. The negative stance of Greece continued until Öcalan, the 
teader of the terrorist organization PKK, was arrested in Kenya. Shortly after 
84 F. Sönmezoğlu, Türkiye Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler: Kıbns, Ege ve Diğer 
Sorunlar (Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2000) p.302 
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his arrest, he admitted receiving aid from Greece in a variety of ways for 
activities of PKK against Turkey in general and for his escape from Syria to 
Kenya during his testimony. The Öcalan affair was vital because it led to a 
change in the attitude of Greece towards Turkey. Since 1999, Greece has been 
following a low-profile line against Turkey within the European Union despite 
the existence ofbilateral problems. 
4.2.2 Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans in the Post-Cold W ar 
Period 
During the Cold War years, Turkish foreign policy was preoccupied with 
protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty under the Soviet communist 
threat just across i ts borders85 . Although Turkey had problems with i ts 
neighbours in the Balkans and the Middle East, such disagreements were only 
secondary in rank. The collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans 
opened a new scene in Turkish extemal relations. In Bulgaria, for instance, 
discriminatory policies applied by the old regime against the Turkish minority 
ended with the collapse of the communist party rule under the teadership of 
Jivkov in 1989. The new Bulgarian regime sought to develop stronger ties with 
Turkey in various fıelds. Bulgaria tried to repair its relations with Turkey for 
85 Y. Çelik, Contempormy Turkish Foreign Policy, (Westport, Connec, Praeger, 1 999) 
86 
three basic reasons86. First, it needed Turkish support to be a member of 
NAT087 . S ince Turkey was already a member of this organization, owning the 
second largest army within it after the United States, Turkey's influence might 
be of important use for Bulgaria. Lastly, the existence of a large Turkish 
minority, w hi ch constitutes almost 10% of the Bulgarian popula tion, mak es 
Turkey a focus of attention for Bulgaria in its foreign policy calculations. The 
change of attitude in Bulgarian foreign policy towards Turkey led to a 
rapproachment in relations and the two states signed a number of bilateral 
military and economic cooperation agreements. This signaled the beginning of 
a new era in relationships between the two states. 
Among ex-communist states ofthe Balkans, Albania, had been the latest to start the 
period of transformatİ on. The first multi-party elections took place in 1991, long a:fter 
the death of Enver Hoxha (1985)88. The 1991 multi-party elections came rather late 
compared to the rest of the communist camp, and it ended up with overwhelming 
victory of the Social Democratic Party (offormer Labor Party members) vis-a-vis the 
Democratic Party (DP) of Sali Berisha. Only a year a:fter, when the DP came to power 
86 B. Demirtaş-Coşkun "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Bulgaristan'ın Dış Politikası ( 1989-
2000) in Ö.E. Llitem and B. Demirtaş-Coşkun (eds), Balkan Diplomasisi (Ankara, Avrasya 
Stratejik Araştım1alar Merkezi Yayınları,2001) p.235 
87 O. W Jr. Clytt, "Bulgaria's Tum toward Europe" European Security, (2) 1 (Spring 1993) 
pp.90-114 
88 N.A. Stavrou, "Aibania: The Domino That Refuses to Faii"Mediterranean Quarterly, (1)2 
(Spring 1990) pp.25-41, M. Muco and L. Minxhozi, "The Political and Economic 
Transformation of Albania" The International Spectator, (27)4 (October-December 1992) 
pp. 95-103 and Speciallssue of W ar Report onAibania, (May 1996) 
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by defeating the Social Democrats89, the swift process of opening up to the outside 
world started in foreign policy and trade90. Thus Albania started to search for ways to 
join international organizations, like NATO, the European Union, International 
Monetary Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Council 
of Europe. This was a fundemantal change for a state like Albania that lived in 
isolation from the outside world in external relations and followed a policy of autarky 
in economics by depending only on its own financial and material resources. During 
this period, Turkey' s relations with Albania developed enormously, particularly in the 
first half of the 1990s91 • In June 199292, the two states concluded a protacal covering 
the fields of transport, tourism, communication, agriculture, banking and the process 
ofexchanging information in areas oftrade, taxation and customs. This was followed 
by the signature of a "defence cooperation pact" on 29 July 199293 , which included 
cooperation in military education and scientific cooperation. They enhanced bilateral 
economic ties through the framework of Black Sea Economic Cooperation. This 
sternmed both from the change in foreign policy orientation of Albania and the riew 
phase of international relations. Official visits of high-ranking members of the 
military and statesmen took place as well. 
89 F. Tarifa "Aibania's Post-Communist Transition: Can Democracy Thrive?" Balkan Forum, 
(1)5 (December 1993) pp.123-133, A. Angjeli, "Problems of Albanian Democracy" 
Mediterranean Quarterly, (6)4 (Fall 1995) pp.35-47 
90 E. Biberaj, "Aibania's Road to Democracy" Current History (November 1993) 
91 L. Zanga, "Aibania and Turkey Forge Closer Ties" RFE/RL Research Report, (12 March 
1993) 
92 FBIS-WEU, 30 July 1992 
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Apart from improving bilateral contacts in multiple fields, Albania 
demanded Turkish support for the Kosovo problem in the international 
arena. The change that was observed in domestic politics had direct 
influence on the foreign policy orientation and external contacts of 
Albania. Following the establishment of the new regime, Kosovo 
became an issue of Albanian foreign policy94• Albania was concerned 
about the fate of Albanians living in Kosovo under Serbian rule. This 
change in the attitude of the Albanian state regarding the issue of 
Kosovo can be interpreted as total divergence compared to the policies 
of the communist regime, during which Albania turned a blind eye to 
that region and perceived the problem as an internal matter of 
Yugoslavia. It was a natural extension of the "isolationist" foreign 
policy line pursued by the communist regime. Thus the Albanians living 
in Albania proper and in Yugoslavia developed different ways of life 
under different political regimes and they lived in total isolation from 
each other during the Cold W ar period. 
N aturally, Albania was the first and the only state to acknowledge the 
self-proclaimed state of Kosovar Albanians, which came into being in 
1990. For instance, during an official visit to Ankara in January 1993, 
Albanian Defense Minister Zhulali underlined the importance of the 
94 L. Zanga, "Albania and Kosovo" RFEIRL Research Report (2 October I 992) 
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defense pacts signed between Turkey and his country, and asked for 
Turkish support and help in case the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina spread 
to Kosovo, a place which had a strategic position in the Balkans95 . In 
response, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel said that 
cooperation would continue between the two states ın the field of 
defense, and he pointed out that "Albania would not be left alone in 
case of danger"96. The issue once more came to the agenda of bilateral 
contacts in October 1993 97 up on a vis it of Albanian Prim e Minister, 
Aleksander Meksi to Ankara. Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin, 
and Albanian Prime Minister Meksi put special emphasis on Serbian 
aggression in the Balkans and its possible impacts. Cetin pointed to the 
potential of the Kosovo problem to spread, and he stated that it was not 
only the Balkans that would be affected by the conflict, but the whole 
world. However, in his statements Cetin refrained from going into the 
details of the problem and means to sol ve it. 
95 FBIS-WEU, 21 January 1993 
96 ibid 
97 BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), ll October 1993 
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Turkish-Greek relations did not display a tremendous change during the same 
time-span. On the contrary, bilateral disagreements continued, particularly over 
Cyprus and issues related with the Aegean Sea. Apart from the problematic 
relations with Turkey, Greek foreign policy was rather aggressive towards the 
countries in i ts periphery, particularly during the first half of the 1 990s. To cite 
a few examples, Greece totaly rejected the international recognition of 
"Macedonia", which was established with the disintegration of the Yugoslav 
state. Greek- Macedonian relations were not normalized until the beginning of 
1996. In addition, disagreements with the Albanian state conceming the 
southem region of Albania (or what the Greeks ca11 "Nothem Epirus") and the 
treatment of the Greek minority in Albania intensified. Greek foreign policy 
towards the Balkans was rather agressive until the second half of 1990s. After 
the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Greece entered in to a new phase 
of extemal relations and it gradually developed ties to its neighborhood. 
In the post-Cold War era, the Balkans became an arena where Turkey and 
Greece raced for prepondarence. With that aim in mind, Turkey took initiatives 
in various fields like politics, economics and military, shortly after the 
emergence of new democracies. Greece followed a similar path, particularly 
after 1995. The two states made great efforts in order to maintain the strategic 
balance between them98. In essence, what both states understood from the 
98 i. Turan and D. Barlas "Turkish-Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the 
Balkans" East European Quarterly (32)4 (January 1999) pp.469-488, p.48 
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notion of preserving the balance was to achieve even a small amount of 
advantage for i ts foreign policy at the expense of the other. Turkey followed an 
active foreign policy regarding the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The process ofYugoslav dissolution was the first test forTurkish foreign policy of the 
new period. Emergence of five new states after the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
brought to the fore a series of unprecedented problems in the Balkans. Whether the 
six states, which were once the constituent republics ofYugoslavia would legally be 
recognized by the international community despite Serbian opposition, was the first 
crisis. The erisis was overcome with recognition of those states by the Europen Union 
shortly after achieving independence. Initially, Turkish position was to support the 
maintenance of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. Once the break-up of Yugoslavia 
appeared inevitable, Turkey acted harmoniously with the European Union and 
recognized the independence of new Balkan states on 6 Februaıy 1992, 
simultaneously and indiscriminately9. Later, a series of ethno-religious and national 
erises occured on ex-Yugoslavia c:;temming from territorial disagreements. Those 
events made ex-Yugoslavia and the Balkans apoint of attention for the West, the 
United States and Russia, mainly because the security and stability of Europe was 
endangered with the possibility that the erises might prolong and spread by embracing 
other states in the continent. 
99 Ş. Kut , "Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası 
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The Bosnia W ar was the watersbed of Yugoslav dissolution. Throughout the 
war, Turkey made every effort at various international fora like the United 
Nations, Coopeation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later 
"Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe"/OSCE), NATO and 
Organization of Islamic Conference 100 in order to end Serbian violence and 
ethnic cleansing against Bosniacs and Croats. Turkey' s main concern was to 
stop massacres and maintain independence and territorial integrity of the new 
republics by way of coersion, threat and/or actual use of force. From the 
Turkish point of view, Serbian violence could only be deterred by way of an 
international armed force (like NATO), strong enough to destroy Serbian 
targets. That thesis was formulated by the "Turkish Action Plan"101 which 
included deterrence measures vis-a-vis the Serbs. However, the Turkish Action 
Plan of summer 1992 was not supported by the West and the US, since they 
were unwilling to intervene in the Yugoslav conflict for a variety of reasons. 
Turkey did not have the necessary means to materialize its plan alone, thus, the 
plan became void. But Turkish Grand National Assembly made a decision on 8 
December 1992 that allowed Turkish troops to join the UNPROFOR and the 
government was permitted to send soldiers abroad in case of an international 
military operation in Bosnia. But Turkey's active line of policy regarding 
Bosnia was not risk free. 
100 S. Çalış, "Turkey's Balkan Policy in the Early ı 990s" Turkish Studies, (2) ı (Spring 200 ı) 
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Greece resisted Turkey's activities ın the Balkans. It refused to recognıze 
"Macedonia" by alleging that both the name of the Republic and the symbols 
used on the country's flag constitute security challenges to Greece. Greek 
attitude lasted un til the beginning of 1996. In essence, the Greek respons e to 
Macedonia was a residue of an old historic problem regarding the province of 
Ottoman Macedonia. Greece did not establish diplomatic contact with this state 
and forced the United Nations to acknowledge the state under the name 
"Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) by arguing that there 
already existed a piece of land in Greeece called Macedonia. Athens 
maintained that recognition of that state with the name "The Republic of 
Macedonia" would be a challenge to Greek territorial integrity. Finally, the 
United Nations recognized the new state as the FYROM. But Turkey used the 
name "The Republic of Macedonia" s ince i ts foundation. 
During the process of Yugoslav dissolution, Greece claimed that Turkey's 
activities were movements of "Islamic encirclement" which aimed to weaken 
the Christian existence in the Balkans, by using historic and cultural ties with 
the Muslims. The argument of Greece was that Turkey developed closer ties 
with Albania and Macedonia, and that it supported the Bosniac cause against 
the Serbs during the ethno-religious war, since the majority of those states' 
populations were Muslim. Greece strongly believed that the relatively more 
active Turkish stance in the Balkans in the fırst half of the 1990s, sternmed 
from Turkey' s desire to establish a kind of Islamic brotherhood in the region in 
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order to weaken the Greek position. Despite the Greek belief that "religion" 
was and/or is the main theme of Turkey's post-Cold War active role in the 
Balkans102, this argument does not reflect the reality. For instance, in addition 
to Bosnia and the others whose populations are overwhelmingly Muslims, 
Turkey improved its contacts with others like Bulgaria and Romania as well, by 
signing bilateral and multilateral agreements covering a wide range of issues 
like economics, military and security cooperation. Thus, "religion" is not the 
driving force behind Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans. The famous notion 
of the early 1990s that there exists two religious axes103 : the "Orthodoks camp" 
(Serbia and Greece) and the "Islamic camp" (Turkey, Albania and Bosnia) in 
the Balkans isa baseless argument. Turkey's major concern during the Bosnia 
War was to stop ethnic violence. Turkey has special historic and cultural ties 
with the Balkans but religion is not a determining factor of contemporary 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey got involved in the Balkans by signing a series of bilateral military 
agreements with the "old" and the "new" Balkan states in the post-Cold War 
era. Those agreements were signed either by the Office of the Chief of the 
General Staff (with the authorization of the 1Council of Ministers) or by the 
M inistry of Defence. Agreements that were signed by the Chief of the General 
102 N. A. Stavrou, "The Dismantling ofthe BalkanSecurity System: Consequences for Greece, 
Europe and NATO" Med iterranean Quarterly, (6) ı (Winter ı 995) pp.27-48, p.46 
103 M. Gıenny, "Heading OffWar in Southem Balkans" Foreign Affairs, (74)3 (May/June 
ı995) pp.98-108, p.I03 
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Staff established the framework for military education, technical and scientific 
cooperation and annual application plans for implementation of the agreements. 
Agreements that were signed by the Minister of Defence, on the other hand, 
stipulated cooperation in a variety of fıelds, such as defence industry, defence 
research and technical cooperation of various kinds. Military cooperation 
between Turkey and the Balkan states was realized within the framework of 
NATO's Partnership for Peace as well, through which military personnet from 
the Balkans were trained by the Turkish military staff. 
In the second half of the ı 990s, Turkey got involved in regional military issues. 
For instance, Turkey participated in international forces which were deployed 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, shortly :::ıfter the success of NATO against the Serbs 
and signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended Bosnia War in ı995. 
Between l995-ı997 Turkey joined both Peace Iınplementation Force (IFOR) 
and Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina under NATO 
command authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Likewise, Turkey 
supported the international air strike by NATO against Serbia in ı 999 because 
of the latter's discriminatory and violent policies against the Albanians in 
Kosovo. When the Serbian supression of the Albanians turned into armed 
violence, the international community responded to it by organizing military 
operations conducted by NATO. Turkish troops arrived in Kosovo shortly after 
the conclusion of "Operation Allied Force" together with the soldiers of other 
participating states. Turkey allowed the entry of large groups of people who 
96 
escaped from violence during the Yugoslav disintegration process, Kosovo 
conflict and various other erises in the Balkans that occurred during the post-
Cold W ar era. 
Turkey's role within the European security structure goes handin hand with its 
activities in the Balkans. Turkey's membership to NATO continues to be the 
determining feature of i ts security policies. The Westem s ecurity system is vital 
for Turkey for two reasons. First, NATO is the most important collective 
security organization in the world. Since the end of the Cold W ar, NATO has 
played an active and determining role in the European crises. Although the 
organization was established as a Cold War institution, NATO's military 
capabilities were tested after the hipolar structure came to an end. In addition, 
the search for a new and capable "European" security architecture within the 
framework of the European Union could only be materialized in close 
copperation with NATO. Thus NATO continues to be the hack-bone of the 
European security system with its material possessions and experience. 
Second, Turkey needs to collaborate with other states in order to be influential 
in regional and/or other developments since it is not politically and 
economically strong enough to carry the burden of huge military operations 
alone. Thus, Turkey's membership to NATO and its participation in military 
operations held by this organization is the building-bloc of its foreign policy 
actions, particularly in the Balkans. 
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CHAPTERV 
TURKEY AND KOSOVO: A CHRONOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF 
THE ISSUE OF KOSOVO AND TURKEY'S RESPONSE 
IN THE POST-COLD W AR PERIOD 
The present chapter aims to examine the developments in Kosovo and evaluate 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Kosovo question in the post-Cold War 
period. In so doing, the domestic conditions of Kosovo, Turkish foreign policy 
priorities and regional factors will be taken into consideration from the 
perspective of the "Larger Albanian Question" in the Balkans. This part of the 
study consists of a description of the events in Kosovo shortly after Milosevic 
came to power in Serbia and an evaluation of Turkish foreign policy in 
response to those developments regarding Kosovo. 
5.1. The "Larger Albanian Question" in the Balkans 
Emergence of independent Albania (1912) signaled the emergence of the 
'larger Albanian Question' in the Balkans. The fact that large Albanian 
communities existed within the borders of non-Alhanian nation-states was 
always a bone of contention, not necessarily between Albania proper and other 
states, but mostly within the host states. From the point of view of the host 
s ta te, there w as always the dan ger, regardless of whether it w as real or not, that 
Albania and/or the Albanians outside Albania would try to come together under 
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one single state, Greater Albania. Every time, the Albanian population within 
the borders ofYugoslavia or Greece would ask for certain political and cultural 
rights, this would reactivate the fears about the creation of a Greater Albania at 
the back of the min ds of the host states. Though the Albanians, who nev er lived 
under one single political umbrella throughout history, hardly expressed an 
unequivocal desire to set up a Greater Albania, host countries always saw their 
existence within their territories as a potential threat to their survival. This 
complicated matters in the Balkans. 
Albania, on the other hand, struggled for its own survival, let alone take steps 
to bring all Albanians under one state as an independent state because it was 
surrounded from the very start by very hostile neighbors. Thus, the notion of a 
larger Albanian state, Greater Albania, always seemed unattainable. Moreover, 
the territorial separation created different ways of life and political culture 
among the members of this ethnic group, preventing the means of acting 
harmoniously. While the indigenous communist regime of Enver Hoxha was in 
power in Albania proper, Tito was leading the communist federation of 
Yugoslavia where a large Albanian population resided in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, and the Albanians of Greece w ere un der the control of a W estern 
type of government. 
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The end of the Cold W ar gave rise to a new wave of nationalism. In certain 
parts of the former communist world this nationalism took on an ethnic and 
irredentist character. In line with this, minority problems of various kinds, 
which had been frozen during the long years of communist regimes, came to 
the fore. Yugoslav wars of dissolution had both these characteristics. For 
instance, the major cause of the war in Yugoslavia was the will of the 
Milosevic regime, which became the main vehicle for the implementation of 
ri s ing nationalism in Serbia in the 1980s and ı 990s. Milosevic cam e to power, 
vowing to build Greater Serbia which would incorporate all the lands where 
there were Serbs, regardless of whether they were in a majority or minority in 
all those areas. That was why Milosevic and his proxies started wars, 
respectively in Croatia and then in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992. 
From the po int of view of the Milosevic regime, the existence of Albanians in 
Kosovo and even in Macedonia was something of an impediment in the 
realization of Greater Serbia. And in the eyes of the Albanians in Kosovo, the 
Milosevic regime and its declared aim to create a Greater Serbia was a direct 
threat to their very survival. Therefore, the drawbacks that the Milosevic 
regime had to suffer in its adventure was always applauded by the Albanians in 
Kosovo who resorted to setting up their own paraUel administration. This was 
part of their non-violent struggle against the Serbian regime. Today the Kosovo 
question has been going through a new phase: Following NATO's concentrated 
air attacks in ı 999 against Serbia because of i ts violent policies in Kosovo, a 
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large NATO force was deployed in the region responsible for the internal and 
extemal security of Kosovo. In addition, an interim United Nations 
administration has been set up torun the country. In broader terms, Kosovo has 
practically been taken out of the control of Serbia, and it is allowed to set up its 
own administration. 
The Albanian question in Macedonia has gone through various phases, too, 
since the break-up of Tito's Yugoslavia. However, it has never acquired a 
dimension similar to that of Kosovo, since the Albanians in Macedonia have 
always enjoyed signifıcant minority rights like a number of other minorities 
living in Macedonia such as the Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Torbesh and so on. That 
is not to say, however, that there have been no problems between the Albanians 
and the Macedonian authorities 104• The Albanians, whose number is estimated 
to be at around one third of the whole population, appear to demand that 
Macedonia be restructured in the form of a federation between two constituent 
nations, the Macedonians and the Albanians, and that the sınaller communities 
like the Turks, Serbs and other non-Macedonians enjoy minority rights. 
Macedonian authorities seem to think that this would be the fırst step in the 
directian of splitting the country into two and the creation of Greater Albania. 
The fact that the Albanians constitute absolute majority in Westem Macedonia 
to the West of the capital, Skopje, through to the borders of Albania makes the 
104 R. Austin, "Aibanian-Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Cooperation?" RFEIRL 
Research Report (22 October 1993) 
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Macedonians extremely suspicious of the idea. Serbia takes a similar view. The 
fear is that, should Kosovo become independent, the Albanians would join in, 
and that this merger would bring in Albania, too, creating Greater Albania. 
At first sight, the fear appears to be quite understandable; however, closer 
examination of the situation on the ground both in Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Albania seems to challenge this over-simplification. Fundamental differences 
in education, social structure, economic life and living standards between 
Albania proper, on the one hand, and Kosovo and Macedonia, on the other, 
make the whole suggestion quite implausible. But the fear is there, whether real 
or not, which seems to be shaping the policies pursued by Serbia and 
Macedonia. Be that as it may, the larger Albanian question in the Balkans has 
not been addressed, and it will continue to be a source of tension in the region 
in the 2000s. The question itself and Turkey' s policies towards it deserves 
serious academic interest105. Though certain aspects of the larger Albanian 
question have been handled from various angles, Turkey's policies have not 
been studied in detail. In this chapter, the larger Albanian question in the 
Balkans and Turkey' s policies on this issue from the end of the Cold W ar to the 
present time will be examined. 
105 H. Ünal H, "Balkanlar'da Geniş Arnavut Meselesi ve Turkiye" Avrasya Dosyası, (4)1-2 
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5.2. The Issue of Kosovo : From Yugoslav Dissolution to 
Dayton Peace Agreement (1990-1995) 
The process of Yugoslav dissolution made the Balkans a security priority for 
the United States and Westem powers. The Albanian question in the Balkans 
constituted an important security concem for Westem powers because of its 
explosive potential. During the presideney of George Bush, the United States 
gave the signal that it would intervene in Kosovo in case of Serbian aggression 
against the Albanians. It was made clear by the "Christmas waming" of 
Bush106 against the Serbs in December 1992. In essence, both Bush and Clinton 
administrations strictly wamed and even threatened Serbia, ın case the 
Albanians were made the victims of violence in Kosovo. Besides, the 
Albanians in Kosovo had to be safe from provocations or support against the 
Milosevic regime. The attitude of Albania proper would be effective on the 
future actions of the Kosovar Albanians. Being aware of Albania's special role 
regarding the issue of Kosovo, the United States and the Europeans supported 
the DP rule of Berisha in Albania proper both politically and economically. 
Strengthening democracy and stable govemments in Albania became the 
building blocks of Westem policy in the Balkans in order to prevent further 
regional crises. In retum, Albania refrained from flaring up the Kosovo issue at 
the international fora and followed a prudent line of policy. Altough the DP 
106 W. Zimmerman, "The Demons of Kosovo" The National Interest, (Summer ı 998) pp.3- ı ı, 
p. ıo 
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rule was interested in developments regarding Kosovo, it did not claim total 
support for independence of the province. However, when the Serbian 
oppression of the Albanians intensifıed, and the international community 
became involved in the matter, Albanians' support of their brethren in Kosovo 
was displayed. At that stage, it became clear that the Kosovo problem was an 
extension of the Milosevic regime's nationalist-expansionist policies 107. 
Altough the Yugoslav wars of dissolution came to a close by the signing of 
Dayton Peace Agreement in late 1995, this time the Kosovo problem arose. 
5.3. Post-Dayton Developments in Kosovo and the Emergence of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
Until the Dayton Peace Agreeement of 1995, the Wesfern states and the United 
States were mainly preoccupied with the Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. 
Since the problematic relations between the Kosovar Albanians and the 
Milosevic regime did not lead to an armed conflict until the second half of the 
1990s, the United States and Europe turned a blind eye to the province that 
remained under offıcial Serbian rule. It seemed that the Kosovo issue was 
neglected, given the ongoing war in Bosnia. Thus, the international community 
focused on the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement for permanent 
peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina and presumed that Milosevic would 
107 S. Markotich, "A Potent Weapon in Milosevic's Arsenal" Transitions (28 April 1995) 
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be the gurantor of Serbian compliance to its provisions. 108 International support 
to the Milosevic regime and the lack of strong domestic opposition accelerated 
Serbian aggression in Kosovo in the years to come. ıo9 
At this point, the international community created a lirık between the lifting of 
trade and arms embargo against the FR Y and the establishment of market 
economy and democratic system of rule that would respect human rights. This 
was called the "outer wall of sanctions". ı ı o The outer wall of sanctions made 
special reference to the issue of Kosovo. Until the Yugoslav authorities found a 
lasting and peacefull solution to the Kosovo issue, they were to remain in 
effect. ı ı ı In broader terms, implementation of the "outer wall of sanctions" 
meant that re-integration of the FRY to international political and economic 
organizations would be closely bound to Belgrade's attitude towards the 
Albanians in Kosovo. By this way, what the Serbian teadership stubbomly 
defıned as an "internal matter" became the heart-core of that state's relationship 
with the outside world. Since the FRY was in need of grants to recover from 
the ruins of wars, the Milosevic regime had to make utmost efforts to establish 
diplamatic contacts with other states in order to be accepted as an equal 
member of the international community. 
108 O. Kesic, "Serbian Roulette" Current History (March ı 998) 
109 F. Schmidt, "Teaching the Wrong Lesson in Kosovo" Transition (12 July ı 996) 
110 E. Hasan i, "The Outer W all of Sanctions and the Kosovo lssue" Perceptions, (3)3 
(September-November ı 998) 
111 J. Mertus, "A W all of S ilence Divides Serbian and Albanian Opinion on Kosovo" 
Transition (22 March ı 996) 
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The maintanence of the principle of "outer wall of sanctions" displayed the 
continous interest of the international community in the province. The United 
States Information Ageney (USIA) 112 opened a permanent office in Kosovo to 
play the role of negotiator between the Serbian regime and the Kosovar 
Albanians. The United States administration was determined to observe quite 
closely the developments in Kosovo. Shortly after this American initiative, 
Ihrahim Rugova 113 called for the opening of "liasion offices" by international 
organizations like the European Union, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and Islamic Conference Organization in Kosova. 
During his visit to the Kosova Mission Office in Geneva, Rugova stated that 
his invitation was valid for the friendly neighborhing countries and particularly 
for Turkey who had historic ties with the Balkans. However, Turkey did not 
open an office following the United States example. Nor did it establish a 
liason office in line with the request of Rugova. Turkey seemed unwilling to 
takean active role regarding the issue ofKosovo. 
In September 1996, an "Agreement of Education" was signed by Milosevic and 
the LDK leader Rugova through the mediation of the Italian religious charity, 
Sant'Edigo. Although the Serbian leadership interpreted this agreement as 
allowing Kosovar Albanians to be integrated into the Serbian system of 
education, the Albanians perceived it as an approval of their own system of 
112 ibid 
113 Zaman, 17 July 1996 
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education, which functioned independent of Serbian political control. The 
Albanians deemed the "mediateri" agreement as a means of emancipation and 
total independence. Since the Education Agreement failed to produce the 
desired effect114, a new agreement on education was reached on 24 April 
ı 998 115 by both sides, again with efforts of Sant'Edigo. The second agreement 
failed to prevent the armed confrontation of 1998. 
Continued tension between the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo turned into 
armed confrontation in 1996. During ı 996, there were attacks on Serbian 
security forces in Kosovo. The attacks were undertaken by the KLA. At the 
time, the Belgrade regime accused the LDK and its teader Ihrahim Rugova for 
establishing and supporting "terrorist" KLA. The LDK leadership, on the other 
hand, rejected the existence of such an armed gathering and claimed that armed 
attacks were the activities of Serbian provocateurs. 116 Rugova argued that the 
Serbian intelligence service was responsible for the terrorist actions which were 
undertaken to downgrade LDK's credibility in the eyes of the international 
community. 
114 C. Chiclet, "Renewed Conflict in Kosovo" Le Monde Diplomatique (November 1997) 
(http/lw""'w. en. monde-diplomatique.fr) 
115 A. Salihu, "An Education Profıt" Transitions (May 1998) 
116 S. Markotich, "Backtracking toward Dictatorship in Serbia and Montenegro" Transition (7 
February 1997) 
107 
KLA intensified its activities against Serbian targets in 1997 to make i ts voice heard 
in the international arena. It was beyond doubt that there existed an organization 
called KLA117, separate from Ruguva's LDK. Discussions about the membership 
composition of this organization and whether such an armed grouping really existed 
or not were no longer valid. The KLA emerged as an altemative to Rugova's LDK to 
aclıive an independent state of Kosovo. It was perceived by most Kosovar Albanians 
as the "armed" branch of the independence movement. The Albanians believed that it 
was the right time to use arms in order to end Serbian oppression and draw 
international attention to the matter. It should, however, be pointed out that the rise of 
the KLA led to a serious divergence of opinion between the LDK leader Rugova who 
insisted on the use of passive methods and the KLA leaders who opposed the passive 
attitute. While the LDK leader Rugova insisted on calling for international mediation 
and/or intervention and searched for ways to become an United Nations protectorate 
un til a permanent solution was fo und to the Kosovo question 1 18; arın ed attacks of the 
KLA continued against Serbian targets. 
5.4. The 1997 Crisis in Albania and Its Effects on the "Albanian Question" 
In a regional context, the cnsıs ın Albania was one of the most crucial 
developments of the Balkans in 1997. Albania plunged in to turmoil when the 
"pyramid investment schemes" collapsed because of the weak economic 
117 C. Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" Foreign Affairs, (78)3, pp.24-42 
118 Turkish Daily News, 25 September 1997 
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infrastructure and problems of transition in political and economic terms. S ince 
the majority of the population lost money through the pyramid system, they 
accused the ruling Democratic Party (DP) of collaborating with heads of those 
schemes. 119 Chaos erupted all over the country. Large groups of Albanians 
started to leave the country to escape from domestic turmoil. This resembled 
the 199 1 Albanian political erisis w hi ch occurred when the old communist 
regime was on the edge of collapse and huge numbers of Albanians sought to 
become refugees particularly in Greece and ltaly in order to eam their livings. 
The neighboring states w ere worried about s imilar problems in cas e the ı 997 
erisis was prolonged. The DP called for extemal help to end the chaos under 
the circumstances. The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 
1 ı O 1 on 28 March 1997, w hi ch put forward the parameters of a temporary and 
limited "Multinational Protection Force" (MNF) that 'would be responsible for 
the distribution of humani tarian ai d across the country. According to resolution 
ll O 1, the MNF would s tay on Albanian so il for three months and the co st of 
the international operation would be shared by the voluntary states. The MNF 
gathered swiftly with the participation of Italy, Spain, France, Romania, Greece 
and Turkey. When they arrived in Albania, "Operation Alba" 120 started. 
119 G. Xhudo, "What Brought Anarchy to Albania ?" Jane's Intelligence Review (June 1997) 
120 E. Greco, "New Trendsin Peace-Keeping: The Experience of Operation Alba" Security 
Dialogue (29)2 (1998) pp.201-212) and G. Kostakos and D. Bourantis, "lnnovations in Peace-
Keeping :The Case of Albania Security Dialogue (29) 1 ( 1998) pp.49-58 
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Although the erisis in Albania was domestic in character, it was carefully 
observed by the regional states and the West. The main concern was the 
possible spread of the turmoil, with extended implications for the periphery. 
Truly speaking, the international community focused on the future effects of 
the erisis on the Kosovar Albanians. It was widely believed that the 1997 
Albanian erisis would give rise to concerns about the "Albanian question" in 
the Balkans. Existence of Albanians outside the borders of Albania proper, 
mainly in Kosovo, Macedonia aad Greece seemed to confırm the concerns of 
the Balkan countries. 
The political and social turmoil of ı 997 in Albania and the continuous 
dissatisfaction of the Kosovar Albanians with the Serbian regime raised 
questions in minds canceming the future of the region. It was a widespread 
notion that the Albanians in Kosovo might benefıt from the erisis in Albania 
and start a war against the Milosevic regime. However, both the 
"comparatively" swift response of the international community to the 1997 
Albanian erisis and the calm attitude of the Kosovar Albanians prevented the 
spillover effect of that turmoil. A further component that prevented the spread 
of the Albanian trouble to Kosovo was that ~osovo had been a long-standing 
1 
issue of the Balkans. Albania started to deal with the issue of Kosovo only after 
the DP rule of Berisha, which came to power with the collapse of the 
communist regime in ı 99 ı and began to support the arguments of the Kos o var 
Albanians. During the authoritarian rule of Enver Hoxha, Albania had always 
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treated the Kosovo issue as an internal matter of Yugoslavia, and the Kosovar 
Albanian resistance movement against Serbia had never been supported 
offıcially. Therefore the Kosovo problem had no direct link with the 
developments in Albania proper in the past. Besides, the main concern of both 
the KLA and the LDK was limited to the independence of Kosovo. Their 
policies did not focus on the establishment of a larger Albanian state with the 
inclusion of all the Albanians in the region. 
5.5. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Milosevic Regime 
The year ı 998 symbolized the beginning of a new era in Kosovo. The armed 
rebellion of the KLA w as harshly responded to by the Belgrade regime and the 
issue turned in to an arın ed confrontation between KLA and Milosevic' s 
security forces. Violent measures applied by the Serbian security and military 
units against the Albanians brought the Kosovo issue to the agenda of the 
international community. Interestingly, the instruments used by the Milosevic 
regime, irrespective of all warnings made by the United States, the "Contact 
Group" andfor international organizations like the United Nations, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union and 
NATO, in order to fınd an overall solution to the problem within the FRY 
ended with the internationalization of the matter. In ı 998, armed dashes 
between Serbian security forces and the KLA bands intensifıed. It was reported 
that Serbia used both police and paramilitary units from i ts Ministry of Interi or 
lll 
(MUP) in order to combat the insurgency121 , as well as the Yugoslav Army (VJ) 
units122, which had played an active role during the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in 
the past. This was the beginning ofthe Albanian "intifada" in Kosovo. 123 
During February and March, KLA fought to establish authority in the Drenica 
region. That triggered off months-long oppression and strong reaction by the 
Serbian regime in order to restore control in the said region. The Serbian 
answer to the activities of KLA had two main outcomes in the Balkans. First, it 
created a huge problem of refugees and internally displaced people. Almost 
one-fıfth of the Kosovar Albanians escaped from Serbian violence, since the 
security forces attacked civilian targets as well, whom they perceived as 
collaborators of the KLA. Large numbers of Albanians moved to Albania and 
Macedonia to save their lives. Mass exodus of Albanians brought about 
changes in the confıguration of neighboring ho st states' populations and burden 
on their economies. The fear was that population movements would bring the 
"question of security" to the agenda of the Balkans, given the proportion of the 
Albanians in Macedonia. Clearly, the international community was alerted that 
the larger Albanian question in the Balkans might arise and create instability in 
the future. Second, international community focused on Serbian brutality in 
Kosovo more than ever and a period of external enforcement was initiated in 
ord er to b ring both si des (Ko so var Albanians and the Belgrade regime) to the 
121 International Herald Tribune, 3 March 1998 
122 Z. Kusovac, "Another Balkans Bloodbath ? " Jane's Intelligence Review (March 1998) 
123 The Guardian, 3 March 1998, International Herald Tribune, 3 March 1998 
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negotiating table for a durable peace. It was realized that the Albanian move for 
independence and violent measures of the Milosevic regime to eliminate those 
demands could no longer be neglected for the sake of Dayton. 
In order to reinforce a peaceful solution to the issue of Kosovo, Turkish 
Foreign Minister Isınail Cem paid an offıcial visit to FRY on 8 March ı998. 124 
Turkey offered the implementation of a three-staged plan to ease tensions. The 
Turkish plan included an initial step of cease-fire in the region, which would be 
followed by the implementation of the "Education Agreement" and fınally 
restitution of rights that were removed by the FRY in ı 989. 125 Shortly after 
that, foreign minİsters of fıve Balkan countries, Turkey, Romania, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria and Greece met in Bulgaria on ı O March and expressed their concem 
about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. 126 In their joint press statement 
three basic po in ts were put forward: respect for existing borders of the FR Y, 
granting extensive autonomy to Kosovo and an immediate end to violence-in 
the region by both sides. Although the fıve foreign minİsters declared their 
willingness to contribute to a peaceful settlement of the issue, it was only a lip 
service, since those countries expected the involvement of more influential 
po w ers for a solution of the problem. 
124 Turkish Daily News, 8 March ı 998 
125 Turkish Daily News, ı O March ı 998 
126 http:// news6.thdo/bbdco. uklhilenglishlworldlmonitoring/newsid-64000164351.stm , ı O 
March ı998 
ıı3 
As dashes continued in Kosovo, outside powers got involved politically and 
diplomatically in the conflict in order to persuade the warring parties to sit 
down at the negotiating table. Initial attempts came from members of the 
Contact Group. On both the 91h and 251h of March ı 998, the Contact Group 
called on the warring parties to negotiate, and it proposed a comprehensive 
arms embargo on the FRY for the latter's excessive use of force against the 
Albanians in Kosovo. Later, international organizations like the United 
Nations, European Union, OSCE and NATO got involved similarly. With 
resolution 1 ı60, the United Nations Security Council supported the 
implementation of the bilateral "Agreement on Measures to Implement the 
ı 996 Education Agreement", signed on 23 March 1998 by Serbian authorities 
and the representatives of Kosovar Albanians 127. With the same resolution, the 
United Nations Security Council repeated the earlier call of the Contact Group 
for an end to armed confrontations and commencement of negotiations to 
achieve "a substantial degree of autonomy and a meaningful self-
administration" in Kosovo. Later, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
resolution ll 99, w hi ch basically pointed to the worsening "humanitarian 
situation" in Kosovo. 
127 UNSCR 1160, 31 March 1998 
114 
These were important moves since the wording of the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions prepared the legal ground for a NATO-led operation 
against Serbia in ı999. With resolution 1199, the United Nations Security 
Council focused particularly on the "excessive and indiscriminate use of force 
by the Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army"128 against Albanians, 
which resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. Resolution ı ı 99 
emphasized that the Serbian measures led to the flow of 50.000 Albanian 
refugees to neighboring countries (Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Turkey) and approximately 230.000 intemally displaced persons who left 
their homes in order to survive. It deseribed the situation in Kosovo as a 
"humanitarian catastrophe" drawing attention to the increase in violation of 
human rights and international humanitarian law. The resolution finally called 
for the announcement of a ceasefire and initiation of a "meaningful dialogue" 
among the warring parti es. In both resolutions ı ı 60 and ll 99, the United 
Nations Security Council affirmed to act under Chapter Vll of the Charter of 
the United Nations, which covered particularly "actions with respect to threats 
to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression". 
A further initiative to end the con:flict in Kosovo came from the United States 
Arnbassadar to Macedonia, Christopher Hill. What was later labeled as the "Hill 
1 
Process" attempted to stop the vioıence immediately through both sides' acceptance 
and compliance of an agreement, which did not involve provisions regarding the 
future political status of Kosovo. Despite the fact that the Hill Process handled the 
128 UNSCR 1199, 23 September ı 998 
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issue of Kosovo as an open-ended question, both the Kosovar Albanians and the 
Belgrade regime refused to lay down arms, and confrontations continued. Only after 
the relatively successful implementation of the experienced US diplomat Richard 
Holbrooke's "shuttle diplomacy'', a series of agreements was concluded between 
Serbia and major international organizations. On 15 October 1998, an agreement was 
concluded between the FRY and NATO on the establishment of an "air verification 
mission" over Kosovo. In essence, this agreement was complementary to the one 
fınalized by the FR Y and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 
16 October 1998, conceming the foundation of the verification mission in Kosovo: 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Those agreements constituted the basis of the United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1203 129, which emphasized the importance of 
materializing the said agreements by the FRY and the necessity of ending armed 
fighting for a durable peace. Resolution 1203 brought two major issues to the fore. 
First, it demanded swift action and negotiation from the FR Y authorities and Kosovo 
Albanian leadership for the "improvement of humanitarian situation and the 
conclusion ofhumanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo. Second, it pointed to the right of 
all refugees and displaced persons to returo to their homes by attributing the 
responsibility to the FRY to provide for safe conditions for their return. 
129 UNSCR I 203, 24 October 1998 
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The United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
were not the only international organizations that involved themselves in the 
Kosovo matter. NA TO watched the developments in the region very closely 
and acted as the "armed branch" of international attempts to end the erisis 
through its air operations. Shortly after the adoption of the United Nations 
Security Council resolution ı ı99, NATO started to work ona possible military 
operation in Kosovo, in case the parties failed to reach an agreement 
concerning the status of the province and continual violence. On ı October 
ı 998, NATO Council ratified the requirement for a military action (ACTREQ) 
if the parti es could not find a solution through negotiations. 
5.6. Turkey's Response to the Atrocities in Kosovo 
Meanwhile, Turkey made official declarations, which only supported initiations 
of the international community, whether in the form of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions and/or statements of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe or NATO on the situation in Kosovo. For instance, 
Turkey expressed approval for the signing of the "New Education Agreement" 
by the Serbian regime and the Kosovar Albanian authorities in ı 998. Another 
example was a joint communique of President Demirel and the Macedonian 
President Kiro Gligorov that was issued on 2 October ı 998, upon the vis it of 
the former to Macedonia. The joint communique expressed support for the 
United Nations Security Council resolutions and underlined the necessity of a 
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solution to the Kosovo issue by protecting the territorial integrity of the FRY 
and the rights of all minorities living in the said province, including the small 
Turkish one130. Two presidents pointed to the annoying situation of refugees 
and displaced people who fled their homes and made their way into 
neighboring countries. Turkey and Macedonia expressed their readiness to 
provide humanitarian aid and shelter for the victims. 
On 13 October, through an offıcial statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
Ankara pointed out that NATO was preparing for a possible operation in 
Kosovo unless the parties to the conflict reached an agreement to stop 
confrontation. It was announced that Turkey would support and participate in 
such a military operation to be undertaken by NAT0131 . It drew attention to the 
fact that the Turkish Grand National Assembly had already approved the law 
on 8 October 1998, which gave permission to the govemment to participate in a 
"joint force" that might be established by NATO in case of a military 
involvement in Kosovo. This low-profıle attitude Turkey took up during the 
conflict was perhaps because Kosovo was not perceived as a primary issue in 
Ankara. Probably the govemment was rather busy with the search for 
membership to the EU and the Greek plans to deploy Russian-made S-300 
missiles in Cyprus at the time. 
130 Dışişleri Güneesi (October ı 998) p.4 7 
131 Dışişleri Güneesi (October ı 998) p.73 
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When Serbian authorities and the Kosovar Albanians remained unwilling to 
find a solution to the erisis in Kosova, the confrontations resumed by 
December 1998. It became evident that the Kosova issue had been deadlocked. 
Under such circumstances, Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a press release at 
the end of December and expressed Turkey's anxiety canceming the 
resumption of hostilities in Kosova and called on both parties to the conflict 
"to cease fighting immediately". Turkey pointed out that a lasting peace should 
be achieved in the province by bringing every one concemed together and 
giving all the people living in Kosova their rights, which they had acquired 
with the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. In the official statements about the 1974 
Constitution, Turkey gave priority to the rights of the "minorities", in 
particular, the "Turks" living in Kosova. Turkish foreign policy regarding 
Kosova focused on the rights of the Turkish minority in Kosova. Rights of 
other communities played a secondary role in Ankara's foreign policy 
considerations. This was interesting, since the international community paid 
utmost attention to the position of Kosovar Albanians and made every effort to 
end the violence in the region by activating international organizations of 
which Turkey was a member. 
Turkish policy regarding Kosova was based on the assumption that the conflict 
would be solved, particularly by the initiations (or rather by coercive 
diplomacy) of the international community before tuming into an actual armed 
confrontation. This presumption of the Turkish govemment was flawed. 
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Neither the struggle in Kosovo ended nor did the Serbian side take the 
warnings of the international coınmunity seriously, particularly those coming 
from NATO. Serbia's miscalculations led to the internationalization and 
prolongation of the erisis in K0sovo with devastating results for the FRY. 
During the armed dashes of 1998 in Kosovo, Turkey was not an active player 
of a peaceful solution, although it was within the small group of states who 
could act as a mediator by using its historic relationship with the region and its 
membership in international organizations. Apart from giving support to 
international efforts to end the conflict, Turkey did not take the initiative as a 
mediator to bring both sides to the negotiating table. Turkish policy makers 
chose to stay neutral and waited to support the actions of others that took 
initiative for a durable solution in Kosovo. 
5.7.1. The Crisis in Kosovo and the Rambouillet Process 
By the beginning of 1999, Serbian violence vis-a-vis the Kosovar Albanians 
had reached its peak. Following the. Rajack massacre, the Contact Group met 
on 29 January and summoned both the Serbian regime and the Kosovar 
Albanians to attend the Rambouillet (France) t~lks in order to find a peaceful 
' 
solution to the problem. This call for direct negotiations symbolized the end of 
unsatisfactory indirect talks of the warring parties. The Contact Group further 
demanded that the negotiations should end in 21 days starting from the date of 
the call. However, both the first (6-23 February) and the second (15-18 March) 
120 
rounds of the Rambouillet talks came to a deadlock, sınce the Serbian 
delegation refused to sign an agreement. In the following days both the United 
Nations Security Council 132 and North Atlantic Council made declarations 
supporting the requirements for a peaceful solution put forward by the Contact 
Group. Through its statement of 30 January 1999, the North Atlantic Council 
emphasized that "NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in 
the light of both parti es' compliance with international commitmen ts and 
requirements" 133• The swift verbal involvement of these organizations 
demonstrated both the emphasis given to the Kosovo issue and the possibility 
of coercive diplomacy in case the parties failed to reach a peaceful solution. 
Despite the Serbian opposition, the United States administration insisted on the 
participation of the KLA members in the Rambouillet talks. The Kosovar 
delegation was composed of the members of Rugova's LDK, one third, 
members of the United Demecratic Movement (LBD) which consisted of the 
splitters from Rugova's LDK and another third, KLA members 134. Two 
prominent Albanian journalists, V eton Surrori and Blerim Shala were added to 
the Kosovar delegation that was headed by the young KLA leader, Hashim 
Thaci. The Serbian delegation, on the other hand, was made up of 
132 Statement by the president of the UNSC, 29 January 1999, 
http://www. un. org/peace/kosovo/sprst99 5. htm 
133 "Statement by the NAC on Kosovo", 30 January 1999, http://nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-
012e.htm 
134 M. W eller, "Enforced Negotiations: The Threat and the Use ofForce to Obtain an 
International Settlement for Kosovo" International Peacekeeping (January-April 1999) pp.4-
27,p.13 
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representatives only from the Republic of Serbia and was led by Prof. Dr. 
Ratko Markovic. Milosevic did not take part in the team. 
The two delegations came to Rambouillet with totally different considerations 
in their minds. The Serbian delegation, which did not include any member of 
the ruling elite, acted very determinedly on two major issues 135 . Maintaining 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY was a top priority for the 
Serbian regime, which still perceived Kosovo as an internal matter. Besides, 
Serbia was adamant in expressing its opposition to foreign troops to be located 
on the territories of Kosovo or any other part of FRY. This reflected the fact 
that the Serbian regime insistently refrained from internationalizing the 
problem. From the perspective of the Milosevic regime, Rambouillet talks 
consisted of two parts136: the "political" component was about Kosovo's 
autonomy and the "military" component was related to the deployment of 
NATO forces on the FRY soil. But Serbia insisted that entry of foreign troops 
in any part of the FRY was unacceptable since the matter touched upon the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. The Albanians, on the other 
hand, favored foreign intervention in the conflict and supported international 
attempts to fınd a solution to the disagreement, since they saw the contributions 
of "outsiders" as the only means to that end. What lied behind this Albanian 
135 A. J. Bellamy, "Lessons Unleamed: Why Coercive Diplomacy Failed at Rambouillet?" 
International Peacekeeping, (7)2 (Summer 2000) pp.95-J 14, pp. 102-103 
136 B.R. Posen, "The W ar for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy" International 
Security, (24) 4 (Spring 2000) pp.39-84, p.47 
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policy was the feeling of distrust to the Serbs, who abolished their autonomous 
status in 1989. The Albanians pointed out that the autonomous status 
established the legal roots of independence from Serbia and the FRY since 
Kosovo had the right to separate before 1989, just like any other constituent 
Yugoslav republic. They maintained that since the abrogation of their 
autonomy, they had to live under the Milosevic regime irrespective of their 
will. They went even further and argued that they had never been a part of 
Serbia. For the Albanians, Yugoslavia was an artifıcial creation of the Great 
Powers and the Albanians never felt part of this multilateral political 
confıguration. 
The "Rambouillet Agreement"137 came out at the end of the talks in France under 
the influence of the Contact Group. The Agreement consisted of; the basic 
principles of equal rights and freedoms for all citizens andfor national 
communities in Kosovo, maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the FR Y, and the establishment of a democratic self-government in Kosovo 
through legislative, executive, judicial and other institutions. Confıdence-
building measures were to be drawn up and implemented. These measures 
involved: the end of the use of force through an agreed ceasefıre, withdrawal of 
forces from the region, safe return, in cooperation with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, of all people who had to 1eave the region because of 
137 lnterim Agreement for Peace and Self-Govemment in Kosovo on 
http://www.state.gov!www.regions/eurlksvo-rambouil/et-text-html 
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violence and armed confrontation and access for international assistance in order 
to reconstruct the province and to provide humanitarian assistance. Thus, the 
Rambouillet Agreement was a detailed piece of work138, which put forward the 
basic tenets of "self-govemment" in Kosovo; the Constitution, the Assembly, 
Presidency, conduct and supervi3ion of elections, judiciary, status of national 
communities, police and civil security, international border security, economic 
issues, and finally, implementation of the Agreement. 
On 14 February, it became evident that the parties would not be able to 
reach an agreement. Thus the Contact Group announced the 
prolongation of the talks, but on 19 of March, negotiations terminated. 
The sides did not agree on major points. But the Contact Group had its 
own priorities. The main considerations of the Contact Group were 
maintenance of territorial integrity of the FYR, demilitarization of the 
KLA and the end of armed confrontation. Besides, the Contact Group 
was strict on abolishing the conditions of an armed confrontation or 
"ethnic cleansing" in the aftermath of Dayton. The determined policy of 
the Contact Group was two pronged. First, they wanted to prove that the 
international community was safeguarding the implementation of 
Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought about political and social 
tranquility to the Balkans following the end of ethno-religious wars in 
138 A. Bellamy, "Reconsidering Rambouillet" Contemporary Security Policy, (22)1 (April 
200 ı) pp.31-56 
124 
former Yugoslavia. Second, acceleration of tension ın Kosovo to 
prevent the rise of the larger Albanian question. It was feared that such 
a chain effect would turn the Balkans into a battlefield. 
5.7.2. NATO's Intervention: "Operation Allied Force" 
The Kosovo erisis erupted at a time when the 50th Anniversary of 
NATO's establishment was on the agenda. Just as it was observed in the 
previous Balkan crises, NATO took an active stance and enforced both 
sides of the conflict to achieve a solution without any resort to arms. 
However, the Kosovo erisis was different from the previous Balkan 
conflicts. The Milosevic regime was warned by the United States that 
force might be used in case gross violations of human rights took place in 
Kosovo (the famous "Christmas warning" of President Bush on 29 
December 1992 and the continuation of this policy by the Clinton 
administration). Thus, giving a free hand to the Milosevic regime in 
Kosovo would create a "credibility crisis" on the part of the United 
States and its Western allies. In addition, NATO had a strategic 
investment139 in Bosnia in the process of implementing the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which finalized the war in Bosnia. NATO forces in Bosnia 
(IFOR, then SFOR) were perceived as the protector of peace in the new 
139 T. K. Vogel, "Preponderant Power: NATO and the New Balkans" International Journal, 
(Winter ı 999-2000) pp. ı 5-34, p.22 
ı25 
state. The resumption of armed confrontations in the Balkans might 
endanger peace in Bosnia, proving at the same time the ineffectiveness of 
NATO in maintaining regional stability. Within the framework of the 
political and military conditions of early 1999, the intervention of 
multinational NATO forces in Kosovo seemed inevitable. Moreover, the 
Milosevic regime did not give a positive answer to the last minute 
warning of the famous American diplomat, Holbrooke, who paid an 
official visit to Belgrade in order to persuade the Serbian leader to accept 
the terms of the Rambouillet negotiations 140• 
On 20 March 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Kosovo Verifıcation Mission (KVM) left Kosovo. Three days later, Javier 
So lana, Secretary General of NATO announced the start of "Operation Allied 
Force" in Kosovo. In his press statement of 23 March, Solana explained the 
objective of the operation as 141 "to prevent more human suffering, repression 
and violence against the civilian population in Kosovo" and "to prevent 
instability spreading in the region". Ina further statement of the organization, it 
was emphasized that the military action was directed towards halting the 
violent attacks committed by the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and the Ministry of 
Interi or (MUP) with the aim of obstructing future attacks against the population 
140 Zaman, lO March I 999 
141 Press Statement by Dr. Javier Solana Secretary General ofNATO, 
http://wwH'. nato. intldoculprl 1 999/p99- 040e. htm 
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ofKosovo142• NATO's military operation against Serbia was continuing during 
the soth Anniversary celebrations of the organization at the Washington 
Summit of April. At the Summit, high-level representatives of the member 
states and NATO offıcials insistently mentioned the necessity of hacking 
diplomacy with credible military force in order to end crisis 143 and NATO's 
finn stance in contributing to humanitarian issues. NATO members were 
psychologically under pressure for military success, to prove actual power 
and/or credibility of the organization. 
NA TO was the so le defense organization with the necessary military equipment 
to function effectively in case of armed conflict144• European initiatives to 
create a comman defense and foreign policy and act together in accordance 
with those perceived objectives, since the beginning of the 1 990s, di d not bear 
fruit and effective mechanisms to act swiftly in case of crisis. For instance, the 
European Union countries' initiatives to revive the Westem European Union as 
the defense ann of the Union and the "Combined Joint Task Force" (CJTF) 
concept designed to enable the EU states to use military equipment ofNATO in 
case of political and military crises, by providing rapid and influential first 
instance intervention to end possible conflicts had not been realized yet. The 
142 Press Release on "Political and Military Objectives of NATO Action with Regard to the 
Crisis in Kosovo", http:llwww.nato.int/doculpr/1999/p99-043e.htm 
143 H. So lana, "A Defining Moment for NA TO: The Washington Suınınit Decisions and the 
Kosovo Crisis" NATO Review (Suınıner ı 999) pp.3-8, p.6 
144 for a detailed anaıysis ofNATO's intervention in Kosovo from the perspective of the "New 
Strategic Concept", see G. Aybet, NATO's Devetoping Role in Collective Security, SAM 
Papers No:4/99 (Ankara, June ı 999) 
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Europeans did not have the necessary military equipment to act effectively, 
without United States participation 145 . This was a rather ironic scene, s ince the 
Europeans deserved to create a truly Euro-centric organization in order to 
minimize United States command and control in matters of defense, but they 
failed to establish such an organization in the absence of direct and/or indirect 
United States involvement. Furthermore, NATO had already been involved in 
the conflicts of the Balkans since the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. 
UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR were examples in that sense. In the end NATO 
had to undertake military operations in Kosovo. However, the air operation was 
only part of the process that would lead to the establishment of peace in 
Kosovo. It was to require continuous post-war efforts by international 
organizations to maintain peace. 
145 E. Pond, "Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe" The Washington Quarterly, (22)4, pp.77-92 
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All members ofthe Contact Group supported NATO's military intervention in 
Kosovo except Russia. Russia was initially involved within the Contact Group 
since its initiation in 1992 and participated in efforts to end the Bosnian and 
Kosovo crises, but it rejected NATO's military involvement in Kosovo. Russia 
opposed the operation led by NATO on various accounts. First, Russia lacked a 
concentrated policy146 regarding Kosovo, although the erisis had not erupted 
unexpectedly. This might stern from the fact that Russia had its own political 
and economic problems since the collapse of the communist rule. Thus the 
period of transition forced her to focus on domestic stability and concentrate i ts 
efforts to solve internal matters in the first place. Second, Russia was 
concerned that NATO involvement in Kosovo might lead to a comparison 
between Kosovo and Chechnya147. Last but not least, Russia did not want to 
give a free hand to NATO in world affairs. The Russian statesmen were 
hesitant that NATO's out of area operations might become habitual in time 148. 
Briefly, Russia did not want to let its old rivals be active in world affairs, in 
general, and in i ts sphere of influence (Caucasus) in particular, outside Russian 
control149. 
\ 
146 O. Levitin, "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle" Survi'val, (42)1 (Spring 2000) pp.l30-140, 
p. 133 
147 V. Baranovsky, "The Kosovo Factor in Russia's Foreign Policy" The International 
Spectator, (35)2 (Aprii-June 2000) pp.113-130, p.115 
148 O. Antonenko, "Russia, NA TO and European Security After Kosovo" Survival, ( 41 )4, 
(Winter 1999-2000) pp.124-144, p.133 
149 A.P. Tsygankov, "The Final Triumph of the Pax Americana?: Western lntervention in 
Yugoslavia and Russia's Debate on The Post-Cold W ar Order" Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, (34)2, pp.l33-156 
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5.8. The Phase of Implementing United Nations Resolution 1244: 
Establishment of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and Deployment of Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
On 9 June 1999 NATO and the FRY signed a peace agreement150 which ended 
NATO' s Operation Allied Force. Onlyaday after the signing of an agreement 
between NATO and the FRY, the United Nations Security Council issued 
resolution 1244, which signaled the beginning of a new state of affairs in 
Kosovo. The resolution stipulated 151 , the withdrawal of all military, police, 
paramilitary forces from Kosovo and demilitarization of the KLA; safe and free 
retum of all refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo under the supervision of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, as well as the deployment 
of effective international civil and security (with substantial NATO 
participation) presence under the auspices of the United Nations, and finally the 
establishment of an interim administration which would provide a substantial 
self-govemment for Kosovo in accordance with the Rambouillet talks and 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. 
150 The peace agreement which was signed between NATO and the FRY was called the 
"Military-Technical Agreement" 
151 UNSCR 1244, 10 June 1999 
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Resolution 1244 authorized the formatian of the United Nations Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), to be headed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General as the most senior civilian offıcial in 
Kosovo 152. It should, however, be noted that UNMIK was designed to 
collaborate with major international organizations during the process of 
implementing resolution 1244. The basic responsibilities of the Interim 
Administration were defined under four pillars, which consisted of 
humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees (led by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees), civil administration (under the auspices of 
the United Nations), democratization, human rights, rule of law and institution-
building (guided by the Organization for S ecurity and Cooperation in Europe) 
and reconstruction and development (managed by the European Union). In 
addition, issues of security and policing were to be undertaken by NATO. The 
special security force, called "Kosovo Stabilization Force" (KFOR) would be 
established inaccordance with the agreement signed by NATO and the FRY 
and it would be deployed simultaneously with the departure of Serbian forces 
(20 June 1 999) from Kosovo. The main duties of KFOR would be 
demilitarization of the KLA, border controls and border-security as well as 
aiding the return of refugees and the displaced persons. Thus the process of 
peace implementation would be realized with the involvement of major 
international organizations, which had both the necessary means and 
152 http://www. un. org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmikl2.html 
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experience. The international community proposed that the Interim 
Administration would be temporary and it would remaın there until the 
establishment of a self-governing democratic system in Kosovo was to be set 
up. 
5.9. Turkey's Attitude towards NATO Strikes Against Serbia and 
Turkey' s Participation in the Peace Implementation Process 
On the fırst day of the NATO air attacks against Serbian targets, Turkish 
Foreign Ministry said that: 
"Being a country which attributes importance to the maintenance of 
peace and stability in the Balkans and having historic, human and 
cultural ties with the region, Turkey has made great efforts to the 
resolution of the conflict through peaceful settlement. However, it has 
been observed that the Serbian regime has not shown willingness to 
work towards fulfılling the expectations of the international community 
and the whole Kosovo population. On the other hand, the acceleration 
of violence in Kosovo and the increase in the number of displaced 
people and the migrants as a result of this has turned the conflict into a 
humanitarian drama. Turkey regrets the stage that the Kosovo issue has 
reached and is worried about possible future developments. The attitude 
of the FRY has made the phased military options for NATO inevitable. 
Being a NATO member, Turkey gives full support to North Atlantic 
Council's (NAC) phased military measures. Although the issue has 
reached such a critical stage, we wish the Belgrade regime had acted 
with common sense and gave a positive response to the expectations of 
the international community." 153 
153 Dışişleri Güneesi (25 March 1999) p.198 
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During NATO attacks against Serbian targets, Turkey seemed to intensify its 
efforts in the Balkans in order to end the military operation. For instance, 
President Demirel paid a visit to Macedonia and the Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, joined a meeting of the EU foreign ministers and 
representatives of international charity organizations that was designed to 
provide humanitarian aid to Kosovo 154. Ankara appointed an arnbassader to 
Belgrade, Ahmet Acet, as the special representative on Kosovo in charge of the 
refugee crisis. The Turkish arnbassader was given the special task of 
communicating President Demirel's message to the presidents of Macedonia 
and Albania conceming the supply of aid to Albanian refugees in those 
countries. In addition, he was to prepare a report conceming the latest 
developments in Kosovo 155• However, such efforts cam e to o la te and to o little, 
given the ongoing military operation of NATO. Turkey' s low-profile attitude 
was limited to observing and reporting the events in Kosovo. Ankara provided 
humanitarian aid to Albanian refugees, together with Germany, Britain and the 
US and offered sanctuary to Albanian refugees 156 who escaped from armed 
clashes in Kosovo. 
As the bombing came to a conclusion in the first half of June 1999, the 
Turkish contingent, which included a mechanized infantry and armor 
154 
"Ankara Diplomatik Atakta", Zaman, 8 April I 999 
155 ibid 
156 http:// new s. bbc. co. uk/hi/Eng/ish/world/Europe/newsid-311 000/311416.stm, 4 April I 999 
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consisting of 988 soldiers 157 arrived in Kosovo in early July. Turkish 
troops were deployed in the south of Prizren, mainly ın Dragas and 
Mamusha 158 where the Kosovar Turkish community predominantly 
resided. A unit of 163 soldiers were also sent to Albania ın order to 
provide security and participate in the safe transfer of humani tarian aid to 
Albanian refugees, who escaped from Serbian violence and found shelter 
there during the fighting between Serbia and the Allied forces. 
Meanwhile, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cem, visited Kosovo on 
17-18 July, and he opened the "Turkish Coordination Offices" in 
Prishtina and Prizren. Those offices were designed to coordinate the 
distribution of Turkish humanitarian assistance and participate in the 
reconstruction process in Kosovo. During his visit, Cem met the Head of 
UNMIK and the Commander of KFOR. The three talked about the latest 
developments in the region. Cem particularly emphasized the involvement 
of Kosovar Turks in the new administrative structure, and he emphasized 
the preservation of all rights given by the previous administrations. Such 
rights covered printing, broadcasting, education in Turkish as well as 
keeping Turkish as one of the official languages in areas heavily 
populated by the Turks. 
157 http:!/ mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ah/OJ.htm, 28 November 1999 
158Zaman, 8 and 29 July l 999 and http:l/news.bbc.co.uklhi!Eng/ish!wor/d!Europelnesid-
385000/385737.stm, 4 July 1999 
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At the Turkish Coordination Offices, Cem also met with Kosovar Albanian 
leaders, Tachi, Bukoshi and Surrori, who acted as negotiators during the 
Rambouillet talks. In his talks with the Albanian side, Cem mentioned the 
importance of collaboration with international organizations in order to achieve 
a lasting peace in Kosovo159. An overall evaluation of the Turkish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Cem's visit to Kosovo shows the consistent stance of Turkey in 
acting harmoniously with its allies and with the international community. 
Turkey particularly dwelled upon the importance of returning the acquired 
rights to all inhabitants of the region, including the Turkish community. No 
emphasis was made to independence of Kosovo at the end of the interim 
administration in the offıcial Turkish declarations. 
5.10. Creation of the "Stability Pact" for South Eastern Europe 
Although an agreement was reached between NATO and Serbia, which ended 
NATO's air operations against Serbia, there was a long way towards finding a 
political solution to the conflict in Kosovo and the prevention of further 
confrontations between the Serbs and Albanians. On 10 June 1999, the 
European Union members, together with the participation of Turkey, the 
United States, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
159 http:// nıfa.gov.tr!grupa/ah/02.htm, 28 November 1999 
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Romania, Russia and Macedonia met in Cologne and announced the formation 
of the "Stability Pact for South Eastem Europe" 160• 
The basic principles of the Stability Pact were: contribution to "lasting peace, 
prosperity and stability for South Eastem Europe". Besides, the Pact was 
designed to fiınction around three working tables, which consisted of 
"democratization and human rights", "economic reconstruction, development 
and cooperation" and "security issues". It was established to function as a 
forum to develop cooperation and dialogue in a regional context with the 
participation of international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Council of Europe. In 
addition, it was perceived that this forum would help fınd solutions to 
problematic issues that might arise among regional states before such problems 
tum into armed confrontations. To what extent the Stability Pact would be 
effective in achieving the perceived regional aims of the participatory countries 
will be observed in the future. Given the last ten years' developments in the 
volatile peninsula, it is very hard to prejudge its success. But there is no doubt 
that the erisis in Kosovo was the stimulus for the W est, who wanted to prevent 
conflicts in the Balkans before they turned into armed confrontations. 
160 http:// europa.eu.intlcomm./external relationslsee/stapact/JOJune 99.htm, 29 April2001 
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Within this framework, members of the Stability Pact elaborated the priorities 
for a durable solution to the issue of Kosovo 161 : establishment of a democratic 
self-govemment in Kosovo and a democratic administration in Serbia, 
economıc reconstruction in the said region on the basis of free market 
economy, foundation of a truly functioning justice and security system and 
above all, maintenance of an administration that respects fundamental rights of 
individuals who belong to different national communities. For one thing, the 
West prejudged that in case a conflict arose in any part of the Balkans, its 
spread to the whole region might be eliminated through preventive measures 
within the framework ·of the Stability Pact mechanism. 
161 P. Roumeliotis, Promoting Stability in the Balkans (Athens, Li van i Publishing 2001) 
pp.25-29 
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CHAPTER VI 
KOSOVO AFTER THE 1999 CRISIS 
6.1. Kosovo in the Aftermath ofNATO's Intervention 
The issue of Kosovo entered a new phase with the en d of NATO' s military 
intervention. The international community undertook the responsibility of 
establishing an Interim Administration in Kosovo in line with the principles of 
the Rambouillet negotiations and the United Nations resolution 1244. This 
rather uneasy task depended on persuading both parties to fully abide by the 
agreed principles. However, the vagueness of the political agreement 
particularly with respect to the future status of Kosovo created a handicap for 
the international administration (UNMIK), simply because the fınal status of 
Kosovo was not designated. Instead, two points were raised: territorial integrity 
of the FRY and a self-governed system in Kosovo, which would respect 
fundamental human rights. These were rather unattainable goals, particularly 
for the Albanians who openly displayed their unwillingness to live in an non-
independent state of Kosovo. Thus, any outcome, which would not lead to 
independence at the end of the interim period would be rejected by the 
Albanians. However, the FRY accepted the terms of a political deal that 
maintained the country's territorial integrity. Both the divergent attitudes and 
perceptions of the Albanians and the Serbs; and the rather vague character of 
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the political agreement for Kosovo will probably make this matter a top priority 
for the Balkans in the coming years. 
On 1 5 December 1999, both Ihrahim Rugova and Hashim Thaci made an 
agreement with UNMIK in order to disband their underground govemments 162• 
This deal constituted the first step towards normalizİng life in Kosovo after the 
end of NATO's Operation Allied Force and in the process of setting up the 
features of the Interim Administration. It should be kept in mind that 
demilitarization of the KLA was an essential part of the agreement between 
NATO and the FRY, which aimed to establish a truly functioning system of 
justice and security in Kosovo. Moreover, UNMIK decided to use the KLA for 
matters of internal security and transform its forces into "Kosovo Protection 
Corps" (TMK). Disarmament and transformation of the KLA was successful. 
During that process, the Interim Administration faced a further impediment; 
emergence of the "Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac" 
(UCPMB) in three provinces which were located at the southem part of Serbia, 
known as the "Presevo Valley". In fact, certain groups from the KLA, which 
refused to take part in TMK, joined the UCPMB and continued to fight for the 
rights of the Albanians in Serbia. UCPMB intensified i ts activities particularly 
\ 
at the "Ground Security Zone"163 between Serbia and Kosovo, which was 
established after the conclusion of the peace agreement. This was also part of 
16? 
-Balkan Report, (4)10, 4 February 2000 
163 
"Presevo Valley Tension", BBC News, 2 February 2001 
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the Albanian revenge actions, which came to the agenda after Operation Allied 
Force. Interestingly, UCPMB activities decreased after Milosevic was removed. 
The period of political transition in Serbia created a convenient environment 
for the UCPMB to materialize its declared aim of equal rights for the 
Albanians. The main thesis of the UCPMB was that the rights of the Albanians 
who resided in southem Serbian territories were also violated so these people 
should be granted their basic rights and join the future independent state of 
Kosovo. 
6.2. The Latest Developments Regarding Kosovo: Elections in Serbia and 
Kosovo 
In the year 2000 two vital elections directly related to Kosovo's future were 
held in Serbia and Kosovo. On 24 September 2000, presidential elections took 
place in Serbia, which brought an end to Milosevic's rule, thanks to the 
opposition parties that gathered under the "Democratic Opposition of Serbia" 
(DOS) led by Vojislav Kostunica. Milosevic announced the election results 
void once it became clear that he would be ousted from the presidency. On 5 
October, an opposition mavement was activated by the Serbs that protested 
Milosevic's reactionary attitudes to the election results and called for respect to 
the majority votes. With the Serbian mass movement, Vojislav Kostunica and 
his allies from DOS got the chance to fınally set up a new govemment and 
replace the old regime. 
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The election of Kostunica syınbolized the beginning of a new era in domestic 
and foreign policy orientations of the FRY. But a series of problems awaited 
the new presidency164 . The new administration had to set up the rule of law and 
improve the economy and get rid of the authoritarian system by establishing a 
new one that would be appreciated both intemally and extemally165 . In order to 
achieve democratic standards in politics and have a functioning economy, the 
"elected" had to cooperate with the international community, particularly with 
the West. For one thing, the FRY was in need ofmaterial aid in order to rebuild 
the country after almost a decade of wars. This, in tum, forced the rulers of the 
FRY to collaborate with the outside world on issues like the trial of Milosevic 
by the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY had 
issued an indictment on Milosevic because of his violent policies vis-a-vis the 
Albanian population in Kosova, especially in the second half of the 1990s. 
Handing over Milosevic to the Court in The Hague would be a serious step 
taken by the new govemment of the FRY. It would facilitate the integration of 
the FRY with the extemal world166. 
164 E.D. Gordy, "Building ANormal Boring Country: Kostunica's Yugoslavia" Current 
History (March 200 I) pp. ı 09-113 
165 L.J. Cohen, "Post-Milosevic Serbia" Current History (March 2001) and J. Mertus, "Serbia: 
Reınaining Europe' s Outlaw Nation" Journal of International Affairs, (54 )2 (Spring 200 ı) 
pp.489-505 
166 A further belief was that Mi losevi c and his supporters acted as a team s ince ı 989 and figures 
!ike the Bosnian Serb comınander Ratko Mladic, had also coınınitted criınes of war and they 
should, therefore, be trailed altogether. It seemed that the FRY statesınan were coınpelled to 
abide the principles set forth by the outsiders in order to be accepted as a ıneınber of the 
international coınınunity. Taking into consideration the fact that no state can be isolated from 
other states in today's world of interwoven state-to-state relations and trans-boundary 
coınınunication channels, the Serbian state did not have ınuch choice. 
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In Kosova, local elections, organized by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 167, were heldon 28 October 2000. During the local 
elections of 2000, three parties contested. The first was the LDK of 
Rugova. Following the disarmament of the KLA, political legacy split 
among different political parties 168, like the Democratic Party of Kosova 
(PDK) of Hachim Thaci and the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK) 
led by a KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj. Results of the elections 
displayed considerable support of Kosovar Albanians to Ihrahim Rugova, 
while the Serbs and same other minority groups, like the Turks, boycotted 
it. The outcome of the elections enforced the assumption that the 
Albanians in Kosova desired stability in the region instead of chaos and 
armed confrontation. 
Shortly after the results of the Kosova municipal elections were made 
public, Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a press release through which, 
concern about the withdrawal of Turks, together with other ethnic 
groups from the election process was put forward. In the official 
statement, it was mentioned that since the Turkish language had been 
deprived of equal status with Albanian and Serbian languages in the 
registration forms prepared for elections, Kosovar Turks had " rightfully 
167"0SCE Annual Report on OSCE Activities/2000", 
www. os ce. or gl docslengl is h/misel anrepOOOe- activ. htnı#Anchor-1. -4183 4 
168 Elections in Kosova: Maving Towards Denıocracy?, International Crisis Group report 
No:97, 7 July 2000, Pristina, Washington, Brussels, p.21 
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reacted" 169• In its statement, the Ministry put the burden onUNMIK as the 
main institution responsible for coordination of the elections. Further, it 
was demanded that the UN Special Representative of Secretary General 
for Kosovo should take the initiative to appoint members of the legitimate 
political party of Kosovar Turks: Turkish Democratic Union (TDU) to the 
Municipal Assemblies 170• Finally, Turkey' s hope of a final solution to the 
Kosovo issue "through negotiations" was pointed out without any 
reference to the proper method to realize that objective. Apart from 
mentioning the status and fundamental rights of the Turkish population, 
the statement included some general remarks regarding Kosovo and the 
need to find a peaceful solution to the conflict between the Serbs and 
Albanians. What deserves attention regarding Turkish attitude is that 
policy was based on the protection of the rights of Turks living in 
Kosovo, rather than an overall approach to the solution of this conflict 
from Turkey's perspective. 
To the surprise of many people, the winner of the October 2000 local elections 
was the moderate LDK of Rugova. This clearly implied that there was a great 
desire for peace among the people living in Kosovo in the aftermath of the 
1999 ethnic confrontation. Another major development was the establishment 
of "Kosovo Protection Corps" (TMK) within the framework of the peace 
169 
"Local elections in Kosovo" on http://www.mfa.gov.trlgrupblbalbaa20/november 
170 ibid 
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agreement, w hi ch fınalized the bom b ing campaign by NA TO against the Serbs 
in ı 999. In essence, the TMK was planned by the United Nations as a civilian 
power, which would take on tasks like disaster response, search and rescue171 
and would be the successor of the KLA. However, the Albanians made a 
different evaluation since they regarded the new structure as a trained national 
force, w hi ch would function in case the integrity of Kosova was threatened 172. 
Although the winner of the October 2000 local election in Kosova was 
Rugova, an overall evaluation of the facts in this problematic environment puts 
forward the fact that the LDK was not the only influential political 
organization 173 . The political arın of the KLA represented by Hashim Thaci 
and the Albanians who stili perceive military power as a necessity for this 
province, all have a say on their own future. 
6.3. The New Constitutional Framework for Kosovo 
In M ay 200 ı, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations for Kosova promulgated the "The New 
Constitutional Framework" which put forward the principles of self-
government in Kosova, before the general elections took place in 
1 
N ovember 2001. The principles of the "N e w Constitutional 
171 L. Cohen, "Kosova: Nobody's Country" Current History (March 2000) 
172 ibid 
173 R. Lani, "Rugova and the UÇK: Chronicle of A Shifting Peace" The International 
Spectator, 34 (4) (October-December 1999) pp.29-40, p.39 
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Framework" can be enumerated as follows 174: The Assembly will 
consist of 120 members. The President will be elected by a two-thirds 
majority of the Assembly for a tem of three years. The 'Presidency", 
elected by the Assembly, will consist of seven members determined by 
the rate of votes. However, the Serbs and non-Alhanian or non-Serb 
communities will have "one" reserved seat each in the Presideney 
appointed by the representatives of these ethnic groups. The 
"Government" will be presided by the Prime Minister with nıne 
Minİsters who will be proposed by the President and approved by the 
Assembly175 • Although the New Constitutional Framework set the 
parameters of self-government in Kosovo, the functions of the Special 
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Kosovo 
will continue with respect to administration and cohesion between 
various international organizations. This was due to the legal 
recognition of the resolution 1244 that acknowledged Kosovo as part 
of the FRY. 
On 17 November 2001, general elections were held. The LDK was the 
forerunner of the elections winning 47 seats of the 120 members Assembly, 
while the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) led by Hashim Thaci won 26 
174 D.H. Demekas, J. Herderschee and D.F. Jacobs, Kosova: Institutions and Policiesfor 
Reconstruction and Growth (Washington OC, IMF Publication Service 2002) p.4 
175 S. Vinogradov, "Kosovo: A Milestone on the Road to Democracy" UN Chronicle, No:2 
(2001) p.72 
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seats and the Alliance for the Future ofKosovo (AAK) got 8 seats176• The Serb 
"Return" (Povratak) coalition became the third popular party winning 22 seats 
in the elections. Within this confıguration, the Kosovo Assembly failed to elect 
a President following the end of the general elections. It was on 4 March 2002 
when the Assembly fınally succeeded to elect Ihrahim Rugova as the President 
and Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK as Prime Minister through a compromise of 
the three Albanian parties: LDK, PDK and AAK177• 
6.4. The Spread of the "Albanian Question" to' Macedonia 
A small group of armed Albanians killed three Macedonian poticemen in 
Tanusevci178, located in the north of Macedonia, just across the border with 
Kosovo on 4 March 2001. This was the beginning of a series of nationalİst 
events in Macedonia, to unfold an organized armed rebellious Albanian group 
called "National Liberation Army" (NLA). Although the fırst attacks of the 
NLA were not taken seriously, the continuous actions of the group attracted 
foreign attention. The chaos later spread to Tetevo and Kumanovo179• The NLA 
and its supporters had concrete demands from Macedonia. Like the other ethnic 
Albanian groupsin Kosovo and Presevo Valley, they demanded equal rights for 
176 T. Ripley, "Instability Reigns in the Southem Balkans" Jane's Intelligence Review (March 
2002) p.39 
177 V. Kozin, "Kosovo at the Crossroads" International Affairs:A Russian Journal of World 
Politics, Diplomacy and InternationaiRelations, ( 48)3 (2002) pp.l98-209, p.208 
178 "The Tanusevci Story" Balkan Report, (5)18 (9 March 2001) 
179 "Macedonia Conflict", BBC News, 9 May 2001 
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every individual in Macedonia. Their claims particularly rested on an equal 
constitutional status for both the Macedonians and Albanians, acceptance of 
Albanian as offıcial language of the state and equal job opportunities in state 
institutions. 
The roots of problematic relations between the Albanians and the Macedonian 
administration goes back to 1989, when an amendment was made to the 
Macedonian Constitution. By this amendment the republic was defıned as the 
"national sate of the Macedonian nation" by abolishing the previous 
designation of the statehood as the "state of the Macedonian people and the 
Albanian and Turkish minorities" 180• Shortly after the dissolution of ex-
Yugoslavia, Macedonia declared its independence on 17 September 1991. 
Since Macedonia achieved its sovereignty in a peaceful manner, the status of 
minorities in that ex-Yugoslav republic was not considered to be problematic 
by the international community that had later deployed the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in order toprevent the spread of 
Yugoslav wars of dissolution to the south. 
180 R.W. Mickey and A.S. Albion, "Success in the Balkans?: A Case Study ofEthnic Relations 
in the Republic ofMacedonia" in I.M. Cuthbertson and J. Leibowitz (eds) Minorities: The New 
Europes Old /ssue (Westview Press 1993) p.57 
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Macedonian state has a sui generis ethnic composition, which consisted of Slav 
Macedonians (60 %), Albanians (23 %), Turks (4%), Rhomas (3%), Serbs 
(2%) and Vlachs (0.4 %). The ethnic confıguration of the country is like a 
small picture of the Balkans, where the population is made up of multiple 
ethnic and religious groups. Being the second largest ethnic group in 
Macedonia, the Albanians had certain demands from the rulers since the fırst 
multi-party elections, which brought Kiro Gligorov to the presideney in 1990. 
The Albanians mainly focused on access to language and educational rights, 
free media in their native language and equal opportunities in various state 
occupations181 . All these demands pointed to the achievement of equal status in 
both the state apparatus and Macedonian social life, since they felt that they 
were discriminated against. In 1995, the Albanian attempt to set up a private 
Albanian-language university in Tetovo was harshly repressed by the 
Macedonian police. In essence, the Albanians desired to play a more active role 
particularly after seceding from Yugoslavia and they wanted an "autonomous 
status" 182 for the northern and western parts ofMacedonia, where a large group 
of Albanians lived. However, the Albanian demands were neglected by the 
Macedonian regime. 
181 A. Ackerman, "The FYROM:A Relatively Successful Case ofConflict Prevention" Security 
Dialogue, (27)4 ( 1996) pp.409-424, p.411 
182 S.J. Kaufman, "Preventive Peacekeeping, Ethnic Violence and Macedonia" Studies in 
Conflict andTerrorism, (19)3 (1996) pp 229-246, p.235 
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The influx 183 of huge number of Albanians in to Macedonia, following 
the Kosovo erisis in ı 999, led to discomfort on the part of Macedonia. 
The fear was that increase in number of the Albanians who resided in 
Macedonia might change the balance in favor of the Albanians and 
stimulate long awaited uprising by that major ethnic group. A further 
ca use for the 200 ı uprising was the escape of former KLA and UCPMB 
paramilitaries to Macedonia. These extremist groups aimed to 
materialize their national objectives by simultaneous erises in states 
where large group of ethnic Albanians lived. This tendeney repeated 
itself particularly after the Kosovo erisis of 1999. 
When the conflicts intensified in Macedonia, a "government of national 
unity" 184 was established on ı3 May 2001 t~ end the uprising and 
prepare the state for the early general elections of 2002. The new 
government was headed by Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski from the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). Democratic 
Party for the Macedonian National Unity (DPMNE) and Democratic 
Party of Albanians (PDSH) and the Party of Democratic Prosperity 
(PPD) made up two Albanian parties of the coalition government. 
However the coalition failed to implement the necessary measures to 
183 D. Perry, "Macedonia's Quest for Security and Stability" Current History (March 2000) 
184 
"The New Macedonian Govemment inFacts and Figures" Balkan Report, (5)36 ( 18 May 
2001) 
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satisfy the Albanian insurgents and to stop atrocities which resumed in 
the northern part of the state. 
Later the "Ohrid Agreement" was signed between the Albanians and the 
Macedonians on 13 August 2001 185 . Furthermore, NATO implemented 
"Operation Essential Harvest", which continued between 22 August-23 
September 2001. Upon this operation, 3500 NATO troops were sent to 
Macedonia for providing logistical support to disarm ethnic Albanian groups 
and destroy their weapons. Following the termination of this, NATO started i ts 
"Operation Arnher Fox" with 700 troops with a specifıc mandate to provide 
protection for international monitors who would observe the adoption of the 
Ohrid Agreement. On 15 September 2002, general elections were held in 
Macedonia. The most vital outcome was the overwhelming victory of the 
Albanian party of "Democratic Union for Integration" led by the prominent 
figure Ali Ahmeti186. Since this party had a great success at the elections, its 
participation in the new govemment became possible. 
185 J.L.C. Eldridge," Playing at Peace: Western Politics, Diplomacy and the Stabilization of 
Macedonia" European Security, (11)3 (Autumn 2002) pp.46-90, p.65 
186 
"Stakes High in Macedonia Election" Jane's Intelligence Review (August 2002) 
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6.5. Further Disintegration of the FRY? : The Issue of Montenegro and 
Its Impact on Kosovo 
The divergence of opinion and uneven balance in administrative matters, 
between two remnant republics of former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, 
came to the surface in 1997 when the Montenegrin govemment adopted the 
"Proposal for the New Commonwealth of States of Serbia and Montenegro" on 
5 August187• This was a vital step on the way towards independence and setting 
Montenegro free from fait accomplis of the Milosevic regime in domestic 
politics and foreign policy. Besides, the Montenegrin proposal was the outcome 
of a cansensus reached by three political parties of the ruling coalition. From 
the point of view of the Montenegrin regime and particularly president Milo 
Djukanovic, the proposal symbolized the formal end of the FRY since it aimed 
to restructure the political and economic relationship between the remnant 
republics. Montenegro made efforts to rearrange the formal link between the 
two since 1997 through its demands for democratization and economic 
liberalization. Moreover, Podgorica had its own political and economic links 
with the West despite Serbian opposition. After declaring their "Proposal", 
Montenegrin statesmen designated a specific time span to the Serbian regime 
for the acceptance of their political future. Montenegro wamed Serbia by threat 
of a referendum for independence in case their proposal was rejected. 
187 Z. Kusovac, "Milosevic Prepares to Play out Montenegro" Jane's Intelligence Review 
(September 1999) 
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Disagreement between the two republies eame to the surfaee again, partieularly 
during the Kosovo erisis of ı 998. The Montenegrin regime eritieized 
Milosevie's violent attitude towards the Albanians. In a newspaper report, 
Montenegrin Prime Minister Filip Vujanovie made a eall for the Serbian 
regime for "responsible" behavior188• In his statement, Prime Minister 
Vujanovie reminded the Contaet Group's threats of sanetions and pointed to 
the neeessity of swift and efficient aetion by Serbia in order to prevent the erisis 
getting out of hand. Montenegro intensifıed demands for an independent 
statehood after ı 999. NATO's Operation Allied Foree against the Serbian 
targets (partieularly the infrastrueture and eommunieation channels) and 
international disapproval of Milosevie regıme ereated a convenient 
environment for the Montenegrin demand for independence. For one thing, the 
West seemed to be a voluntary supporter of any politieal and economic 
initiative which would weaken the Serbian state and help overthrow Milosevic 
from the presideney. 
During the year 2000, the issue of Montenegro was neglected partieularly 
because Kosovo's future status attracted most foreign attention, although the 
Montenegrin rulers did not give up their demands for independence. Moreover, 
Milosevie was ousted from the presideney and replaeed by Kostunica. Once 
Milosevic was ousted from his post, the West was no longer interested in and 
188 http:// news6. thdo. bbc. uk/hi!English/specia/-reportl 1998/kosovo2/newsid/64403st, 1 O 
March 1998 
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supportive of movements, which would destabiiize the Balkans and change the 
existing borders. Thus the victory of pro-separatists at the en d of 22 April 2001 
general elections did not pave the way for Montenegrin independence given the 
lack of external sympathy for such a change. In fact, the election results 
displayed an almost evenly division of eleetaral votes: those who favored 
independence and those who demanded reinforcement of close ties with the 
Kostunica regime. Still, Milo Djukonovic and his supporters insisted on equal 
footing between the two republics on administrative facilities. The new Serbian 
regime of Kostunica was applauded by the international community since it 
handed over Milosevic to the ICTY at The Hague shortly after his arrest on 1 
April 2001 189. Serbia and Montenegro signed an agreement that brought a 
special status to their administration on 15 March 2002. Only one year later, in 
2003, two constituent republics of the FRY signed an agreement, which 
changed the name of the state to the "Republic of Serbia and Montenegro". 
This last step brought a special status to the relationships of the two republics. 
Although it was stated that the agreement, which was signed by an initiative of 
the European Union, di d not mean the independence of any of the republics, the 
future status of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro is unknown. The 
unresolved issue of Kosovo's fınal political status and Montenegrin demands 
for eventual independence are directly related to each other. In case 
Montenegro achieves independence, this will display the offıcial end of the 
189 On 15 November 2000, FRY's membership to the OSCE was accepted at the OSCE Vienna 
Summit, see Balkan Report, (4)88 (15 December 2000) 
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state since one of two constituent republics will no longer exist. This in tum, 
may open the way for the Albanian demands for independence, because the 
legal b as e of the 1999 agreements and accords, w hi ch depended on the integrity 
of the FRY will no longer be valid in the absence of Montenegro. Similarly, 
independence of Kosovo may accelerate Montenegrin actions for the common 
e nd. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EV ALUATION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOW ARDS 
KOSOVO AND THE BALKANS IN THE POST-COLD W AR PERIOD 
7.1. TheDevelopmentsin Domestic Politics and Turkey's Foreign Policy 
During the second half of the 1990s, Turkey was very much preoccupied with 
domestic political and economic problems. In 1994, one of the major economic 
erises of the Republican period emerged with tremendous consequences. 
Economic instability led to the allegations of political corruption and social 
dissatisfaction among the people. This was followed by a political 
fragrnentation. A number of new political parties were bom. Some of these 
parties emerged from political splits and did not have major ideological 
differences compared to the existing ones. The outcome was short lived and 
unstable coalition governments that were formed by the political parties, which 
often had totally divergent priorities. The coalition govemments failed to act 
coherently on major economic and political issues. Foreign policy got its share 
from this chaos as well. 
Turkish people sought a government, which would save the state from the 
economic chaos and s tay away from any kin d of corruption. Pro-Islami st RP 
(W elfare Party) or pro-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Action Party), which were 
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not ab le to form govemments or ev en enter the Parliament before the ı 990s 
started to play active roles in Turkish politics. This led to the rise of religious 
movements and the Islamİst political party ofNecmettin Erbakan, the RP. After 
the general elections of ı 996, RP formed a coalition govemment with C iller' s 
DYP where Erbakan was the Prime Minister. Regarding foreign policy, there 
was a division of labor between DYP and RP. While Ciller dealt with the 
European Union affairs, Erbakan took care of relations with the Islamic 
countries 190. 
The RP-DYP coalition govemment was perceived as a threat to the secular 
structure of the state by the public and the policies of the govemment were not 
appreciated by the Turkish establishment191 . Following a social event that was 
organized by one of the municip~lities in Ankara where demonstrations against 
the secular system took place and the guest Iranian diptomats criticized the 
secular structure of the state, the Turkish military was alerted. 28 February 
ı 997 was a tuming point of the tension between the RP-DYP coalition 
govemment and the military. The Chief of the Turkish General Staff prepared 
eighteen points plan in order to abolish anti-secular movements in the country 
and presented it to the govemment during a session of the National Security 
190 P. Robbins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan" Survival, no: 39 (Summer 1 997) 
pp.82- ı 00 
191 M. Cooper, "The Legacy of Ataturk: Turkish Political Structures and Policy Making" 
International Affairs, (78)1 (2002) pp.! 15-128, p.l 19 
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Council192. The plan was a total challenge to the policies of the Erbakan 
government. 28 February symbolized the end of the Erbakan government, 
which lasted less than one year. Although Turkey was ruled by coalition 
governments during the l 990s, the RP-DYP coalition was the most problematic 
one for Turkish politics, since it was perceived as a challenge to secularism. 
During the l 990s, economic instability had been the major problem for Turkish 
governments. Allegations of corruption were put forward against almost all the 
political parties that ruled the country due t~ the economic situation of the 
country and unresolved fınancial crises. People lost faith in politicians. 
Besides, the coalition governments, which were made up of political parties 
with different political perspectives, weakened the effıciency of the executive 
power and slowed down the decision-making mechanism. The ineffıciency of 
the coalition governments was observed in the field of foreign policy as well. 
Turkey made an active start to the post-Cold W ar period, but then lost pace due 
to a series of problems stemming from domestic conditions. The governments 
had to deal with the problem of economic decline, issues related to the social 
system like education, health and social security. In order to deal with the 
domestic issues successfully, the governments had to agree on a certain 
strategy. However, the constituent parties of the coalition governments often 
failed to reach a compromise between themselves. 
192 H. Kramer, Avrupa ve Amerika Karsisinda Degisen Turkiye, (ceviri: Ali Çimen) {İstanbul, 
Timas Yayiniari 200 I) p.l 1 7 
157 
7.2 Turkey and the Dissolution ofYugoslavia 
An examination of Turkish foreign policy shortly after the end of the Cold W ar 
brings one to the conclusion that there was a change in its implementation 
towards a more active diplomacy. What lied behind this change and what 
remained unchanged in objectives and actions of Turkish foreign policy during 
the new era? To answer these questions, conditions of the post-Cold War 
international environment have to be explored. The end of the Cold War 
symbolized the collapse of ideological confrontations while opening the scene 
for new areas of conflict and new challenges to security. The international 
community suddenly came across the eruption of ethno-religious and 
nationalistic wars. There was a need to develop means and mechanisms to 
respond to those crises. In most cases the erises ended with the replacement of 
multi-ethnic and multi-national ~tates with sınaller nation-states, as seenin ex-
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. 
In adapting to the new international political environment, Turkey chose 
to act in harmony with Western allies within NATO. After the occupation 
of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, Turkey supported the military operation 
against the latter. Turkey' s s tan ce during the Gulf W ar of 1991 w as the 
first of a series of international crisis, where Turkey acted in accordance 
with the international community in a conflict, to which it was not a 
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During the wars of Yugoslav dissolution and particularly during the Bosnia 
war, Turkey made utmost effort to end the confrontations in the shortest period 
of time with minimum casualities. Turkey adopted an active line of diplomacy 
within the international organizations and participated in order to achieve this 
aim. Particularly during the 1991-1993 period, it played an active role to 
motivate foreign military intervention to end the armed confrontations ın 
Bosnia. Turkey intensifıed its efforts to make the United States get involved in 
efforts to stop the war. The initiatives of president Özal on behalf of foreign 
military intervention in Bosnia, who negotiated with United States Presidents 
Bush and Clinton, could be considered as part of Turkey' s efforts to provide 
foreign military involvement in Bosnia. Turkey believed that foreign armed 
intervention into the conflict was unavoidable given the military dominance of 
Serbia vis-a-vis the Bosniacs. Turkey put forward a concrete plan (Three Stage 
Plan) to end the war in Bosnia, which included military measures. Turkey 
strongly argued that foreign military involvement in Bosnia was obligatory to 
reach a ceasefire. In this respect Turkey proposed to provide troops for a 
possible multilateral air operation in Bosnia. However, Turkey lacked the 
economic and military means to realize the objectives set in the plan alone. 
Although Turkey's active stance gained sympathy in the Balkans, Greece 
resisted Turkey's policies by daiming that Turkey tried to create an Islamic 
axis in the Balkans against Christian states, particularly against Greece. In light 
of the disputes with Turkey, Greek reaction to the Turkish activities was not 
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surprising. Besi des, Greece followed a ho stil e attitude in the Balkans un til 1995 
and this set the scene for an active and influential Turkish diplomacy. For 
instance, Greek support given to the Serbian regime during the process of 
Yugoslav dissolution and the Kosova erisis of 1999 was not appreciated. 
Besides, Greece refused to recognize Macedonia with its offıcial name and 
started a dispute within the United Nations for an offıcial recognition of the 
name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYROM) instead of "The 
Republic of Macedonia". Turkey, however, recognized "the Republic of 
Macedonia" with its constitutional name after Bulgaria and became the fırst 
state to open an embassy in Skopje. 
7.3. Turkey and the Albanian Crisis of 1997 
In 1997, Albania plunged into turmail since the "pyramid investment schemes" 
collapsed because of weak economic infrastructure and problems of transition 
in political and economic terms. When the chaos in Albania reached its climax, 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tansu Çiller, announced that "Turkey was 
ready to offer help of all kinds" 194, including to take part in any international 
force gathered to normalize life in that cduntry. Shortly after, a Turkish 
1 
delegation composed of military and civilian offıcials started a series of offıcial 
visits, which included Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria in order to fınd a 
194 BBC (SWB), 22 March 1997 
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solution to the erisis in Albania195 • And when the United Nations allowed 
voluntary participation, Turkey took part in that multilateral initiation (MNF) 
and Turkish troops arrived in Albania on 2 ı April ı 997. Turkish military 
deployrnent was responsible for the safe distribution of humanitarian aid in 
Tirana and the northem part of Albania196. 
Intensifıed relations between Turkey and Albania gradually ran out of steam 
with simultaneous change in foreign policy actions of Turkey and Greece, 
particularly after the establishment of a new govemment in Albania following 
the 29 June 1997 parliamentary elections held under the monitoring of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe197. As a result of the 
general elections, a new govemment was formed by the Socialİst Party, headed 
by former communist leader Fatos Nano, the Social Democrats and the 
Democratic Alliance 198. The Greek govemment acted swiftly to cultivate good 
relations with the new socialist govemment, leaving aside allegations related to 
what it called Northem Epirus, Southem Albania, and the treatment of Greek 
Orthodox minority in Albania. In essence, the Greek attitude was an extension 
of the change in foreign policy actions regarding the Balkans since the 
beginning of 1996. 
195 BBC (SWB), 25 March 1997 
196 BBC (SWB) , 21 April 1997 
197 Turkish Daily News, 30 June 1997 
198 Turkish Daily News, 9 July 1997 
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The change in Greek foreign policy started with the improvement of relations 
with Macedonia in ı 996. Greece gradually left aside the rather harsh foreign 
policy line in i ts periphery. For instance, in Iate November ı 997, Greece hosted 
a Balkan Conference199 through which the participants (Turkey, Albania, 
Bulgaria, the FR Y, Romania, Macedonia and Greece) discussed the flash points 
in the Balkans and possible solutions to the problems. During the Conference, 
the Greek side concentrated its efforts on regional cooperation particularly on 
the issues of investment, joint infrastructure and technologl00, and the major 
outcome of the Conference was the cansensus reached on improvement of 
economic ties for further cooperation in the Balkans. 
A further example of Turkish-Greek rivalry for influence in Albania came 
to the fore with a Turkish initiative to rebuild Albania's most important 
military base, Pashalimani that had been destroyed during the late Albanian 
erisis and reconstruction of the naval academy at Vlore201 . However, the 
Albanian government signed a simultaneous agreement with Greece for the 
latter' s lift from the seabed the Albanian military equipment in the harbors 
of Vlore and Sarande, which endangered human lives in the coasts. As part 
of a new foreign policy line, Greece was not willing to set the scene for 
Turkish initiatives in Albania202 . The Greek willingness to cooperate with 
199 BBC (SWB), 3 Noveınber 1997 
200 BBC (SWB), 5 Noveınber 1997 
201 BBC (SWB), 27 January 1998 
202 H. Ünal, "Arnavutluk İyice Yunanistan'a Kayıyor", Zaman, 9 January 1998 
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Albania was welcomed by Albanian authorities, who were in need of urgent 
and big amounts of aid to recover from the crisis. During a visit to Ankara 
in February 1998, President Rexhep Meidani stated that his country was 
open to collaboration with the neighboring countries in every field. 
Pointing out the impact of signing four military cooperation agreements 
with Greece lately, he stated that friendly relations with Greece and Turkey 
would be the k ey to be integrated in different European structures203 . 
Albanian authorities often pointed out that economic ties with Greece was 
perceived as the "key" to integration with Europe204. Turkish-Greek rivalry 
for influence particularly in Albania could be evaluated as part of two 
states' common will and projection to be influential in the region. Given 
the continuous rivalry for influence in the Balkans, this meant a "winner 
takes all" game for Turkey and Greece. To change the strategic balance in 
favor of one side would pave the way for taking the upper hand in future 
regional developments and materializing one's objectives in line with 
national interests at the expense of the other. 
203 BBC (SWB), 14 February 1998 
204 As the Albanian President Rexhep Meidani claimed during a state visit in Ankara, BBC 
(SWB) 14 February 1998 
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7 .4. Turkey and the ls s u e of Kosovo 
In 1995, Turkey signed the Customs Union Agreement with the EU. Turkey 
perceived the Agreement as a step towards the realization of European Union 
membership. The evaluation of the situation by the European Union was quite 
different since it did not consider the Customs Union Agreement as a guarantee for 
Turkey's European Union membeıship205 . However, the ruling coalition government 
of DYP (True Path Party) and CHP (Republican People's Party) that signed the 
Customs Union Agreement on behalf of Turkey, introduced it to the Turkish people 
as the watersbed in the country's relations with the European Union. Turkey's first 
female Prime Minister Tansu Çiller aspired to be the head of the government who 
succeeded to achieve Turkey's membership in the European Union. The foreign 
policy of the ruling coalition governments headed by Tansu Çiller (1993-1996)206 
focused on Turkey- European Union relations and all the other issues of extemal 
relations became secondary in priority. Accession to the European Union has been a 
foreign policy priority of the Turkish governments since the 1950s. The Turkish 
people have expected to be a part of the Union for a very long time. After signing the 
Customs Union agreement, Prime Minister Çiller tried to benefit from the advantages 
of the occasion for her political career as well. 
205 B. Yeşilada, "Turkey's Candidacy for EU Membership" Middle East Journal, (56)ı 
(Winter 2002) pp.94-ı ı ı, p.95 
206 First Çiller Govemment (25 June ı 993-ı5 October ı 995), Second Çiller Govemment (ı5 
October ı 995-5 November 1995), Third Çiller Govemment (5 November ı 995- ı2 March 
1996). 
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When membership to the European Union became the number one issue, 
Turkey' s foreign policy towards the Balkans or any other region lik e the 
Middle East or Central Asia was neglected. In the second half of the 1990s, 
Turkey's involvement in the Balkans slowed down. Turkey seemed to 
withdraw from the Balkans while the Greek attitude towards the region totally 
changed. After realizing that a hostile attitude distanced it from the Balkans, 
Greece started a process of reformutating its foreign policy on the basis of 
cooperation. Greece mended its relations with Macedonia and sought to 
establish close relations with Albania. Greece realized that its pro-Serbian 
stance during the process of Yugoslav dissolution and the ı 999 Kosovo erisis 
was not welcome by the regional states and particularly by the ex-Yugoslav 
republics. 
Turkey ended up with a low-profile attitude in foreign policy. The ı 999 
Kosovo erisis came out when Turkey lost interest in the Balkans. During the 
period of 1995-1998, Turkey had a positive attitude towards the Milosevic 
regime. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Milosevic was 
considered as the guarantor of the peace in Yugoslavia. Turkey accepted this 
Westem perception and supported the Milosevic regime, despite the fact that 
\ 
1 
this line of policy distanced it from Albania. Both Albania proper and the 
Kosovar Albanians considered Turkey as a natural ally in the Balkans. Despite 
the expectations of the Albanians, Turkey supported the Milosevic regime after 
166 
the realization of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This meant the avoidance of 
the accelerating tension between the Albanians and Serbs. 
Examination of Turkish foreign policy towards the issue of Kosovo between 
1991-2001 puts forward the fact that Turkey failed to develop a foreign policy 
line w hi ch reflected i ts own perception of the developments that helped realize 
its national interests, long before the conflict turned into a crisis. Taking into 
consideration historic ties with the region, expectations of Kosovar Turks and 
Albanians and Turkish cl ai m of i.>eing a "regional power", Turkey should have 
been more active and followed a more determined line on this issue. However 
Turkish policy towards Kosovo could not be separated from the overall 
framework of Turkey's foreign policy. This was coupled by the domestic 
weaknesses of the country (like economic underdevelopment and lack of 
monetary resources, dissolution of politics, rivalry and disagreement among the 
different branches of the executive) w hi ch becomes an obstacle for efficient 
action in the international arena. 
After the conflict in Kosovo turned into a cnsıs ın 1999, Turkey acted 
harmoniously with NATO allies and demanded that the Milosevic regıme 
should end repression in Kosovo. Turkey repeated the statements made by 
international organizations and supported their initiatives to solve the conflict. 
Turkey' s official statements regarding the Kosovo erisis pointed out to 
maintaining common stance with the international community. These claims 
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have become justifıcations for the low profıle attitude that Turkey followed 
during the Kosovo crisis. Turkey refrained from taking unilateral actions, like 
playing the role of a reliable mediator between the Albanians and the Serbs. 
Turkey' s Kosovo policy focused mainly on the protection of the rights of the 
Turkish community in Kosovo. Interestingly Turkey started to highlight the 
rights of the Turkish community when the United States and the West made 
efforts to protect the Albanians. After dashes between the Albanians and the 
Serbs reached a elimax in 1998, the international community naturally 
concentrated on the violation of the rights of the Albanians. Since Turkey 
emphasized particularly the rights of the Turkish community in offıcial 
statements, this policy did not coincide with the expectations of the Albanians 
who were in need of international support against Serbian repression. Turkey 
preferred to make offıcial declarations that gave support to the initiatives of the 
United States and the West. After the erisis of 1999 and NATO's Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo, Turkey took part in KFOR and got militarily involved 
in the region. 
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CONCLUSION 
Various factors appear to have shaped Turkish foreign policy towards the issue 
of Kosovo. The Kosovo problem arose as one of the most important security 
challenges in the Balkans (and Europe) in the post-Cold War period. The 
emergen ce of the 1999 Kosovo erisis can not be separated from the eruption of 
the "larger Albanian question" in the Balkans in the 1 990s. The issue of 
Kosovo is related to the "larger Albanian question" that constitutes a sui 
generi s example with i ts potential to spread to the Balkans. The division of the 
large group of Albanians into different states is an old problem in the Balkans. 
The end of the Ottoman influence on these territories did not lead to the 
creation of a nation-state that included all the Albanians. Instead, the Albanian 
population was separated and put under the rule of various states in the region 
by the London Conference of Ambassadors in 1912. The Balkans Wars, World 
War I and II did not change the situation and the Albanians remained 
concentrated particularly in Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece. The artificial 
division of the Albanian population was the starting point of a prolonged 
"Albanian question" in the Balkans. Those people were either put under strict 
control by the host states or they were not able to live in accordance with their 
national identity, stemming from the ho st states' perception of the se people as 
potential sources of instability. 
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Kosovo is located in the Balkans. Turkey has historic and cultural links with 
the Balkans, which go back to the Ottoman times. Besides, the Balkans is a 
corridor between Turkey and Europe. In addition, in the early 1990's, Turkey 
had ambitions to be a "regional power" in the Balkans. This ambition naturally 
pushed Turkey to obtain an influential position in the events of the region. lt 
was expected that Turkey would play an active and determining role in one of 
the most im portant problems of the Balkans in the post-Cold W ar period. The 
expectations of the Turkish nationals and the Albanians who live both in 
Albania proper and in Kosovo also compelled Turkey to take a more active 
s tan ce. 
The dissertation aims to show that Turkey did not follow an active policy 
towards the issue of Kosovo. Turkey ignored the developments in Kosovo un til 
the Serbian oppression against the Albanians turned into a erisis in 1999. One 
reason was that the Kosovo erisis emerged at a time when Turkey lost interest 
in the region. After the signing of the Customs Union Agreement with the 
European Union in 1995, membership to the Union became the foreign policy 
priority of Turkey. Ankara made efforts to fulfıll the requirements of 
membership and started a process of domestic reform particularly for 
realization of the Copenhagen political criteria, which were put forward by the 
European Union. Although Turkey applied active diplomacy towards the 
Balkans in the fırst half of the 1990s, this was followed by a low-profıle policy 
in the second half of the decade. After the signing of the Dayton Peace 
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Agreement, Turkey thought that the erises in the Balkans ended and believed 
that Milosevic should be supported since he was perceived as the guarantor of 
Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Why was the issue vital for Turkish foreign policy and why should Turkey have 
been more active? The cultural and historic residue of the Ottoman past is an 
indispensable part of the Balkans. With its long-term rule, which lasted about 
five hundred years, Turkey has a special and advantageous starting point to 
play an influential role in the region. It is very common to talk about Turkish 
imprint on architecture, language, social and cultural traditions of the Balkans. 
The end of the Cold W ar provided states with an international environment that 
leads to more contact and cooperation since the ideological obstacles were 
abolished. Turkey felt relieved with the disintegration of the neighboring Soviet 
Union, the leader of the communist camp. The initial fears that Turkey might 
lose its strategic importance in the eyes of the Western allies, given the 
disappearance of the communist threat, di d not com e true. On the contrary, not 
only Turkish politicians, but also most analysts of international relations argued 
that Turkey had political, economic and social potential to act as a regional 
power. 
Being located at the crossroads of three continents, Turkey is expected to have 
a say in the events of the surraunding regions: the Balkans, the Middle East, 
Caucasus and the Black Sea region, taking into consideration its claims of 
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being a regional power. In order to play such a role the state should have the 
necessary qualifıcations and political will. A state can be considered a regional 
power to the extent that it makes others believe that it has the capability to 
influence the events of a particular region. Two factors play a determining role 
in labeling a state as regional power. The fırst factor is the capabilities of that 
state. These include political, economic strength and stability. The second 
factor is the perception of other states. That means the regional power should 
have influence to make other states act or refrain from acting in the way it 
demands. This is only possible when the others have the belief that the regional 
power has the means to make them act in accordance with its own policies. 
Other states should be aware that in case of non-obedience they would be 
penalized by the stronger. 
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of super power, which was 
attributed to the Soviet Union and the United States, leaders of two ideological 
camps, ceased to exist. Today regional powers have extended room for 
maneuver. When the Cold War came to an end, Turkey rose as a strong 
regional power. This was the common view of international analysts and the 
claim of the Turkish ruling elite. The geographical location of the country and 
the strong historic ties with the surraunding states created a conducive 
environment for Turkey to be more active in extemal political and economic 
contacts. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a group of Turkish 
speaking states emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus, together with new 
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democracies and market economies in Eastern Europe as potential areas of 
cooperation. 
In the Balkans, Turkey signed economic cooperation agreements with Bulgaria 
and Romania, resulting in considerable amounts of economic profıt for Turkish 
businessmen. Turkey and Bulgaria found a peaceful solution to the problem 
that sternmed from Bulgarian policy of ethnic discrimination, which had 
influenced the Turkish minority living in that state. Turkey also signed defense 
cooperation agreements with Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia. However, 
Turkey' s improving relations with the Balkan states annoyed Greece. Greece 
started the 1990s with worsening relations with the neighboring countries. 
During the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, Greece supported the Serbian side. 
This created a negative image of Greece taking into consideration the policy of 
ethnic discrimination and ethnic cleansing followed by the Serbs during the 
wars. When Yugoslavia collapsed, Greece refused to recognize Macedonia 
with its constitutional name by putting forward histarical and cultural reasons. 
Whereas Turkey was the second state, following Bulgaria, to recognize "The 
Republic of Macedonia" with i ts constitutional name and the fırst state to open 
an embassy in Skopje. Rivalry and unresolved problems between Turkey and 
Greece continued after the end of the Cold War. Greece even argued that 
Turkish active stance in the Balkans sternmed from the "Islamic encirclement" 
policy against Greece. Greek claims concerning Turkey did not reflect the truth 
since Turkey's foreign policy towards the Balkans has never been built on a 
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religious basis. Turkey's active involvement sternmed from the conducive 
international political environment and this policy lost strength and slowed 
down as result of domestic problems that the state faced. Among these 
problems, the PKK issue and fight against terrorist activities of this 
organization, enduring economic problems like high rate of inflation, 
unemployment, low amount of investment, and unstable coalition governments 
that ruled the country since 1991 all had direct and negative influences on 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Particularly in the second half of the ı 990s, Turkish involvement in the 
Balkans remained low profıle. Turkey's approach to the issue of Kosovo is 
very teliing in that sense. Although the problems pertaining to Kosovo were not 
new, tension between the Albanians and the Serbs intensifıed with the 
Yugoslav wars of dissolution and turned into an armed conflict in the second 
half of the decade. Turkey did not develop a clear and long-term policy about 
Kosovo before the issue turned in to an international crisis. Ev en after the ı 999 
Kosovo erisis erupted, Turkey followed the policy line determined by the 
Western states under the teadership of the United States. Turkey was contended 
with joining the statements made by the West and supporting the initiatives of 
the Contact Group, the European Union, Organi~ation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and NATO. It was prestigious to support international 
attempts to solve the problem but Turkey followed a low profile approach 
throughout the erisis although it contributed to the international security force 
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(KFOR) in Kosovo by sending troops after the intervention of NATO. The 
expectation for the future would be an intensifıed and more active Turkish 
involvement in similar crisis. 
Although the prolonged issue of Kosovo, which reached its elimax and turned 
into a "crisis" in 1999 had manifold implications for the Balkans, i ts direct and 
fırst instance influence was observed in the FRY207. Ironically, Kosovo had 
been the fırst target of Serbian nationalism and irredentism, which was 
activated by Milosevic shortly after he came to power. Starting from the second 
half of the 1 980s, Milosevic manipulated the issue of Kosovo in order to 
legitimize his rule and justify extreme nationalistic policies. Initially Milosevic 
sought strengthening Serbian influence within Yugoslavia. When it became 
clear that other constituent republics (particularly Slovenia and Croatia) would 
not automatically accept the overwhelming Serbian influence in Yugoslav 
domestic politics, Milosevic resorted to armed measures to enforce Serbian 
doruinance and motivated the Serbs in Yugoslavia against the rule of the host 
republics. Milosevic aimed to fınd supporters to his extreme nationalistic aims 
and create political instability in the rival republics in order to create "Greater 
Serbia". Without any doubt, Milosevic fıred nationalistic/ethnic tensions and 
started the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. The struggle against the "common 
enemy", be it Croatians, Slovenes and/or Bosniacs strengthened the teadership 
207 The name ofthe state has been changed to the "Republic ofSerbia and Montenegro" in 
2003 by an agreement signed by the two constituent republics of the ex-FRY. 
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of Milosevic. Thus, nobody dared to or even thought of changing the ruling 
govemment in Serbia. Instead, the Serbs took joint action to create "Greater 
Serbia" at the expense of other Yugoslav republics. 
The rise of nationalİst sentiments and dissolution of multi-national states 
became the characteristics of the post-Cold War period. During the wars of 
Yugoslav dissolution, analysts expected that armed confrontations might 
spread to regional states since they might re-start historic territorial 
disagreements and questions of sovereignty, which were ignored during the 
Cold War. It was expected that nationalİst wars might spread to near abroad 
because of territorial proximity and the social reality that no state in the 
Balkans is an homogenous entity in terms of national, ethnic and/or religious 
features of their populations. 
The Bosnia war was the fırst post-Cold War erisis in the Balkans with a 
potential to expand territorially. One basic feature of the Bosnia war was that it 
was both a national and a religious confrontation in terms of the warring 
parties. Gradually it turned into a struggle between "Christian" Serbs and 
"Muslim" Bosnians. Thus the prolonged conflict led to fears that the 
\ 
neighboring regional states might get involved 'in the conflict by giving support 
to the warring parties. The "religious war" scenario was based on the 
assumption that Greece would take part on the Serbian side while Turkey, 
Macedonia and Albania would fıght on the Bosnian side. Such a scenario did 
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not beeome true. But when the ı 999 Kosova erisis erupted, similar eoneems 
eame to the agenda. The fear was that the eonfliet between the Serbs and the 
Albanians might expand to the Balkans. It was alsa claimed that the potential 
of the Kosova erisis to spread was more than the previous erises sinee almost 
half of the Albanian population in the Balkans resided in territories that 
eneircled Kosova. 
The issue of Kosova had a peeuliar position ın Yugoslav dissolution. It 
remained as a prolonged and waiting issue sinee the beginning of the ı 980s. 
Nationalistie tensions between the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosova 
accelerated simultaneously with the eruption of ethno-nationalism all over the 
world, at the beginning of the 1 990s. Milosevic desired to achieve "Greater 
Serbia", whereas the Albanians resisted Serbian oppression. This created hatred 
and tension between the two nation. Kosova is "symbolie" for the Albanians 
s ince they claim that the region has been the cradie of their national awakening. 
The Albanian movements of opposition against the Yugoslav communist rule 
alsa emerged in Kosova. The dissatisfaction of the Albanian population paved 
the way for aehievement of "autonomy" in ı974. However, shortly after the 
death of Tito, Kasavar Albanians raised their voiees for equal status like other 
constitutional republics, which would open the way for eventual independence. 
Thus the Milosevic regime had alsa attributed a syınbolic importance to 
Kosova in the achievement of "Greater Serbia". 
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The 1999 erisis and NATO's intervention was a tuming point for the issue of 
Kosova. Intemationalization of the issue had direct influence on domestic 
politics of the FRY. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, 
Milosevic was accepted as a "partner" by the United States and the W est. 
Milosevic cooperated with the Westem states, which sought a peaceful 
settlement to the process of Yugoslav dissolution. Milosevic was an 
inseparable actor of the post-Dayton peace implementation process. After the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the process of re-integrating the FRY 
to international politics started. With the end of civil war, an environment 
suitable for the rule of Milosevic appeared since the wars of dissolution ended 
by a peace agreement. 
The Milosevic regime abused the process of nonnalizing domestic and foreign 
policy in the FRY. This became evident particularly in Kosova. Tension 
between the Albanians and Serbs intensified in the second half of the 1 990s 
since the Albanians were dissatisfied when they were left outside the 
framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement and repression of the Albanians by 
the Milosevic regime continued. During the Dayton Peace talks, the 
international community turned a blind eye to the issue of Kosova in order not 
to annoy Milosevic and persuade him to accept the provisions of a peaceful 
agreement to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The policy of appeasement 
gave a free hand to the Milosevic regime since the claims that Kosova is an 
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"internal matter" of the FRY was tacitly accepted. This led to the acceleration 
of the conflict with broader implications for Serbia and the FRY. 
The international community feared that worsening of the situation in Kosovo 
might create a security threat by flaring up the "larger Albanian question" in the 
Balkans. Foreign intervention in Kosovo was no surprise for the analysts of 
international politics, although it was a surprise for the Milosevic regime. 
Under conditions of rising nationalism, the West was concemed about the 
potential of the Kosovo issue to spread through the Balkans, paving the way for 
inevitable and prolonged chaos. Taking into consideration the Bosnian 
example, there was much fear that the Kosovo issue might tum into war 
between the regional states, whi~h were perceived as "potential sides" of the 
conflict. Thus the fear of "regional" confrontation led to foreign intervention. 
The defeat of the FRY as a result of NATO intervention had two maJor 
consequences for the ruling govemment. The Milosevic administration lost 
legitimacy and political credibility in the eyes of both the domestic public and 
the international community. Continuous repression of non-Serb nationals and 
the authoritarian system of rule were no longer tolerated by the international 
community after the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Besides, Milosevic was perceived as 
an obstacle to the establishment of a democratic state that respects fundamental 
rights and freedoms of all the people in the FR Y. The 24 September 2000 
elections displayed an overwhelming loss of domestic support for the 
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Milosevic administration. Although Milosevic insisted to stay in power, public 
resistance and collaboration of the major opposition parties led to the 
establishment of a new govemment and Milosevic was ousted from the 
presidency. 
Albanians who are living dispersed in various Balkan states constitute the 
majority in certain parts of the host states and those territories are located very 
close to each other. This has been perceived as a security challenge to the 
region because of the fear that Albanians might gather and establish the larger 
Albanian state in the future. Although the realization of the larger Albanian 
state seems unattainable for the time being, fear remains on the part of the 
states, which host huge Albanian populations. What makes the 1999 Kosovo 
erisis vital was that, the movement of the Albanians towards Albania and 
Macedonia as a result of the armed confrontations changed the confıguration of 
the population in these states. The developments that took place in Macedonia 
at the beginning of 2001 made clear that the Al hanian question remains to be a 
security challenge to the Balkans and Europe. The unrest created by the NLA 
and the operations undertaken by NATO (Operation Essential Harvest and 
Operation Arnher Fox) to end the fıghting between the rebellious Albanians 
and the Macedonian security forces are very teliing in t~at sense. 
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The signature of the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the 
FR Y in June 1999 ended NA TO air strikes against Serbian targets. But that 
agreement did not clarify the future administrative status of Kosovo. On the 
one hand, the agreement guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
FR Y and accepted that Kosovo would remain as part of that s ta te. On the other 
hand, the international agreements safeguarded eventual self-rule for Kosovo. 
This rather complicated picture became even more complex with the 
involvement of various international organizations in the matter, each of them 
holding different duties for the reconstruction of social, economic and political 
life in Kosovo. Those international organizations work under the auspices of 
UNMIK, which was established in 1999 by the United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1244. The international community was directly involved in 
the matter by holding responsibilities in various fields of life in Kosovo. 
Kosovo remained part of the FRY after NATO's intervention and elections 
took place in the province following the establishment of UNMIK. In both the 
28 October 2000 municipal elections and the 17 November 2001 general 
elections, the LDK of Rugova got majority of the votes. Those elections were 
vital in two respects. First, an overwhelming1 number of the Kosovar people 
\ 
1 
showed loyalty to the LDK leader Rugova and his modest policies on the way 
towards independence. Second, tae elections were evaluated as building blocks 
for establishing a democratic self-rule in Kosovo. From the perspective of the 
Kosovar Albanians, the 1999 erisis and the following developments in the 
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regıon opened the way for inevitable self-govemment and eventual 
independence of Kosovo. Despite the interpretations of the Albanians that the 
existing situation in Kosovo would lead to independence, the international 
community does not support a radical solution to the problem. The 
international documents about the province favored the maintenance of 
territorial integrity of the FRY and sovereign rights of that state in Kosovo. 
This was made clear particularly after Milosevic was ousted from the 
presideney on 5 October 2000. The victory of the anti-Milosevic parties was 
realized when all the opposition forces gathered in order to topple down 
Milosevic since he was perceived as the source of problems in the FRY 
because of his (and his party's) extreme nationalistic policies. Serbian 
opposition parties received international support. Vojislav Kostunica replaced 
Milosevic and became the new president. When the opposition parties, under 
the teadership of Kostunica came to power in Serbia, the international 
community evaluated this as the fırst step of establishing a democratic rule in 
the FR Y s ince Milosevic was no longer in power. 
Ambiguity canceming the political status of Kosovo continues since the end of 
the 1999 eri sis. Initial step s for the development of self-rule started shortly after 
the end of NATO attacks. The "Kosovo Transitional Council" (KTC) was 
established in July 1999 to function as a supreme local consultative bodj08, a 
208 A. Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration" Survival, (43)2 (Summer 2001) 
pp.31-48, p.39 
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forum of reconciliation among the Albanian teaders and between the Albanians 
and the international community. In September 1999, the process of 
demilitarizing the KLA started and the organization transformed into the 
"Kosovo Protection Corps" (KPC). The KPC was designed as an internal 
security force to provide a civilian and uniform emergency response service. 
This would help control and constrain the destabilizing tendencies within the 
KLA. The third step was the establishment of the "Joint Interim Administrative 
Structure" (HAS). Within that structure, the Albanians had the chance to work 
for building up a civilian administration together with international forces. This 
would provide legitimacy for international rule among the Albanian population 
while maintaining democratic participation in the new administrative 
structure209. Holding the municipal (2000) and general (2001) elections have 
further contributed to the establishment of a democratic system of rule with the 
participation of each national group living in Kosovo. 
International observers create different scenarıos for the future of Kosovo. 
Among these, three scenarios attract attention for the foreseeable future. In the 
first one, Kosovo remains as an "international protectorate" under the control 
of the United Nations. For many, this would be the natural outcome for the 
future, given the vagueness of future political status and the existence of an 
"interim" administration that ruled the province s ince the second half of 1999. 
209 ibid 
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The simple formula depends on the transformatian of the interim 
administration (UNMIK) to a permanent one, by improving the existing 
political and economic system. But this formula is contrary to the claims of the 
international community, which were based on the maintenance of FRY's 
sovereign rights over the province. Besides, establishment of a permanent 
international protectorate would mean referring back to the old methods of 
international politics at a time when the tendeney is towards strengthening 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. 
The second scenario represents the other extreme: "Independent Kosovo". This 
option totally neglects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and 
naturally it would find supporteıs among the Albanians210, who struggled for 
that aim s ince the beginning of the ı 980s. According to that scenario, the 
international administration would gradually tum into a separate political and 
economic entity where the Albanians would hold the power. Here the basic 
claim is that there already exists a political environment conducive for the 
transformatian of the existing interim administration into an independent 
political structure under the control of the Albanians who make up the majority 
of the population. The motive is that since the ı 999 crisis, Kosovo entered in to 
an irreversible phase of independence as a result of long repression of the 
210 D.N. Nelson, "Kosovo Futures, Western Dilemmas" The lnternatiooanl Spectator, 
2(2002), pp.11-18 
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Albanian population by the Serbian regime and the humanitarian intervention 
of the international community that cam e afterwards. 
The supporters of independence claim that Kosovo has entered a new phase 
and it is not possible to refer back to the old federal system. It is argued that 
reestablishment of the previous system would lead to the resumption of old 
hatreds between the two nations and confrontations would resume. Some even 
argue that such an independent state would join with Albania and some parts of 
Macedonia where majority of the Albanians reside, in order to establish 
"Greater Albania" by gathering the historically divided Albanian populations in 
the Balkans. The Albanian question in the Balkans, mistreatment of that 
population by the host states in the region and the potential of that national 
problem to blow up is a reality. However, the claim that the Albanians' search 
for the establishment of "Greater Albania" at the expense of surrounding states 
is an exaggeration of facts21 1• But it should be underlined that Kosovar 
Albanians are trying to achieve irrdependence. 
The third scenario is the reestablishment of a special type of political and 
economic relationship between the FRY and Kosovo. In that scenario, Kosovo 
is granted ornnipotent powers in the domestic realms of justice, health and 
education under a rather free system of rule, which would be adınİnistered in 
211 T. Judah, "Greater Albania?" Survival, (43)2 (Summer 200 l) pp. 7-18 
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accordance with the demands of the population. However this entity would be 
bound with principles determined by the FRY in the fıelds of foreign policy 
and defense. This formula is built on the perception of Kosovo as the "third" 
constituent republic of the FRY, together with Serbia and Montenegro. This 
option might be supported by the Serbs since it respects the sovereign rights 
and territorial integrity of the FRY, by keeping Kosovo within its borders and 
administrative control. Such an option could be evaluated as giving back 
Kosovo its autonomous rights, which were withdrawn by the Milosevic regime 
in 1989. The major difference would be enlargement of scope of the 
autonomous rights and acceptance of Kosovo as having equal rights with 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
Given the vagueness of Kosovo's status, three scenarios came to the agenda as 
probable developments for the future. Naturally and rightly those options 
reflect total divergence form the old and the existing situation in the region. 
Most vital of all, those perceptions put forward the fact that Kosovo would be 
taken from the control of Serbia incrementally. 
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